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The inception of psychology as a practicing profession in 1938 brought with it a continuing 
scientific struggle geared towards cementing its place as a value-adding health service in the 
form of psychotherapy. Concepts such as Empirically Supported Treatments (ESTs), Evidence 
Based Treatments (EBTs) and Evidence Based Practice in Psychology (EBPP) arose out of 
research attempts to scientifically prove the efficacy of psychological treatment versus 
psychiatric medications or versus no treatment. This focus on evidence in psychotherapy partly 
stems from, but also influences public policy in the form of practice and training mandates as 
well as government and insurance funding policies for psychotherapy. At present ESTs, EBTs 
and EBPP are the source of polarisation among psychologists who argue for either sides of this 
controversy, raising questions on a practical/policy level as well as an epistemological level. 
This thesis differentiates between ESTs, EBTs and EBPP as well as the Common Factors 
approach and continues to critically investigate the advantages, practical/policy implications 
and epistemological critiques against these approaches. Some of the identified shortfalls 
resulting from unwarranted epistemological (empirical) assumptions are addressed by 
proposing a social constructionist model of therapeutic factors based on social constructionist- 
and eco-systemic theories. The proposed model allows therapists to employ EBT’s in 
conjunction with various other (excluded) approaches that are available in their arsenal of 
treatments. Clinical case studies are used to illustrate the model’s practical operation in 
therapeutic contexts.  
Keywords: Evidence Based Treatments (EBTs); Empirically Supported Treatments (ESTs); 
Common Factors; Evidence Based Practice in Psychology (EBPP); Empiricism; Critical 
Psychology; Social Constructionism; Deconstructionism; Psychotherapy; Therapeutic Models 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
Given [the] history of squabbling among historians, what is to be done? How 
can one fashion a critical perspective out of the competing claims of traditional, 
revisionist, and counter-revisionist historians? If we accept that psychologists 
are not inherently malevolent, how can we explain the frequent use of 
psychology in support of unjust social relations? If we accept that earlier 
psychologists' methods were no more ridiculous than those of physicians or 
other social scientists, do we lose our ability to criticize the often mindless 
empiricism of our field today? If revisionist historians misunderstood the 
politics of the early IQ debate, how can we hope for a political understanding 
of psychology in the rest of this century? (Prilleltensky & Fox, 2009, p. 30). 
 
Traditionally psychology, and specifically the fields of psychotherapy and family 
therapy, has been characterised by feverish academic debate surrounding the basis and 
mechanisms of behavioural/psychological change (Norcross & Newman, 1992; Prochaska & 
Norcross, 2010; Sexton, Weeks & Robbins, 2003).  
From their roots in ancient philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Descarte, Kant, etc.) to their 
inceptions in the field of science (Wundt, Freud, Pavlov, etc), and even in modern times, 
different paradigms (worldviews) and models of psychotherapy compete for recognition as 
‘authority’ on human behaviour and/or 'treatment of choice' in the pursuit of behavioural 
change.  
This competition is best illustrated in the current drive for evidence informed treatments 
wherein the treatment, which is 'shown empirically' to yield the most change for [enter 
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behavioural problem], is ultimately recommended as treatment of choice (Fourie, 2012; 
Lindegger, 2007). Such recommendations then serve the current philosophy of ‘best practice’ 
that underlie medicine and medicalised psychology (Sexton et al., 2003).  
The concept of best practice is poised to become difficult to resist, especially since it 
is likely to have a significant impact on medical aid funding (Lindegger, 2007) as well as on 
professional councils that prescribe accountable practice guidelines to clinicians (Sexton et al., 
2003). Sexton et al (2003) go so far as to say that in numerous areas, including justice and 
managed healthcare settings, the concept of best practice has become the criterion that informs 
decisions to fund treatment programmes.  
This reality not only poses important challenges for psychotherapy practitioners, but 
also for theorists and thinkers who develop models of psychotherapy practice. Of the numerous 
challenges, the two that stand out are first, at a practical level: How will psychotherapists 
successfully treat clients from a Best Practice approach when they (psychotherapists) have been 
trained in different models of psychotherapy?  
Related to this question, yet at a more theoretical- philosophical level, the second 
challenge asks the question: How (if possible) can differing worldviews on psychotherapy be 
accommodated in a best practice approach, when such an approach itself is anchored in a 
positivistic worldview? 
In attempts to reconcile differing models of psychotherapy, many theorists have turned 
their attention to the identification of common factors that are presumed to be responsible for 
behavioural change during psychotherapy (Fourie, 2012). Sexton et al. (2003) claim that the 
common factors movement has led to the development of "...more specific, systematic, and 
well-articulated clinical models...[and] the emergence of "family intervention science"..." (own 
emphasis added, p. xxiv).  
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The latter quote, taken from the preface of a prominent family therapy textbook, 
illustrates clearly how positivist notions such as best practice, evidence based practice and 
common factors can infiltrate and draw professional discourse into the realm of positivism, by 
proposing empiricism and essentialism as the chosen avenues to solve the practical and 
philosophical challenges that face psychotherapists.  
 
1.1      AIMS AND RATIONALE 
 
While acknowledging the contributions of evidence based and common factors 
approaches, it is the opinion of the author that a social constructionist model of therapeutic 
factors is needed in order to address some of the serious epistemological flaws (which underlie 
existing models of therapeutic factors) that limit its accessibility and relevance to some of the 
post-modern approaches to psychotherapy.  
The aim of this dissertation was three-fold: First, to outline the epistemological 
foundations and assumptions of current evidence based and common factors approaches 
together with arguments from an eco-systemic and social constructionist viewpoint to illustrate 
the philosophical biases that underlie these models. 
The second aim was to argue for the consideration of eco-systemic and social 
constructionist inputs to address the shortcomings in current models of evidence based practice 
and common factors. A social constructionist model of therapeutic factors is proposed and 
discussed in terms of its benefits to the current field of therapeutic outcome research.  
Finally, the author aimed to operationalise and illustrate the proposed model’s practical 
utility and relevance by making use of various case illustrations to highlight different aspects 
of the model. An in-depth case formulation is also provided to assist with the latter aim.  
It is acknowledged from the outset that the proposed model is birthed from an 
exploratory attempt to make well-established, yet theoretically abstract social constructionist 
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concepts more accessible for practical application in therapeutic settings. As a result, the author 
trusts that the proposed model will stimulate further research into its utility and relevance as 
well as its application in various professional contexts.  
 
1.2      TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE STUDY 
 
As a means of promoting the trustworthiness and credibility of the present research, 
emphasis is placed on open and transparent self-reflection and fair representation of different 
views. In addition, Ballinger’s (2006) guidelines for the evaluation of the quality of research 
findings are offered to encourage the reader to continuously engage in the evaluative practice 
of assertions made in this study.  
The first of Ballinger’s (2006) considerations involves the coherence of a study. This 
includes an evaluation of the extent to which there is a fit between the various aspects of a 
study, including the aim of a study, the methods used to pursue this aim, the worldview that 
influences a researcher’s decisions regarding his or her study and the extent to which a 
researcher acknowledges his or her role in producing the findings. 
The second consideration concerns the extent to which the reader can see evidence of 
systematic and responsible research conduct. Such evidence might be reflected in the degree 
to which a researcher has given thought to his or her impact on participants, given the way he 
or she presented himself or herself to them, as well as through the provision of fitting extracts 
that have been accurately transcribed, described and contextualised to clearly illustrate the 
researcher’s interpretations (Ballinger, 2006). 
The third consideration deals with the degree to which a researcher’s interpretations are 
convincing and relevant. Apart from being compelling or interesting, Ballinger (2006) also 
recognises that research should contribute to the knowledge or understanding of the domain 
under enquiry. 
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Finally, the reader is also encouraged to consider whether a researcher has shown 
sufficient reflexivity, meaning that he or she has shown sensitivity to the role he or she plays 
in the research process and outcomes, and that this role is appropriately accounted for given 
his or her epistemological orientation (Ballinger, 2006). 
 
1.3      ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As the content of this dissertation is primarily of a theoretical nature, many of the ethical 
dilemmas that are relevant to qualitative research studies are absent. Furthermore, the clinical 
case studies that serve to illustrate various aspects of the social constructionist model of 
therapeutic factors are based on existing clinical records that were produced by the author in 
the course of therapeutic work. All case clients’ therapeutic processes were concluded by the 
time of their inclusion in the study.  
Given that case illustrations are based on existing clinical records, ethical standards do 
not require that informed consent be obtained on the condition that clients’ anonymity be 
protected. With respect to the issue of informed consent, Eysenbach and Till (2001) report that: 
 
…non-intrusive research such as retrospective use of existing medical records 
may be conducted ethically without the express consent of the individual 
subjects if the material is anonymised at the earliest possible stage, if there is 
no inconvenience or hazard to the subjects, and if the institutional review board 
has reviewed and agreed the research protocol (p. 1104). 
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Nevertheless, all efforts were made to obtain informed consent from case study clients 
for inclusion in this study. Also, all names and personal particulars that might lead to the 
identification of case study clients were changed as a means to protect their anonymity.  
Departing from the research aims and methodological issues raised in this introductory 
chapter, the rest of this text focuses on providing a comprehensive and critical overview of the 
evidence based approaches, common factors theories as well as social constructionism as they 
pertain to the field of therapeutic factors and outcome research (Chapters 2 and 3). A social 
constructionist model of therapeutic factors is outlined in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 are 
dedicated to practical illustrations of the proposed model with the help of clinical case studies. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 7, a critical discussion of strengths and limitations of the 
model as well as suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2    
IN STI TU TIO N ALISE D  PS Y CHOL OGY: EST’s, EBPP AND COMMON 
FACTORS 
 
The field of psychology has a long history, as described in the previous chapter. As will 
be demonstrated, the field of psychology, and perhaps more so psychotherapy, has through 
time embodied several different ‘roles’ in historical discourse. These roles include 
psychotherapy: ‘As philosophical enquiry’; ‘as mystical practice’; ‘as devil’s advocate’; ‘as 
saviour of the damned’; ‘as right arm of the oppressor’; ‘as voice of the oppressed’; ‘as 
peacemaker/fence-sitter’; ‘as an institution’; ‘as personified being’. To say that these roles are 
part of the history of psychotherapy may be only half true, since they all, in current times, form 
part of the identity of psychotherapy, and in a broader sense psychology.  
The contemporary field of psychology addresses diverse views on what psychotherapy 
should entail, what it should do and how it should be done. These views, which have developed 
over the course of psychology’s history, currently finds expression in different philosophical 
schools of psychotherapy (Meyer & Moore, 2003). Some of these schools (e.g. cognitive 
behavioural psychology) are based on positivistic epistemologies and advocate objectivity, 
standardised practice (i.e. manualised treatments) and reductionist practices that attempt to 
isolate the working factors of psychotherapy (Bryceland & Stam, 2005; Meyer & Moore, 
2003). Other schools (e.g. feminist and critical psychology) are based on postmodern 
epistemologies that emphasise power relations, oppression of minority views and emancipative 
practices (Bryceland & Stam, 2005; Fox, Prilleltensky & Austin, 2009).  
Still other schools (e.g. narrative and second order systems psychology) are based on 
postmodern epistemologies that focus on the social construction of realities through language, 
discourse and negotiation, including what is deemed normal, deviant, unlawful, ethical, 
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healthy, etcetera (Bryceland & Stam, 2005). Finally, some schools of psychology (e.g. African 
psychology) are based on cultural epistemologies and practices that developed independently 
from the western conceptualisation of psychology. These approaches stress the importance of 
cultural and religious contexts that may explain deviant behaviours, and how cultural rituals 
are prescribed in order to restore a harmonious balance of the individual with his or her social 
surroundings (Meyer & Moore, 2003; Viljoen, 2003a).  
What is important to note is that these different schools of psychology have evolved 
out of the varied needs of diverse groups of people to find appropriate explanations for the 
problems they encounter. Therefore different schools of psychology were formed in a variety 
of contexts where each was deemed to be appropriate in explaining the psychological problems 
encountered in that specific context (Viljoen, 2003b).  
For example, the behavioural school developed in a social context where mental health 
care was based almost exclusively on inferences relating to sub-conscious psychological 
processes that were at best hard to prove, and at worst attributed its failures to such sub-
conscious psychological processes in the individual (Sternberg, 2001). A patient who failed to 
recover during the course of psycho-analysis was said to be resisting change, and hence this 
failure was attributed to the patient’s unconscious personality, rather than being a failure of the 
approach itself. Hence, more psycho-analysis would be prescribed to deal with the patient’s 
unconscious resistance.  
Critics of psycho-analysis were of the opinion that as a scientific approach to mental 
health, it was “infallible” since its assumptions and attributions made it difficult and even 
impossible to falsify (Meyer & Viljoen, 2003).  Because, the psycho-analyst is always right 
and the patient always ‘wrong’, the need for more objective ‘scientific’ approaches became 
strong, so that responsibility for failure was not placed exclusively on the patients’ unconscious 
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processes. In this way behavioural psychology served the social need in western contexts to 
avoid a single treatment method (i.e. psycho-analysis) being enforced on all patients when there 
was no way to test its appropriateness and/or effectiveness (Sternberg, 2001).  
Similarly, the school of feminist and other critical approaches in psychology developed 
in social contexts where the modernist views of progress sought to bring all people into 
compliance with the socially accepted definitions of normality. The scientific fervour at that 
time to correct the deviant was based on the successes of positivistic science to bring order to 
many questions and problems in the world. With this order came the experience of power to 
control nature and the belief that eventually, given enough objective enquiry, scientists would 
control and bring to order any unwanted (un)natural occurrences, including many ‘mental 
disorders’ of the time such as homo-sexuality and other forms of social deviance (Becker, 2008; 
Rubington & Weinberg, 2008).  
The critical psychology movement became important in a time when the status quo was 
intolerant of alternative lifestyles and it used science and psychology to label such lifestyles as 
unnatural and deviant. Critical approaches questioned the very notion of normality by 
suggesting that it never had pre-determined parameters, but that these parameters of normality 
were socially defined and laden with subjective and political agendas. By definition then, 
critical approaches questioned the ‘objectivity’ of positivistic scientists and criticised them for 
masking their subjectivity with scientific jargon (Fox et al., 2009; Teo, 2009). 
The differing roles that psychology (and specifically psychotherapy) played over time 
stressed the dangers of utilising psychological knowledge out of context. Also the differing 
roles allow us to appreciate the important impact that psychology can have in shaping society 
when its practitioners assume specific roles in appropriate contexts. Some would argue that it 
is due to this constant reflexivity on context, through which psychology and its practitioners 
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gain the knowledge and power, that affects change (Cecchin, 1992; Hoffman, 1992). Thus, 
reflection, introspection and awareness of context are major aspects addressed in the training 
of psychologists (Hess, 2011). 
It is evident that most psychology training programmes are designed to educate 
prospective psychologists about differing worldviews so that they can understand and work 
with people who function on the fringes of societal norms (Hess, 2011). However, as with 
many institutions, institutionalised psychology seems to be heading in the direction of 
becoming ever more prescriptive to its members, controlling how they should think and what 
practices they should avoid. Instead of encouraging divergent understandings and methods of 
enquiry, institutionalised psychology runs the risk of marginalising those who do not conform 
to its norm of empirically based practice.  
The latter claim finds support in the various voices that express their opinions and 
grievances in the debate on, and some would say enforcement of, Evidence Based Practice 
(EBPP) and Empirically Supported Treatments (EST’s) (e.g. Beutler, 1998; Bryceland & Stam, 
2005; Chambless, 2002; Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 2012; Lampropoulos, 2000; La Roche 
& Christopher, 2009; Levant, 2004; McFall, 1996; McFall, 2000; Mcloughlin, 2001; Serpell, 
Stobie, Fairburn & Van Schaik, 2013; Wolf, Dulmus & Maguin, 2012; Young, 2014). 
 
2.1     EST’S & EBPP: DANGLING CARROTS, LEADING THE BLIND? 
 
Contemporary psychology discourse (as seen in scientific journals) is laden with 
questions of superiority, validation, defence and exclusion of psychotherapy practices. This 
discourse finds concrete expression in various institutional bodies that have come to be 
accepted as the authorities on psychology and psychotherapy. Examples of these include the 
likes of the American Psychological Association (APA) and its various right hands: the British 
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Psychological Association (BPA), the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) 
board for psychology and all the other mandated governors of psychology and psychotherapy 
practice.  
These bodies establish guidelines and sanction the practices that psychologists may or 
may not perform. These policies may affect the funding that other organisations (including 
medical aids) allow for psychological services (Bryceland & Stam, 2005; Cautin, 2011; 
Duncan & Reese, 2013). For instance, the APA Presidential Taskforce on Evidence Based 
Practice (2006) states the following regarding their view of effective psychological practice 
that informs their policy for funding of psychological services:  
 
EBPP promotes effective psychological practice and enhances public health by 
applying empirically supported principles of psychological assessment, case 
formulation, therapeutic relationship, and intervention…Therefore, psychologists 
whose training is grounded in empirical methods, have an important role to play 
in the continuing development of evidence-based practice and its focus on 
improving patient care (Own emphasis added, p.271). 
 
Given the history of psychology and psychotherapy and the power these entities afford 
their users, misusers and abusers (see Cautin, 2011) it is no surprise that bodies such as the 
APA and HPCSA attempt to control exploitation and abuse of power by psychologists. These 
governing bodies go a long way in providing guidelines to its members (i.e. psychologists and 
those in training) for appropriately and responsibly practicing their profession in order to 
protect the public. What these bodies also took upon themselves, which is clear from the above 
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quote, is to promote and eventually mandate ‘appropriate’ epistemological and ontological 
worldviews for its members (i.e. psychotherapists and those in training).  
Clearly the message promoted by the APA’s stance on EBPP is that research and 
practice, based on empirical evidence, and that psychologists grounded in a positivistic 
worldview have important roles to play. Therefore, what is not explicitly stated in the APA’s 
stance on EBPP is that research not based on empirical methods and psychologists who are not 
grounded in positivistic worldviews do not have important roles to play in the continuing 
development of EBPP and improving public health.  
In 1995, before the advent of EBPP, an even more stringent movement advocated for 
the exclusive use and funding of empirically supported treatments (EST’s) in psychotherapy 
practice (Duncan & Reese, 2013). The treatments included on these lists need to show that they 
are sufficiently empirical by adhering to specific criteria that are assumed to indicate their 
superiority over treatments that are excluded from these lists. Again, as one can deduce from 
its name, the EST movement is solidly based in a positivistic worldview in that it assumes 
empirical evidence is superior to other forms of enquiry. Also, it needs to be stated that the 
EST movement was again a product that was spearheaded by the APA, Division 12 (Society 
for Clinical Psychology) under the guise of a Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of 
Psychological Procedures, 1995 (Duncan & Reese, 2013).  
It is interesting to note that the EST and later the EBPP movements in psychology 
occurred in reaction to a similar movement in psychiatry that produced guidelines for 
psychiatric treatment of specific disorders (Duncan & Reese, 2013). Given their history of 
competitive rivalry for recognition and turf in the mental health field (Cautin, 2011), it is no 
secret that psychology is at risk of being left out in the cold somewhat with more and more 
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evidence flooding in to suggest biological bases for traditionally psychologically defined 
disorders (see Noggle & Dean, 2013).   
Examples of the latter are numerous, including schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders, bipolar and major depressive disorders and even stress related disorders and anxiety 
disorders that can be effectively managed with psychiatric treatment (Sadock, Kaplan & 
Sadock, 2007). The co-occurrence of the EST movement shortly after a similar movement in 
psychiatry then is yet another clue pointing to the desire of governing bodies of psychology to 
establish ‘their’ profession as an empirical one, perhaps even embodying aspirations for 
psychology to be just like its bigger, more famous and respected cousin, psychiatry. 
Apart from their practical and policy implications, it is clear from the preceding 
discussion that the EST and EBPP debates mask more fundamental philosophical issues related 
to the current state of psychology practice. It is argued here that psychology has evolved over 
time to play different roles that allowed it to liberate our minds from religious oppression and 
to broaden our understanding of human behaviour. Psychotherapy became a treatment choice 
when mentally ill patients were banished from communities or damned by the church as being 
possessed by the devil (Cautin, 2011).  
Over time, psychology also became an institution, just like the church, with members 
similar to the church’s congregation who are ordered by its governing bodies to treat the public 
according to its mandated guidelines and procedures as compiled in its holy bible, also known 
as the APA guidelines. Finally, as with the church, the APA and similar governing bodies 
stepped into the trap of assuming an exclusionary worldview, that is empiricism and promoting 
empirical evidence as the only gospel that can save the masses. Where it previously acted as a 
liberating science, psychology now in its institutionalised form may run the risk of becoming 
a dictating institution itself. 
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In order to understand the critiques of the EST and EBPP movement, it is necessary to 
first understand what these movements advocate, why they advocate them and why they have 
become such a force with which to be reckoned. The next section will provide definitions of 
EST and EBPP and outline their principles. 
 
2.2      EST’s AND EBPP: A LOOK BACK AT THE FUTURE 
 
As it was alluded to before, the EST and EBPP movements in psychology are based 
firmly in a positivistic epistemology and as their names suggest, the proponents of these 
movements regard empiricism as the golden standard of scientific enquiry. Given their recent 
prominence (since 1995) in psychological discourse (e.g. Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 2012; 
Levant, 2004; McFall, 1996; McFall, 2000; Norcross, Beutler & Levant, 2006; Sparks, Duncan 
& Miller, 2008) it is tempting to think of the EST and EBPP movements as modern ones 
advocating for cutting edge treatment methods to increase the standard of care in mental health 
care. By examining them closer, one can see that these movements are tired old trends of yester 
years that have simply been dusted off, repackaged and sold as something new and promising. 
 
2.2.1     EST’s: The Beginning of a Controversy 
 
With its brief in hand, the Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological 
Procedures (1995), set out in 1995 to do what has never been done before. Its goals were clear 
and noble, and when achieved would cement psychology firmly in the scientific realm, 
eradicating any questions of its scientific inferiority and ensure that its scientist-practitioners’ 
desires for professional validation and recognition are met. The Task Force was finally going 
to show that psychology is equal to medicine and has its answer to pharmacology in the form 
of lists of empirically supported treatments.  
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With these carefully crafted lists, it was believed that any form of clinician subjectivity 
would be eliminated. Just like psychiatrists, psychologists would merely have to diagnose the 
patient’s condition, consult the lists to see what psychotherapy is indicated for that condition 
and then follow the step-by-step manualised approach to fix the patient’s problem. The 1995 
Task Force heralded the age of empirically validated treatments (EVT’s) and what would later 
become empirically based treatments (EBT’s) or empirically supported treatments (EST’s) 
(Duncan & Reese, 2013). 
The initial report of the Task Force included promising results that led to ambitious and 
controversial recommendations. The result of its toil was a short report that included an initial 
list of 25 empirically validated treatments (including well-established and probably efficacious 
treatments). The majority of the well-established treatments were cognitive behavioural 
treatments with a few interpersonal therapy treatments as well as brief psychodynamic 
therapies as a grouping (Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological 
Procedures, 1995).  
The recommendations that followed from this and subsequent reports on EST’s 
included, among others, that training in EST’s become a priority, that EST’s become a high 
priority issue in the accreditation of doctoral programmes, that funding for treatments be 
determined by their empirical status, and even that it should be deemed unethical and 
punishable for clinicians to use approaches that were not on the EST lists for specific disorders 
(Duncan & Reese, 2013; Levant, 2004; McLoughlin, 2001; Task Force on Promotion and 
Dissemination of Psychological Procedures, 1995).  
Following the initial report of the 1995 Task Force, controversy erupted among 
psychologists who were on opposing sides of the EST camps. The Task Force and the EST 
movement were criticised for being biased in their criteria of what constituted evidence of 
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efficacy and it was suggested that the criteria favoured approaches such as Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Interpersonal Therapies that were more focussed on outcomes 
and lends itself to manualisation (Bryceland & Stam, 2005; Duncan & Reese, 2013; Stuart & 
Lilienfeld, 2007). Other critics held that manualised treatments do not allow for a full 
appreciation of clients’ realities (Report of the CPA Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice of 
Psychological Treatments, 2012).  
Furthermore, it was suggested that the EST movement was overly strict in its definition 
of what constitutes science (Levant, 2004) and that findings based on RCT’s as used in outcome 
research have limited use in clinical practice due to a lack of external validity (Report of the 
CPA Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice of Psychological Treatments, 2012). In fact, 
Woody, Weisz and McLean (2005) report on some university directors’ opinions of EST’s, 
saying that the “…lists of ESTs reflect a political or theoretical bias more than they reflect 
treatments that work” (p. 11). 
Proponents of EVT’s, EBT’s and EST’s made strong statements that served to fuel 
resistance in this movement. For instance, Richard McFall, a former president of the Society 
for a Science of Clinical Psychology (Section III of Division 12 of the APA), declares the 
following in his manifesto for a science of clinical psychology: “…I believe that we must make 
a greater effort to differentiate between scientific and pseudoscientific clinical psychology and 
to hasten the day when the former replaces the latter” (McFall, 1996, p. 75).  
Duncan and Reese (2013) point to attitudes of superiority held by EST proponents 
based on presumed evidentiary support as reflected in statements such as the following: “not 
administering EBTs [or ESTs] is unethical…and perhaps even “prosecutable”” (Chambless & 
Crits-Cristoph and Carey quoted in Duncan & Reese, 2013, p. 495). Furthermore, in the United 
States of America, government funding policy for mental health services have gradually 
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adhered to EST claims of superiority by restricting funds to community programmes based on 
EST’s (Duncan & Reese, 2013). 
Despite the strong governmental and institutional support the EST movement managed 
to garner, a 10 year follow up survey conducted in 2005 indicated that training in EST’s at 
university level and in internships in America declined from 1995 (Woody et al., 2005). These 
authors cite philosophical opposition (especially the view that EST’s represent a scientific bias) 
as one of the stumbling blocks responsible for the decline in training in EST’s at university 
level. However, they conclude their article with the following words affirming their assumption 
of the supremacy of empirical science: “If the results of this survey are any indication, graduate 
training in clinical psychology has a long way to go before it reflects the scientific basis of the 
discipline” (p. 11). Among other concerns, it is the EST movement’s assumption of superiority, 
despite clear practical and philosophical weaknesses, that lead their critics to protest loudly in 
objection to its worldview of exclusivity. 
Duncan and Reese (2013) observe that the EST movement’s call for accountability via 
empirical research support may in itself have questionable empirical justification. They point 
to weaknesses in the research that support the notion of model-specific factors, including the 
implausibility of conducting true randomised clinical trials (RCT’s) in psychotherapy outcome 
research; as well as the mounting empirical evidence (including dismantling techniques) that 
negate technique-specific effects and refute claims of superiority by any one approach. Duncan 
and Reese (2013) conclude their critique on EST’s by remarking that “…the evidence points 
in the same direction. There are no significant unique ingredients to therapy approaches, 
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2.2.2     EBPP: Different Name, Same Controversy? 
 
The controversy surrounding EST’s resulted in the birth of what is today known as 
Evidence Based Practice in Psychology (EBPP). Some argue that EBPP is just a euphemised 
term for what essentially is still EST’s, whereas others outline important differences between 
the two movements (Duncan & Reese, 2013).  
The shift from EST’s to EBPP occurred in 2005 when the APA established a 
Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology. According to the APA, 
evidence based practice was different from EST in that the former integrated “…the best 
available research with clinical expertise in the context of patient characteristics, culture, and 
preferences” (APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006, p. 273).  
From the definition provided above, it is clear that the APA Presidential Task Force 
attempted to repair the divide caused by the EST movement and its insistence on empirical 
evidence. Instead, the Presidential Task Force emphasises the need for best available research, 
which it states may include effectiveness studies, process research, common factors research, 
single-subject research, as well as case studies and qualitative research (Duncan & Reese, 
2013). The EBPP approach then has a broader definition of what qualifies as evidence, while 
the EST approach stresses the importance of empirical evidence in the form of randomised 
clinical trials (RCT’s) (Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 2012). 
Apart from their definition of evidence, the EBPP movement also emphasises the 
importance of clinical expertise as exercised when a clinician bases a treatment decision on 
previous experience and/or subjective judgment. This is in contrast to the EST approach that 
seeks to eliminate all forms of subjectivity (including clinical judgment) by means of 
standardisation. Finally, the EBPP movement also factors in aspects of the client’s 
 19 
© University of South Africa 2015 
 
characteristics and preferences that should be considered when making treatment decisions 
(Duncan & Reese, 2013).  
The Presidential Task Force describes the differences between EST’s and EBPP in the 
following manner: 
 
EBPP is the more comprehensive concept. ESTs start with a treatment and ask 
whether it works for a certain disorder or problem under specified circumstances. 
EBPP starts with the patient and asks what research evidence (including relevant 
results from RCTs) will assist the psychologist in achieving the best outcome. In 
addition, ESTs are specific psychological treatments that have been shown to be 
efficacious in controlled clinical trials, whereas EBPP encompasses a broader 
range of clinical activities (e.g., psychological assessment, case formulation, 
therapy relationships). As such, EBPP articulates a decision-making process for 
integrating multiple streams of research evidence—including but not limited to 
RCTs—into the intervention process (APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-
Based Practice, 2006, p 273). 
 
Although the Presidential Task Force went a long way to address some of the 
controversial issues that stem from the EST movement and made the evidence-based 
approaches to treatment more inclusive of approaches that do not lend themselves to 
manualisation and RCT’s, there are still critics of both these movements (Bryceland & Stam, 
2005; Duncan & Reese, 2013; Norcross et al., 2006; Stuart & Lilienfeld, 2007).  
Despite its commendable effort to expand the narrow view of evidence proposed by the 
EST movement, the EBPP movement continues to exacerbate the notion that some therapies 
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are ‘more equal’ than others (Duncan & Reese, 2013). For instance, research regarding the 
implications of evidence based practice in social work (Drisko & Grady, 2012) has found wide 
discrepancies in the application of evidence based practice guidelines on micro- versus macro-
levels. While in practice EBPP, as it is defined, encourages the incorporation of clinical 
expertise and patient values into the treatment decision process, on health-care policy levels, 
health funders tend to forego these aspects of the EBPP process by merely providing lists of 
approved treatments for which they are willing to pay. As such, clinical expertise and client 
values become lost in translation from the EBPP definition to its application at a policy level. 
It is also pointed out that the compilation of these lists lacks transparency and that criteria for 
inclusion to these lists are not explicitly stated (Drisko & Grady, 2012).  
While the concept of EBPP may be admirable on paper, it seems its pragmatic effect 
on health care policy is marginally different from that of the EST movement. Through EBPP’s 
insistence that practitioners consult lists of evidence-based treatments in order to make 
decisions on which treatment would get the best results, it reinforces the assumption that the 
magic ingredient lay in the specific approach rather than in the therapeutic alliance that is built.  
Such lists provide opportunities for health-care funders to restrict treatment options 
based on questionable claims that some treatments are better than others. This problem 
emanates from the fact that EST and EBPP movements both advocate the same assumptions 
that therapeutic models themselves contain ‘active ingredients’ much like a psychiatric drug 
contains an active substance that is essential to its potency (Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 
2012; Sparks et al., 2008).  
What was initially a metaphor for psychotherapeutic conversation, the medical model 
has seemingly seduced some researchers to believe that the therapeutic potency of their 
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conversations with clients can be isolated, condensed into context-free manuals and/or 
therapies and marketed and sold as cures for specific life problems.  
Perhaps the future of psychology (as envisioned by evidence-based proponents) holds 
the potential for a dispensary of psychotherapy treatments outside our offices. Here clients can 
stand in line to collect their potentially harmful psychologist-prescribed psychotherapy or if 
they just feel a bit under the weather they can opt for the self-therapy dispensary where they 
find a Schedule one or two therapy, no questions asked.  
After all the empirical approach is clear in its promise: ‘True facts on the underlying 
order of the world will be unveiled as our empirical observations eventually converge over 
time’ (Sternberg, 2001). One may therefore ask whether the medical model really fits 
psychotherapy so seamlessly or are we making the same mistake as the nude emperor flaunting 
his new robe to the public?  
 
2.3    EMPIRICALLY BASED ASSUMPTIONS: A MEDICAL MODEL FOR  
    PSYCHOTHERAPY? 
 
Informed by a positivist epistemology and relying on empiricism as a guiding approach 
to scientific enquiry, evidence based approaches operate from the fundamental positivist 
assumption that reality exists with a pre-existing order that is independent of human 
observation and interpretation. Moreover, the assumption is made that humans can access this 
underlying order of things via observation through their senses, given that they adhere to certain 
scientific conditions (Wendt & Slife, 2007). These include that their observations be 
systematic, controlled, neutral and unbiased in order to qualify as being empirical (Sternberg, 
2001).  
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Wendt and Slife (2007) make the following remark with regards to psychology’s 
relationship with empiricism: “…empiricism is not viewed as a particular epistemology or 
philosophy at all but as a transparent window to the way things are” (p. 613). Despite Von 
Foerster (1984) raising serious epistemological objections to the very concept of objective 
observers, it has become generally accepted that psychology as a science should rely primarily 
on empirical evidence, meaning that many other forms of evidence are relegated to the realm 
of non-science or pseudo-science (Wendt & Slife, 2007). For example, Sternberg (2001) states:  
 
The difference between the psychological approach to the study of the human mind 
and the approach of the humanities is psychology’s emphasis on scientific theory 
and methodology as its means for conceptualizing and empirically testing ideas 
(Own emphasis added, p.4). 
 
Moreover, those who make use of other forms of evidence (i.e. non-empirical evidence) 
are frequently shunned and criticised for being “non-scientific” and even unethical (see  
Duncan & Reese, 2013; McFall, 1996). This occurs despite numerous illustrations of the 
credibility and trustworthiness of non-empirical methods for scientific enquiry (Ballinger, 
2006). Furthermore, it is questionable whether empirical methods of enquiry (for example the 
use of RCT’s) are always appropriate when studying human behaviour (Duncan & Reese, 
2013; Fourie, 2012).  
Nonetheless, it seems as though the history of psychology has established a scientific 
hierarchy with empirical methods at the pinnacle of the mountain of evidence. If its inherent 
superiority is in fact based on assumptions, then why is it that some researchers would bend 
over backwards to prove that their findings are empirically derived rather than through some 
other scientific method that is perhaps more appropriate? 
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Through adopting a scientific stance (or more correctly an empirical stance), fields of 
study such as medicine have been able to systematically map the human body into its basic 
components (i.e. cells), and its supra-systems (i.e. bodily structures, organs and organ-
systems). Understanding how these components interact with each other to affect normal bodily 
functioning also allowed medical scientists to understand abnormal bodily functioning and how 
to correct it. This in turn led to the development of medical technologies, such as surgery and 
medications that are applied following a thorough assessment of the underlying bodily 
problem.  
This model of treatment (i.e. the medical model), based on an empirical method and 
positivist assumptions, has served the field of medicine well. Due to its success, the medical 
model has been adopted (with sometimes questionable appropriateness) in most, if not all, 
spheres of human functioning, including emotional, cognitive and social spheres (Bryceland & 
Stam, 2005; Fourie, 2012; Sternberg, 2001). After all, it is argued that our emotional, cognitive 
and social behaviours are products of a biological organ, the brain, and thus can be affected by 
abnormalities in the structure or functioning of the brain. Although the latter argument is quite 
sound, adoption of the medical model in psychology has far reaching implications as will be 
discussed briefly below.  
 
2.3.1   Underlying Personality 
 
Beginning as early as 384 BC, philosopher of science, Aristotle, proposed that reality 
exists in the objects we observe, and hence all objects of our study have an underlying and pre-
existing order (Sternberg, 2001). For example, Aristotle proposed that an object of study (e.g. 
a chair) exists as a meaningful object in external reality and that its existence is independent of 
the interpretations and observations of its observer. In other words, Aristotle argued that the 
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meaning of the concept of a chair is inherently contained in the object of the chair and that we 
can discover this meaning by directly and objectively observing the chair.  
Following Aristotle’s empirical view of objects of study, meant for psychology that 
personality too should have a pre-determined, underlying structure that exists ‘out there’, 
perhaps in the brain’s structure, and that its secrets are waiting to be uncovered by wily 
scientists with crafty methods (read empirical methods) meant to cast light on the true nature 
of every personality.  
Of course, Aristotle’s thesis had an antithesis that came from his teacher, Plato, in 428 
BC. For Plato, the meaning and nature of objects did not reside in external reality, “but in the 
abstract forms that these objects represent” (Sternberg, 2001, p. 7). Plato’s ideas, that reality is 
informed by the observer’s perceptions, are embodied in contemporary theories of 
constructivism and social constructionism, which bring into question the idea of an underlying 
personality (Andersen 1992; Fourie, 1994; Frugerri, 1992; Van Zyl, 2009). This alternative 
view holds that we cannot study any external object without investigating our subjective 
interpretations that inform the meanings we attach to that object. Also see Hoffman (1992) for 
an insightful account of a social constructionist critique on the concept of personality structure. 
 
2.3.2   Underlying Disorders 
 
From the assumption that things exist ‘out there’ and have a pre-established natural 
order, positivists argue that anomalies in this pre-existing natural order are what lie at the root 
of many of society’s problems (Teo, 2009). Thus, if an underlying order of things exist, 
disruptions in this natural order would result in problems or underlying disorder of things.  
Translated into the realm of psychology, this idea of underlying disorders, has found 
expression in areas such as abnormal psychology and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
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Mental Disorders (DSM). In short, the positivist assumption is that human problems (including 
behavioural, emotional and interpersonal problems) are the result of a deviation from the 
natural order of things (Hoffman, 1992). Hoffman (1992) illustrates how positivistic notions 
of normality (i.e. an underlying natural order) have led to the distinction between normal and 
abnormal developmental pathways based on a subjective norm that leaves little room for 
alternative developmental pathways that fall outside the norm.  
In this way then, positivist assumptions of normality flowed into the idea that deviations 
from the natural order of things are indications of disorder since they are a ‘nuisance’ to the 
norm or are at odds with the goals and expectations of the norm. Thus it is argued that 
deviations from the norm should be rectified in order to prevent psychological disorders and 
maladjustment as defined from the perspective of the norm (Hoffman, 1992, Van Zyl, 2009). 
This line of argument is reminiscent of the medical model tasked with the responsibility to 
remove obstructions from normal bodily functions.  
Examples of the positivist normality bias are abundant, but probably best illustrated in 
the initial classification of homosexuality as an abnormal developmental pathway and thus a 
psychological disorder (included in the DSM III) that needed to be treated and rectified. Only 
in later editions of the DSM, and through societal pressure led by LGBT activists, was it 
recognised that homosexuality represents an alternative developmental pathway and not 
necessarily an abnormal developmental pathway (Van Zyl, 2009). 
 
2.3.3   Diagnostic Labelling 
 
Given the assumption that human problems result from a deviation of the natural order 
of things (i.e. a disorder of things), an extension of the positivist worldview on ‘psychological 
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disorders’ led to the necessity for diagnostic categories of specific disorders that have been 
proven to exist ‘out there’ (Van Zyl, 2009).  
The act of diagnosis entails the identification of signs and symptoms that together 
suggest the presence of an underlying psychological or physical disorder (Barlow & Durand, 
2005). A diagnostic label is then applied to the person who is said to suffer from [enter 
diagnostic label]. Any behaviour of the labelled person is subsequently interpreted in light of 
their diagnostic label and in many cases the diagnostic label is offered as an explanation for 
any subsequent behaviour. (See Van Zyl, 2009, for a detailed account of the process of 
reification of diagnostic labels).  
The pitfall is that the diagnostic label is presumed to indicate an underlying and 
objectively existing disorder, and therefore if we know your diagnosis then we know how you 
are deviant from the natural order of things. The diagnostic label of a person then suggests what 
is wrong with this person and informs how they should be treated according to positivist 
standards.  
Labelling theory suggests, however, that diagnostic labelling is an interactive process 
that is necessarily informed by the subjective interpretations made by the diagnostician of the 
‘disordered’ and ‘deviant’ behaviours of the labelled individual. Furthermore, when diagnostic 
labels are applied to human behaviour they can serve to induce the behaviour they describe by 
altering others’ expectations of and behaviours towards the labelled individual (Van Zyl, 2009). 
Thus, whereas diagnostic categorisation may work well for physical disorders, it may have 
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2.3.4   Psychotherapy as Treatment with Underlying Curative Ingredients 
 
Since it is assumed in the positivist worldview that psychiatric diagnoses point to an 
underlying disorder of the normal order of things (i.e. normal personality or behaviour), the 
onus rests on scientists and psychology practitioners to devise methods to remedy this deviant 
state of affairs, as represented by specific disorders (Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 2012; 
Hunsberger, 2007).  
In medical terms one might say that the body’s natural hormone levels have become 
disrupted and thus medication is introduced into the body to restore the natural hormone levels. 
Comparatively, since the positivist worldview assumes that each psychological problem is a 
distinct disruption of an underlying natural order that exists in the mind or brain, it follows that 
a specific intervention (aimed at removing the disruption) should be used to restore the natural 
state of affairs of the mind.  
Because positivists see things as existing ‘out there’, it follows that interventions also 
exist ‘out there’ and thus must have underlying and pre-existing ingredients that can act upon 
the underlying and pre-existing disorders of behaviour and in so doing restore the underlying 
and pre-existing order of personalities (Fourie 2012). It is argued therefore that, if a specific 
intervention is effective in providing relief for a given psychological problem, then according 
to the positivist worldview, there must be something inherent in the intervention itself that 
should be replicated in all instances of that specific disorder. It is this argument that lays the 
foundation of the current drive for EST’s and EBPP. 
Critics of positivist notions of abnormal behaviour and psychotherapy are of the opinion 
that their proponents seek to reduce complex human interactional phenomena to basic and 
simplistic elements that approximate a medical reductionist model of human behaviour (Fourie, 
2012; Hunsberger, 2007). This medical model thus discounts the interactive process of the 
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individuals (i.e. clients and therapists) who are involved in the therapeutic endeavour. Instead 
the medical model focus is fixated on the effect of the treatment on the specific underlying 
disorder.  Specific critiques of EST’s and EBPP are discussed in a later section (See section 
2.6).  
 
2.3.5   What Counts as Evidence? 
 
Seeing that all scientific enquiry is based on, and informed by, basic assumptions about 
reality and the extent to which researchers have access to that reality, it is problematic to favour 
one scientific approach above another. It is fair to say, however, that certain worldviews 
support certain approaches to scientific enquiry above others. As has been pointed out, the 
positivist worldview favours the empirical method as the gold standard of scientific enquiry 
since this method best serves positivist goals and rationales. In the realm of positivism then, 
methods of data collection such as introspection, hermeneutic analysis or even discourse 
analysis may be frowned upon as being unscientific (or more accurately unempirical).  
However, alternative worldviews that inform scientific enquiry have developed and 
will continue to develop in what Thomas Kuhn describes as paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962). 
Examples of such developments include Roy Bhaskar’s Transcendental Realism and Critical 
Naturalism (1998a; 1998b) as well as critical realism (Archer et al., 1998). The latter authors 
argue that scientific enquiry is only possible in so far as the objects of investigation have 
internal generative mechanisms that are activated during experimental procedures. Critical 
realists therefore argue that while reality exists independently from the observer, the observer’s 
purpose is to identify and activate those generative mechanisms that govern events in the world 
out there, thus bringing into question the neutrality of the scientific observer.  
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Post-modernism, as an example of a paradigm shift, led to the adoption of alternative 
epistemological positions relative to scientific enquiry, including constructivist and social 
constructionist epistemologies (Van Zyl, 2009). As alternative epistemologies, these systems 
of understanding the world are also based on assumptions about reality and the extent to which 
researchers have access to reality. These assumptions then, in turn, inform their approaches to 
scientific enquiry as well as how they define and approach problems of a psychological nature 
(Van Zyl, 2009).  
It seems, however, that the illusion of a unitary worldview of science and psychology 
persists through the institutionalisation of positivistic values and empirical methods as 
prescribed through regulating bodies of psychology (Wendt & Slife, 2007). Cries of disgust at 
the mere mention of using non-empirical methods reminds of reactions to the worst acts of 
blasphemy. These cries of disgust are then also an indication of the privileged position that the 
positivistic inner circle is granted. If science were religion then ‘clearly’, the positivistic priests 
seem to reassure themselves: ‘only positivists can be called scientists and clearly any methods 
that are not positivistic (i.e. empirical) cannot be scientific’. ‘And after all’, they declare: ‘we 
are the ones chosen, privileged by Science itself to spread its gospel, and let it be known that 
whoever deviates from our ways are false prophets in service of a pseudo-science, false and 
foul.   
Having discussed evidence based approaches to psychotherapy with an outline of their 
underlying paradigmatic assumptions that promote the questionable use of a medical model of 
psychotherapy, the focus will now shift to a competing approach to psychotherapy outcome 
research. One that seeks not to divide ranks, but to unify differing models and even divergent 
worldviews by focussing on their commonalities.  
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2.4    COMMON FACTORS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
Seemingly, both the EST and EBPP approaches are afflicted by the same ailment that 
pervades every aspect of their supporters’ reasoning related to psychological treatments. That 
is, an absolute secure attachment to a medical model of psychotherapy leading evidence based 
proponents to assume that some therapies are inherently better than others for treating specific 
human problems as ‘disorders of the psyche’. In opposition to this viewpoint, a different 
approach was developed to explain the effectiveness of psychotherapy and its various treatment 
models. 
This different approach links to the dodo bird verdict that states that most models of 
psychotherapy are not only more effective than no treatment, but that they are all more or less 
equally effective as treatments for a variety of psychological disorders (Duncan & Reese, 2013; 
Fourie, 2012; Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 2008). Given its belief in the relative 
equality in effectiveness of different psychotherapy models, this different approach to 
psychotherapy effectiveness research seeks to investigate the commonalities between different 
models of psychotherapy (Fourie, 2012; Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 2008) and 
hence has been termed the common factors movement.  
Norcross and Newman (1992) describe the common factors movement as an approach 
intent on discovering the ‘core ingredients’ that divergent models of psychotherapy have in 
common and ultimately devise more effective treatments using these common elements. 
Duncan and Reese (2013) describe the common factors of psychotherapy as “interdependent, 
fluid, dynamic, and dependent on who the players are and what their interactions are like” 
(p.498). 
In contrast to the evidence based movements, the common factors approach to outcome 
research is critical of the comparison of therapeutic models in terms of model-specific 
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components and techniques. From as early as the 1930’s critics of comparative outcome 
research (the basis of EST’s and EBPP) have made statements on the low likelihood that 
technique-specific factors contribute significantly to the behaviour changes observed in 
psychotherapy (Duncan & Reese, 2013; Fourie, 2012; Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et 
al., 2008).  
According to Duncan and Reese (2013), the common factors movement can contribute 
“a big picture view of what really works” in psychotherapy (p.498).  Similarly, Norcross and 
Newman (1992) point out that the field of psychotherapy is heading more and more towards 
the acknowledgment of the need for integration of various ideological understandings of 
psychotherapy with an appreciation of what is common to all models of psychotherapy. This 
call for integration has a long history that slowly gathered momentum over time.  
Sparks et al., (2008) credit psychiatrist, Saul Rozensweig, as having made the first 
observation that “…some potent implicit common factors, perhaps more important than the 
methods purposely employed, explained the uniformity of success of seemingly diverse 
methods” (p. 453). Having uttered these words in 1936 (Sparks et al., 2008), Rozensweig’s 
insights fuelled enquiry into the common factors of psychotherapies only much later.  
In unison with Rozensweig’s suggestions, a presentation at the 1940 conference of the 
American Orthopsychiatric Society outlined four areas common to the diverse theoretical 
approaches that inform psychotherapy: “…having similar objectives, making sure that the 
relationship is central, keeping the responsibility for choice on the client, and enlarging the 
client’s understanding of self” (Sparks et al., 2008, pp.454-455). From these early observations 
in psychotherapy outcome research the idea evolved that diverse theoretical approaches 
differed more in theoretical content, but that the underlying process of change is common to 
all.  
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Subsequent comparative studies lent increasing support to the idea of common factors 
that thread through diverse models of psychotherapy (Sparks et al., 2008). Notable contributors 
include Heine (1953) who emphasised therapist characteristics; Fiedler (1950) on the ideal 
therapeutic relationship; Hoch (1955) lamenting the role of methods of influence; Garfield 
(1957) shining light on the impact of catharsis and opportunity for new understanding; and 
even Carl Rogers (Sparks et al., 2008) who cemented the idea that “the therapist-provided 
variables were “sufficient” for therapeutic change”, referring to the therapist’s role in creating 
an interpersonal space characterised by “empathy, respect and genuineness” (p.456). 
Over time and with increasing empirical fervour in the domain of common factors 
research, Sparks et al., (2008) described how the necessary elements of effective psychotherapy 
came to be defined in clearer and more sophisticated terms than before. Various researchers 
started outlining comprehensive models of a psychotherapy based on common factors. Frank 
(1973) provided an account of how common factors in psychotherapy (including healing 
practices beyond the westernised concept of psychotherapy, such as traditional healing) 
affected the underlying process of behaviour change. Researchers in the field (E.g. Fourie, 
2012; Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 2008) then also credited Frank’s account as 
having incorporated the role of client expectancy as an important factor in effective 
psychotherapy. Norcross and Newman (1992) point to the importance of Frank’s observation 
that “all psychotherapeutic methods are elaborations and variations of age-old procedures of 
psychological healing” (p.10) and that there is in fact nothing new under this sun.  
Given the amount of research and the variety of opinions on common factors, it is no 
surprise that the number of factors proposed to be common to effective psychotherapies have 
accumulated into impractical proportions. This is reflected in research papers that express 
criticism, and perhaps, scepticism of the common factors movement. For example, Where are 
the commonalities among therapeutic common factors? by Grencavage and Norcross (1990). 
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These authors reviewed 50 studies that outline common factors and found that “the number of 
factors per publication ranged from 1 to 20, with 89 different commonalities proposed in all” 
(p. 372).  
As a result, common factors theorists have turned to grouping factors together in what 
can be seen as meta-factors. For example, Duncan and Reese (2013) outline Duncan’s model 
of five common factors (Fig. 2.1), including extra-therapeutic and client factors (87%); and 
treatment effects (13%)1 that are subdivided into the remaining four common factors: Therapist 
effects (46-69%), alliance effects (38-54%), technique-specific and expectancy effects (30%), 
and feedback effects (15-31%).  
In Duncan’s model, client and extra-therapeutic factors include the client’s worldviews, 
strengths, struggles, motivations, distress, supportive relationships as well as unexplained 
variance (Duncan & Reese, 2013). Therapist effects refer to characteristics of the therapist that 
impact on therapeutic outcome and represents the second most influential factor, whereas the 
therapeutic alliance represents the third most important factor and one of the best predictors of 
outcome. Technique specific factors include those aspects general to all methods of treatment 
such as the model’s rationale, the explanation offered for the problem as well as scripts that are 
followed to address the problem.  
In their explanation of the latter process Duncan and Reese (2013) are of the opinion 
that “[m]odels achieve their effects…through the activation of placebo, hope, and expectancy, 
combined with the therapist’s belief in (allegiance to) the treatment administered” (p. 500). 
Regarding the final factor, it is believed that client feedback provides necessary information to 
                                                          
1 Of the overall outcome of psychotherapy, Duncan’s model proposes that client and extra-therapeutic factors 
account for 87% of behaviour change, whereas the remaining four common factors, collectively known as the 
treatment effects, account for only 13% of the overall outcome of psychotherapy.  
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the therapist regarding therapeutic outcomes and expectations so that the therapist may 
timeously adjust the treatment as needed.  
When seen as a holistic, interactive/reciprocal process, common factors models 
encapsulate much of social constructionist conceptualisations of the therapeutic process 
(Fourie, 2012). For instance, social constructionists would say that the client and therapist are 
constantly exchanging ideas about the problem as informed by their individual characteristics, 
expectations and guiding model, thereby providing each other with constant feedback and 
constant opportunity to adjust their explanations of the problem with concomitant possibilities 
for new or different actions.  
Although Duncan and Reese (2013) do emphasise the interdependence and interplay of 
the various common factors, attention is explicitly drawn to the “disproportionate influence” 
of the client on therapeutic outcome (p. 498). Understandably, clients as a result of their 
individuality, differ in huge ways and thus what is worked on in the context of psychotherapy 
is chiefly determined by the client’s unique characteristics and support structures. 
 
Figure 2.1 Duncan’s Common Factors (Reprinted from Duncan & Reese, 2013, p. 498) 
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However, when a client comes to therapy, it is unlikely that they purposefully bring 
these variables along and these factors are likely to be un-mobilised as change factors prior to 
therapy. Therefore, although the client contributes 87% of what is useful to the outcome of 
psychotherapy, it can be argued that, that 87% was likely not useful to effect the desired change 
outside the context of psychotherapy, as otherwise the client would not have sought the help 
of a psychotherapist.  
By illustrating the commonalities of effective psychotherapists, the common factors 
movement has added much to our understanding of what contributes to effective psychotherapy 
(Fourie, 2012). This has led to various strategies of how to conceptualise the process of 
psychotherapy (Norcross & Newman, 1992). In fact, Norcross and Newman (1992) emphasise 
the fact that common factors therapists function on the level of clinical strategy and are guided 
by the change process rather than by a theoretical abstraction or by recipes based on specific 
techniques. Given its bird’s eye view of therapy models and techniques, it’s ‘meta perspective’ 
provides common factors therapists the luxury of selecting what works best from all the 
different approaches and perhaps even to integrate all that seems different about psychotherapy 
approaches.  
 
2.5      PSYCHOTHERAPY PROCESS vs VARIABLES OF CHANGE 
 
More recently, the common factors movement has become defined as a meta-theoretical 
approach to conceptualise effective psychotherapy (Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 
2008). Given escalating empirical proof that the bulk of the active ingredients of psychotherapy 
transcends any specific theoretical approach or technique of psychotherapy (in the form of 
therapist, client and extra-therapeutic variables), proponents of the common factors movement 
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have in some ways abandoned close-knit alliances to specific theories and models of 
psychotherapy.  
Norcross and Newman (1992) also attach weight to the “...dissatisfaction with single-
school approaches and a concomitant desire to…see what can be learned from other ways of 
thinking…” (p.4) as contributing to the development of a common factors movement. The 
common factors trend, then, is closely associated with eclectic and integrative psychotherapy 
approaches that seek to combine the best elements of varied and epistemologically incongruent 
therapy models (Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 2008).  
Eclectic and integrative approaches differ chiefly on the value their proponents attribute 
to the role of theory in psychotherapy outcomes (Norcross & Newman, 1992). According to 
Norcross and Newman (1992) eclecticism can be defined as the pursuit of the best technique 
or model for the specific person and problem at hand. The selection of the therapy technique 
to be used is based on predictions of its efficacy for the specific client and problem and is 
reliant on “…data on what has worked best for others in the past” (p. 11).  
Proponents of eclecticism place little emphasis on the guiding belief systems that 
inform the techniques of specific models and rely instead on the outcomes of techniques to 
make decisions on its applicability. Thus, implicitly or explicitly, technical eclectics are guided 
by positivist worldviews that suggest that empirical data should guide the therapist’s selection 
of techniques, and is probably the closest approximation of EST approaches to psychotherapy. 
Integrative psychotherapy, on the other hand, can be defined as the integration of 
“…two or more therapies…in the hope that the result will be better than the constituent 
therapies alone” (Norcross & Newman, 1992, p. 11). Thus, rather than simply adding 
components of therapies together, the integrative approaches also attempt to integrate the 
theories that guide varieties of psychotherapy models. Norcross and Newman (1992) 
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emphasise the commitment to “…[synthesise] the best elements of two or more approaches to 
therapy…[and seek] an emergent theory that is more than the sum of its parts…” (p. 11-12). A 
glaring assumption of the proponents of integrative approaches then is that existing models and 
theories of psychotherapy are inadequate to effect the desired behaviour changes and thus need 
to be enhanced into ‘super models’ of psychotherapy by changing its epistemological building 
blocks.  
Since proponents of the common factors movement are intent on elucidating the basic 
ingredients of effective psychotherapy across various and differing models and theories, 
Norcross and Newman (1992) describe common factors as a third avenue towards 
psychotherapy integration. The eventual result of common factors research is believed to be 
the creation of “more parsimonious and efficacious treatments based on…commonalities” 
(Norcross & Newman, 1992, p.13). In pursuit of its promise of providing a meta-theory of 
psychotherapy change, it is envisioned how common factors and model-specific factors can be 
integrated to provide the best treatments for specific clients with specific disorders (Norcross 
& Newman, 1992).  
According to Norcross and Newman (1992) integrative approaches to psychotherapy 
have shown unprecedented growth in interest since the 1980’s due to factors such as sheer mass 
of therapeutic models (over 400), inadequacies of single theories, demands to illustrate 
psychotherapy effectiveness and clearly described procedures, interest in brief solutions and 
exposure to other models of understanding, and finally mounting evidence to support the dodo 
bird verdict. Probably the most important organising factor of the common factors movement 
has been its institutionalisation in the form of professional networks, such as the Society for 
the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration (SEPI), that serve to legitimate the common 
interest of integration- and common factors fanatics (Norcross & Newman, 1992).  
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However, as Fourie (1992) points out there have been considerable critiques of the 
common factors movement (as will be discussed later in this chapter).He is of the opinion that, 
while contributing much to our understanding of what is necessary in effective psychotherapy, 
having knowledge of common factors is not sufficient for effectively practicing psychotherapy.  
Norcross and Newman (1992) acknowledge the limitations of common factors, but 
contend that with further empirical research and painstaking commitment, the field of 
psychotherapy will eventually converge to a point where psychotherapists and systems of 
psychotherapy grow to be more similar as they discover their commonalities and integrate their 
differences. These authors are of the opinion that the path to integration includes recognition 
of the complementarity of seemingly opposing models of psychotherapy; of the interplay 
between cognition, behaviour and affect; of the need for empirical validation of treatments and 
the need for a common language for psychotherapy.  
In order to achieve the goal of integration, the strategy of common factors proponents 
has been clear: Emphasise its potential, illustrate the relatively unimportant role of theoretical 
models2, and spread the gospel to all corners of the psychotherapy world. This is illustrated in 
suggestions by common factors proponents (Sparks et al., 2008) of how even family therapy 
and social work could stand to benefit from the wondrous discoveries and insights of the 
common factors movement, a strategy that seemingly has paid off.  
The field of family therapy has for long emphasised the relational aspects of 
psychotherapy (Becvar & Becvar, 2000) and with the epistemological shift from observed 
systems to observing systems the focus shifted from family members’ worldviews alone to 
                                                          
2 Some estimate its contribution to the outcome of therapy to be as low as 1% (Wampold cited in Sparks et al., 
2008). 
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include the therapist and his or her worldviews as central to the psychotherapy process 
(Checchin, 1992; Frugerri, 1992; Van Zyl, 2009).  
Recent dialogue in family therapy journals show that common factors concepts such as 
therapist-client worldview matching (Blow, Davis & Sprenkle, 2012), the role of the therapist 
in common factors (Simon, 2012a) and effectiveness of therapists (Simon, 2012b) are currently 
hot topics for debate in the family therapy field. Common factors theorists advocate that their 
approach is not only compatible with the epistemologies that guide social work and family 
therapy, but essential to it (Drisko, 2004; Sparks et al., 2008).  
Seemingly then, the all-pervasive common factors movement offers redemption to the 
adversarial field of psychotherapy by proposing a pan-theoretical view of psychotherapeutic 
change. No longer do psychotherapists need to be confined by the limits of their theories and 
models. In fact Norcross and Newman (1992) emphasise how common factors therapists 
function on the level of clinical strategy and are guided by the change process rather than being 
restricted by theoretical abstractions or recipes from specific techniques. Despite currently 
offering little in the form of a satisfactory conceptualisation of the change process, common 
factors proponents believe that their approach offers the chance to sample everything and use 
what works, even if it means mixing and matching different techniques from different models. 
After all, the common factors movement has ‘empirically’ proved that it is not your models or 
techniques that matter, but rather mostly your client’s- and then some of your factors that do.  
 
2.5.1   Client- vs. Therapist Factors 
 
Handbooks on integrative and eclectic psychotherapy (Norcross & Goldfried, 1992; 
Prochaska & Norcross, 2010) stress the importance of psychotherapists understanding the 
process of change. Therefore techniques and models are employed as deemed necessary by the 
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therapist to achieve the main goal and to affect behaviour changes as requested by the client. 
As such the common factors movement does not offer any “specific frameworks of client 
personality or psychopathology as empirically correlated with outcome, but affirms the 
preeminent role of nonspecific client factors across therapies and self-generated change” (Own 
emphasis added, Sparks et al., 2008, p. 460). The latter quote encapsulates the general 
assumption of common factors theorists of a client-centric instead of a therapist-centric process 
of psychotherapy.  
As the impact of client- and external factors on the outcome of behaviour change is 
estimated to range between 40% and 87%, the client himself or herself is framed as the catalyst 
for change, whereas the therapist plays merely a supportive role (Sparks et al., 2008). The latter 
authors quote Prochaska, Norcross and Di Clemente who suggest that “…it can be argued that 
all change is self-change, and that therapy is simply professionally coached self-change” 
(p.460).  
Although Prochaska et al.’s view on the impact of therapist contributions to outcome is 
somewhat unflattering to psychotherapists with their many years of training, it is definitely not 
a ground-breaking view. In fact, Humberto Maturana had similar ideas already in 1975, when 
he coined the term structural determinism (Maturana, 1975). Being a biologist, Maturana made 
the observation that any biological organism can change only so much as its biological structure 
allows it to change. Translating this to psychological terms, it means that any change that 
occurs in human beings is primarily due to their biological structure allowing them to change, 
and thus a therapist cannot change clients when their biological and/or personality structures 
do not allow them to change.  
Of course, Maturana also understood that organisms do not exist in a narcissistic 
vacuum, and thus added the concept of structural coupling to his theory of change (Maturana, 
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1975). Although the limits of change is set by an organism’s biological structure, Maturana 
noted that change occurred with the introduction of difference through contact with 
environmental or other biological structures. Structural coupling then simply means that for 
one structure to affect an influence on another structure, those two structures need to couple in 
a way that makes change possible. In psychological terms, structural coupling suggests that a 
client will not change if there is no coupling with another structure that carries news of 
difference (such as a therapist or an environmental event that serves to disturb its status quo). 
Consider the soccer ball as an example of this concept. A soccer ball’s structure is such 
that if the right amount of force is applied to it, it can become buoyant (it is structurally 
determined in such a way). A human foot’s structure is such that it can apply only a certain 
amount of force without disintegrating (it is structurally determined that way). When you 
couple the foot’s structurally determined amount of force it can exert to the soccer ball’s 
structurally determined buoyancy potential, it allows the foot to influence the ball in such a 
way that it bounces off the foot to move in a given direction. Maturana would say that the two 
are structurally coupled in a way that affects change3 (i.e. the ball moving in a given direction).  
If the foot, however, were coupled with a one ton cement block, it would result in the 
foot disintegrating, since the cement block’s structure is such that it does not become buoyant 
with the amount of force the human foot can exert. Thus, the foot and the cement block are not 
structurally coupled in a way that allows the block to be moved in a specific direction. They 
are, however, coupled in a way that leads to the disintegration of the foot (as a result of the 
limits set by its structure). 
The work of Maturana lent critical support for second-order family therapists’ and later 
social constructionist psychotherapists’ work on the negotiation and co-creation of new 
                                                          
3Also see the works of Karen Barad (2004) on relational ontology, as discussed briefly in Chapter 7. 
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understandings of old problems that are equally reliant on the dialogical interaction between 
client and therapist (see Andersen, 1992; Anderson & Goolishian, 1992; Anderson, Goolishian 
& Winderman, 1986; Checchin, 1992; Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Efran, Lukens & Lukens; 1990; 
Fourie; 1994; Fourie, 2012; Frugerri, 1992; Hoffman, 1992; Minuchin, Nichols & Lee, 2007). 
However, as mentioned before, common factors researchers’ interpretations of empirical 
findings imply that client factors contribute more than therapist and/or technique-specific 
factors to the outcome of psychotherapy. Thus, owing to the client’s major influence in 
psychotherapy, Sparks et al., (2008) define their model of common factors as a client-directed, 
outcome-informed (CDOI) approach and suggest that it…  
 
…takes advantage of the extant literature on the role of nonspecific factors, 
particularly client variables and engagement via the therapy alliance, client 
perceptions of early progress and the alliance, and known trajectories of change. 
As such it is more about change than about theoretical content (p.459). 
 
If client and external factors make up the best part of the factors responsible for change, 
then one may ask why the therapist is paid?  Frank and Frank (1991) describe the therapist’s 
role as one of providing the client with a healing alliance as well as selecting a therapeutic 
model that best fits with that client’s characteristics and worldview. The latter notion of 
worldview matching has also surfaced as a hot debate in family therapy journals, e.g. The 
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy (see Blow et al., 2012; Simon, 2012a; Simon, 2012b).  
Various authors (Norcross & Newman, 1992; Sparks et al., 2012) agree that besides the 
client- and external factors, the therapeutic alliance is the most important factor predicting 
behaviour change. As mentioned before, Carl Rogers’ idea of empathy, respect and honesty as 
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being necessary for successful psychotherapy is a case in point. Fiedler (1950) also concluded 
in his classical study that there is little difference in the nature of the ideal therapeutic 
relationship as described by experts informed by divergent theories of psychotherapy.   
One of the major tenets argued in the current thesis is the idea that the therapist’s 
contribution lies in his or her ability to facilitate a negotiation of a new narrative framework of 
the problem that allows for the mobilisation of dormant common factors, including client- and 
external factors. To achieve this, it becomes important for the therapist to reflect not only on 
what the client contributes, but also on what he or she contributes to the therapeutic 
relationship, and more importantly how he or she contribute it.  
Again this reflexivity on the part of the therapist has been emphasised extensively by 
eco-systemic, constructivist and social constructionist researchers (e.g. Andersen, 1992; 
Anderson & Goolishian, 1992; Anderson, Goolishian & Winderman, 1986; Checchin, 1992; 
Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Efran et al., 1990; Fourie; 1994; Fourie, 2012; Frugerri, 1992; 
Hoffman, 1992; Minuchin et al., 2007).  
The reflexivity on self and the therapeutic relationship as emphasized by eco-systemic 
and social constructionist authors have focused on the collision of differences between client 
and therapist worldviews, suggesting that the therapist needs to provide something sufficiently 
different, but not too different, in order to impact optimally on the client (Efran & Clarfield, 
1992). The goal of psychotherapy, irrespective of model used, would then be for the client and 
therapist to renegotiate, in interaction with each other, the parameters of the client’s problem 
(some would say to re-story a problem to allow for solutions to become apparent).  
This social constructionist idea of psychotherapy suggests that the differences between 
divergent theories of psychotherapy may be quite superficial and that the potent element (i.e. 
the co-constructing interaction via language and discourse) is facilitated by the therapist’s 
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attitude towards the interaction that brings news of difference. In Hill’s (1995) words: “…there 
is a general equivalence of mechanism [among differing psychotherapy models] despite the 
superficial nonequivalence of content” (p. 87).   
Fourie (2000) outline such a social constructionist conceptualisation of therapeutic 
change that includes elements of a cognitive reframe followed by therapeutic action that is 
coherent with this reframe and stresses that such a reframe stems from the dialogical process 
between therapist and client. In order to reach a reframe, the therapist enters into a dialogical 
interaction with the client on the meaning of the problem and bargains on the difference of his 
or her understanding (embodied in his or her therapeutic model or technique) to that of the 
client’s original understanding, that together form a new co-created understanding of the 
problem.  
This new understanding then informs different paths to solution and behaviour change 
that are incorporated into a therapeutic ritual or activity (such as therapeutic techniques, 
prescriptions, etc.). The therapeutic relationship then is not just a relationship, but a relationship 
context that is characterised by orthogonal interaction and ‘brings news of difference’ (Efran 
& Clarfield, 1992) 
While rejecting the medical model (e.g. EST and EBPP) that suggests that 
psychotherapy occurs in distinct phases, Sparks et al., (2008) make the observation that therapy 
from a common factors perspective operates in an altogether different paradigm, what they call 
a common factors paradigm. Due to its different conceptualisation, common factors 
psychotherapy does not lend itself to a therapeutic recipe approach, but rather a “fluid… always 
unique collaboration between client and therapist” (Sparks et al., 2008, p.465).  
However, as it was described above, the common factors movement understanding of 
psychotherapy and the therapeutic alliance is somewhat different from the eco-systemic and 
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social constructionist understandings. Although these approaches all reject the medical model, 
a common factors view of successful psychotherapy is when the client cures him or herself by 
utilising whatever therapy offers, and the therapeutic alliance is lineal in that the therapist’s 
role is to offer a congruent model and support while trying not to get in the client’s way of 
healing (Sparks et al., 2008).  
The therapist is taught as many techniques and worldviews as possible so that he or she 
may change colours like a chameleon in order to adapt to the client’s view of things. The 
interaction then becomes less of an exchange and negotiation of worldviews than a customer 
satisfaction mission. This is perhaps best illustrated in Sparks et al.’s (2008) description of the 
therapeutic process:  
 
…CDOI practitioners collect feedback data from the first session and through 
subsequent sessions to determine if therapist provided variables, including method 
and intangibles such as warmth or professional demeanor, fit with client views and 
expectations (p.465). 
 
With their interpretations of empirical findings it seems then that common factors 
theorists and practitioners have fixated on factors and ingredients and their relative 
contributions to outcome. Thus, the client as person have been confused with client factors and 
the therapist as person with therapist factors.  
The process of interaction between therapist and client has been reduced to alliance 
factors and the importance of each in the therapeutic interaction has been reduced to the 
empirical percentage of their contributions to outcome. Therefore a good therapist in common 
factors language (e.g. CDOI-approach) is one that knows how little he or she contributes to 
psychotherapy, that is less than 13% (Duncan & Reese, 2013), and how much he or she should 
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yield to client preferences or worldviews due to the exorbitant influence of client factors on 
psychotherapy, that is up to 87% (Duncan & Reese, 2013). As Fourie (2012) would comment, 
meaningful (or meaning-making), equitable human dialogue between client and therapist has 
been overlooked. 
 
2.6    CRITIQUES OF EST’S, EBPP AND COMMON FACTORS 
 
As with any scientific endeavour, progress in understanding is facilitated through 
critique of a theory’s shortfalls. This section summarises various critiques of the evidence 
based and common factors movements. These critiques highlight not only methodological 
concerns with these approaches, but also question the philosophical assumptions on which 
these endeavours are based.  
The first point of critique against evidence based movements surrounds the question as 
to what constitutes evidence. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, ESTs demand the use of 
empirical evidence to validate specific treatments for specific disorders, whereas EBPP 
advocates for the use of best available research in clinical decision-making. Drisko and Grady 
(2012), however, point out that EBPP hierarchies of evidence emphasise empirical evidence 
(i.e. experimental designs), which may reinforce ideas of its superiority over other forms of 
evidence.  
Stuart and Lilienfeld (2007) further point out critiques that echo the concern that 
empirical evidence based on laboratory research may not be appropriate when applied in a 
community setting due to differences in characteristics of the populations. Among these 
differences is the fact that community populations often have numerous comorbid difficulties, 
whereas ESTs usually rule out participants who do not have clear-cut single diagnoses (Sparks, 
Duncan & Miller, 2008). Furthermore, Whaley and Davis (2007) cite research that bring into 
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question the cultural sensitivity and/or competency of the treatments identified as evidence 
based and report that research samples used in EBPP and EST outcome studies are very seldom 
ethnically and racially diverse. 
Although the EBPP approach is more inclusive of what constitutes as evidence, Stuart 
and Lilienfeld (2007) remark that this approach is not clear enough in defining what it means 
by evidence and also that it offers no clear criteria for differentiating between treatments that 
are evidence based and those that are not. Furthermore, Klein (2002) is of the opinion that the 
“…weak criteria chosen for demonstrating evidence-based psychotherapy benefits would 
allow both prayer and EMDR to be considered validated treatments” (p. 29).  
As a result of the stated weaknesses Stuart and Lilienfeld (2007) highlight that there is 
a double bind engendered in the EBPP approach: “Finding the most substantiated treatment 
with the most generalizable application may be as impossible as finding the deepest lake at the 
highest altitude” (p. 615). They also argue that the EBPP approach does not provide guidelines 
related to potentially harmful treatments, including emotionally expressive therapies and crisis 
debriefing. As a potential solution, Stuart and Lilienfeld (2007) propose that treatments be 
plotted on an effectiveness-harmfulness continuum based on the strength of the evidence that 
support either its benefits or potential danger to clients’ mental health.  
On the topic of experimental evidence, Lindegger (2007) outlines and critically 
discusses various approaches that are aimed at establishing best practice guidelines for 
psychotherapy, among which include double blind randomised designs, experimental designs, 
correlational designs, etcetera. Although these may be ideal approaches for researching 
clinical/medical settings, Lindegger (2007) recognises important limitations to these 
approaches when they are applied to psychotherapy research. Among the limitations are 
researchers' difficulties to separate the active ingredients of psychotherapy from non-active 
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ingredients; and the difficulty of attributing the outcome of treatment to therapist skill versus 
effectiveness of the specific approach.  
To address these limitations, newer empirical approaches have been proposed. These 
include using therapy manuals to control for therapist skill and "dismantling" techniques 
(Lindegger, 2007, p. 466) that systematically remove certain components of an approach to 
ascertain which of these actively contribute to therapeutic change. These proposed solutions, 
however, do not address the more basic critique against evidence-based movements (i.e. its 
unwarranted philosophical assumptions that are projected as truths).  
The first of these unwarranted assumptions relate to the assumption that all evidence is 
empirical evidence. Wendt and Slife (2007) have the following to say in this regard: 
 
The failure to consider a philosophy of science perspective led the Task Force [on 
EBPP] to make a number of epistemological assumptions that are not based on 
evidence or rationale and that thus violate the very spirit of evidence-based 
decision making…The Task Force’s grand assumption, underlying all the claims 
of its report, is that “evidence” equals “empirical.” (p. 613). 
 
They go on to illustrate the logical flaw contained in the reasoning upon which the EBPP 
approach is based by pointing out that EBPP calls for evidence to promote the transparency of 
psychological treatment, but does not provide evidence (and thus not transparency) to justify 
empiricism as the methodological method of choice to establish the effectiveness of any 
specific method.  
Furthermore, Wendt and Slife (2007) critique the EBPP definition of qualitative 
evidence in that… 
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…it tends to assume that all alternative methods [of research] are variations on 
the same empiricist epistemology…[and that] it fails to understand and value 
qualitative research as a different philosophy of science (p. 613-614). 
 
By constricting the contribution of qualitative methods as providing ‘subjective’ 
evidence only, Wendt and Slife (2007) argue that they are demoted as an inferior source of 
evidence to empirical methods that are assumed to provide ‘objective’ and therefore ‘more 
valuable’ evidence. However, the objectivity of empiricism as a method of inquiry in 
psychology can be debated in, and of, itself (see Wendt & Slife, 2007).  
To illustrate the arguments proposed above, the reader is invited to consider the 
following. If the research question is framed as: 'What makes therapy work?', then one needs 
to take into account that there are different approaches to psychotherapy that are informed by 
different philosophical worldviews regarding what effective psychotherapy entails. These 
include positivist epistemologies as well as epistemologies based in the postmodern paradigm 
such as constructivist- and social constructionist epistemologies.  
Should one frame the solution to the research question as: 'Only therapy that is 
empirical (i.e. validated by experiments) equals therapy that works' then one argues from within 
a specific frame (a positivist frame), but reaches a conclusion that sweeps across various frames 
in its implications. Thus, one can accept that the conclusion may be valid in a positivist frame, 
but it can be totally invalid in a social constructionist frame, as these frames have different 
guiding principles.  
Terre Blanche and Durrheim (2006) refer to Thomas Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts 
to highlight the logical flaw referred to above:  
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Because paradigms differ in terms of the questions they consider legitimate and the 
scientific methods they endorse, there is no way of empirically adjudicating 
between them - they are said to be 'incommensurate', meaning...they simply talk 
past one another (p. 5).  
 
Thus endorsing empiricism (a positivist value) as the key means of adjudicating between 
positivist and postmodern therapeutic approaches, is similar to the pigs declaring yard 
Olympics to decide which of all the animals can ‘oink’ the loudest. 
The second unwarranted assumption of evidence based approaches that is questioned 
is the idea that a therapeutic technique, or some active ingredient it contains, is responsible for 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy. On this topic, Fourie (2012) elaborates on how evidence 
based movements and common factors theories’ reliance on positivistic/empirical 
underpinnings lead to the unwarranted equation of psychotherapeutic interventions (talking 
cures) to pharmacological interventions (biochemical cures).  
Specifically, Fourie (2012) and Hunsberger (2007) argue that the tendency to equate 
therapy with pharmacological interventions is flawed in that it supposes that the power of 
psychotherapy lies in the approach itself, and thus seeks to reduce the mechanism of change to 
that ‘magical active ingredient’ inherent in the approach. This in positivistic thinking is termed 
essentialism (Parker, 2001; Carr, 2006).   
Whereas common factors researchers seek to address the limitations of evidence based 
approaches by discovering the common elements that contribute to effectiveness of various 
psychotherapy models, this approach has also been widely criticised. The critique on this 
movement also fall into two categories: Methodological- and research issues and 
epistemological issues.  
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With regards to issues related to research methodology, Chambless (2002) points out 
that the common factors movement’s claim of generally equal effectiveness of psychotherapy 
across various models is based on questionable research methodology. Specifically she is of 
the opinion that conclusions that support the dodo bird verdict are based on overgeneralised 
findings from meta-analyses.  
Schneider (2002) on the other hand is of the opinion that common factors research relies 
heavily on meta-analyses and experimental research designs and argues that more nuanced 
qualitative research is required in order to make sense of clients’ experiences of smaller 
(statistically insignificant) differences in outcomes. According to Schneider (2002):  
 
It is precisely by looking more closely that outcome research will stretch beyond 
the merely apparent and reach into the tacit, affective, and existential. These are 
the domains that arguably matter most to clients, but are rarely queried in 
mainstream clinical research (p. 26). 
 
Beutler (1995) comments on the tendency of common factors approaches to result in 
poorly delineated lists of common factors that vary considerably from one approach to the next. 
He further remarks that: “…identifying any set of [common] variables does little in the way of 
identifying what aspects of the therapist’s behavior and therapeutic intervention give rise to 
them” (p. 79). 
With regards to the latter critique, Arkowitz (1995) remarks on the fact that common 
factors tend to be taken out of context rather than being seen to comprise a complex, interrelated 
interactive process. Arkowits (1995) identifies the need for a theory of the processes of change 
that would serve to tie various common factors together in a meaningful way. This need is 
echoed by Hill (1995) who states the following: “before we can make statements about whether 
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common factors or specific factors are more important in leading to change…[we] need to 
determine how any factor operates to lead to change” (p. 89). 
With regards to philosophical critiques of common factors, a recent debate that was 
carried out in the Journal of Marital and Family Therapy illustrates how family therapists (and 
other common factors proponents) are walking into the logical mess created by a positivist 
privileged stance. The mentioned debate centres around the question of which is more 
important: That the family therapist work from a model whose worldview matches his/her own 
worldview or choose a model whose worldview matches that of the client (Blow et al., 2012; 
Simon, 2012a & 2012b). While both parties argued compelling points for either of the 
positions, they failed to recognise that they are engaging in a basic logical flaw: Personification 
of the model as an agent engaging in the therapeutic process.  
Notice the framing of the debate above and the necessity of using the pronouns 'whose' 
to refer to the model's worldview, suggesting that the therapeutic model itself is personified 
and able to possess a worldview. This personification of the model points again to the positivist 
concept of essentialism, as if the model itself essentially possesses that worldview. Moreover, 
the idea is created that the model itself is actively engaging with the client through its 
worldview, instead of just being a source of concepts and metaphors that the therapist can 
utilise to inform his or her worldview while engaging with the client.  
Thus, from a social constructionist viewpoint one might say that the author who 
proposed the model, framed that model from his or her worldview, and subsequent users of 
that model interprets and frames that model from their personal worldviews. In this sense then 
one can see how the mixing of paradigms (i.e. using positivist concepts to solve problems 
emanating from a different worldview) spawns various theoretical problems. 
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This leads to a general critique of the common factors movement and its tendency to 
divide the holistic interactive process of psychotherapy into underlying factors (also see 
Castonguay & Holtforth, 2005). Here the reader is referred to Fig 2.1 above. Notice that the 
factors are divided into client factors and then a blob of other factors that are said to interact to 
affect the outcome of therapy. A peculiarity of this model is that the therapist as a factor is 
muddled into this blob of common factors, creating the idea that he or she plays an auxiliary 
role in the therapeutic process, one of the factors that the client can utilise in his or her recovery 
process. This is exemplified in the CDOI approach of Sparks et al., (2008).  
The problem with this conceptualisation is that one of the two main agents in the 
therapeutic process (i.e. the therapist) is relegated to the role of a subsystem (or sub-factor) 
along with the other impersonal factors (such as technique, alliance, feedback, etc.). The 
therapist then is underestimated as being one of the elements of therapy that the client uses 
rather than the other player or agent in therapy with whom the client interacts. This critique is 
addressed in the next two chapters where a revised model of common factors is proposed by 
drawing on concepts of social constructionism and eco-systemic psychotherapy.  
 
2.7      Conclusion 
Despite many critiques of the evidence based and common factors movements, it is 
acknowledged that these have contributed to the knowledge and understanding of 
psychotherapy. Whereas the views expressed in this thesis are guided by a critical postmodern, 
social constructionist worldview, it is also acknowledged that critique without proposed 
solutions is not constructive. Therefore, the chapters that follow serve the purpose of 
elucidating aspects of the postmodern paradigm as well as insights from a social constructionist 
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epistemology that may contribute to further our understanding of the process of change that 
occurs in effective psychotherapy in order to address some of the shortfalls identified above.  
This will include a reconceptualisation of the common factors model by drawing from 
social constructionist and family systems ideas and concepts, as well as illustrations by means 
of therapeutic formulations/clinical vignettes of how specific models may be utilized in this 
social constructionist model of therapeutic factors.  
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SO C IAL  CO NST RU C TIO N I S M AN D C OMMON  FA CTO RS 4 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, common factors models of psychotherapy have 
various limitations, some of which stem from paradigmatic assumptions, and which provide 
very limited guidance regarding the change process in psychotherapy. As there is no clear 
conceptualisation of how common factors may interact to give rise to a process of change, 
therapeutic activity from a common factors perspective runs the risk of being poorly integrated. 
It is also a point of critique that its lack of a guiding conceptualisation of a change process 
raises questions of the legitimacy of clinical decisions (see Chapter 2).  
As pointed out previously, common factors models tend to list and group common 
factors into meta-categories of factors with statistical data regarding each factor’s contribution 
to overall behavioural change. Although it may be beneficial for research purposes to know 
how much each factor contributes to the overall outcome of psychotherapy, it is argued here 
that such statistics are of little use when a therapist is engaged in the practice of psychotherapy. 
In fact, such statistical data may even create the impression that some factors should be 
considered as being less important than others, as is the case with technique- or model factors 
(Duncan & Reese, 2013; Sparks et al., 2008).  
It is argued here that conclusions based on the statistical contribution of factors to 
general therapeutic outcome may lead therapists to underestimate the importance of some 
factors in specific therapeutic cases while they are focussing on those factors with the highest 
                                                          
4 Parts of this chapter has been adapted from a chapter that appeared in the author’s unpublished mini dissertation 
titled Reframing diagnostic labels as interpersonal metaphors: A social constructionist perspective (Van Zyl, 
2009). These parts were rewritten and adapted to be relevant to the current topic. 
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statistical values. Also, as argued in the previous chapter, the statistical impression of the client 
contributing up to 87% to the overall therapeutic outcome leads to curious conclusions 
regarding the role of the therapist. In the CDOI approach to psychotherapy (Sparks et al., 2008), 
for instance, it is suggested that the client contributes most of the change factors and thus affects 
‘self-change’ while the therapist’s role is to support and get out of the way.  
Such a lopsided concept of the therapeutic interaction may undermine what Fourie 
(2012) calls ‘the dialogue’ between client and therapist. Symbolising more than mere verbal 
exchange, Fourie’s use of the term dialogue refers to the co-construction of new ideas about, 
and different paths to, the solution of the therapeutic problem as initially defined by the client 
himself or herself. This latter process counts on an equitable exchange between client and 
therapist that is not served by a general attitude of submissiveness to client demands5.  
Therefore, as a means to address such unfortunate conceptions of the therapeutic 
relationship that may stem from current models of common factors, this chapter explores 
concepts and ideas about change that are based in a postmodern paradigm, specifically eco-
systemic and constructivist theories. From these considerations, it is proposed that the common 
factors model be reconceptualised as a multi-systemic model with the client and therapist as 
reflecting agents, reflecting on themselves and their alliance as factors, among other sub- and 
supra-factors, including technique factors. In such a model it will be illustrated that the therapist 
as a person-factor alongside the client as a person-factor constitute the two most important 
factors in the therapeutic supra-system6. 
 
                                                          
5 Reflexivity from a social constructionist view suggests that any therapist attitude (including submissiveness to 
client demands) may be beneficial to therapeutic outcome if this therapist attitude is adopted reflexively and 
purposefully (Hoffman, 1992). Such reflexivity allows the therapist to introduce specific interactive dynamics to 
the therapeutic interaction so that its meaning may be reflected on negotiated to bring about new meaning.   
6 The concept of two or more individuals forming a therapeutic supra-system through their interactions and 
reflections is well documented in family therapy literature. See Becvar & Becvar (2000) for further information 
on this topic.  
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3.1    INDIVIDUALS AND CONTEXT: IS THERE SENSE IN REDUCTION? 
 
According to Efran et al. (1990) empirical conceptions of psychological cause-effect 
chains: 
 
…can be an unproductive mental game. Often we don’t need to traffic in causal 
attributions at all. We know what we like even when we don’t know why we like it. 
We know that when our brother was late, we got upset. We also know that when he 
apologized in a particular way, our distress vanished. That much we can be certain 
of, and it is important. The rest is often idle inference (p. 101). 
 
Furthermore, Efran et al. (1990) demonstrate how causes and effects are constructed in 
conversation whereby phenomena (including lived experiences) are subdivided into parts 
(Lifschitz & Fourie, 1990). As a result, the empirical notion that social experience and social 
living exist with special laws determining that event A would lead to outcome B is problematic 
from a social constructionist perspective (Fourie, 1994). 
Many post-modern theorists (e.g. Lifschitz & Fourie, 1990) are of the opinion that 
social systems constitute whole systems (meaning that causal chains are purposeless due to the 
understanding that its creation inexorably leads to tautologies. Said differently: “[a] description 
is turned into a purpose that is then asked to account for the description” (Efran et al., 1990, p. 
99). For instance, a child that is considered to have a learning disorder may find that his mother, 
bearing in mind his difficulties, takes it upon herself to ensure that his homework is done and 
that he has the right materials to study for tests. He may thus become used to the level of 
assistance he receives from his mother and never develop the skills and autonomy to 
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successfully master his schoolwork. The diagnosis communicates a ‘state of affairs’ that sets 
in motion an interactional pattern that reinforces or even creates that feared state of affairs.  
Due to the problems associated with causality in the realm of human relationships and 
behaviour, a different worldview is embraced by many social scientists in an attempt to 
transcend these empirical pitfalls. This different worldview conceptualises our social reality in 
terms of wholeness and context (hence its name eco-systemic epistemology) and is a product 
of a wider ontological shift known as postmodernity. 
 
3.2     POSTMODERNISM: A CONTEXT FOR SEEING PEOPLE IN CONTEXT 
 
According to Sey (2006) “postmodernism is a broad term for many different approaches 
that set themselves up in opposition to the coherence and rationality of the modern world” (p. 
524). Modernist approaches (such as empiricism), which emphasise the scientific endeavour 
for discovering ultimate truths, is fundamentally based on the assumptions that observers of 
social reality can bypass their subjectivity and view the world in a direct, objective and value-
free manner via their senses (Fourie, 1994; Sey, 2006; Von Foerster, 1984).  
Postmodernism, however, is critical of the modernist assumptions that promote the 
concept of one truth. Instead, the movement seeks to recognise the opportunities that result 
from embracing multiple and relative truths. Furthermore, these multiple social truths are 
assumed to be the products of the meanings that people attribute to events through the medium 
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3.3       ECOSYSTEMIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 
 
When considering eco-systemic theory, it is important to understand the concept of 
second-order cybernetics that suggest that a system (such as a group of friends or a client and 
therapist) should be understood as being whole, self-referential and autopoietic, among other 
elements (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). The wholeness of a system means that it is self-referential: 
The observer who describes the system also becomes part of the system since his or her acts of 
observing helps to construct the system (Fourie, 1994).  
Any observer of a system therefore has to include himself or herself as part of that 
which he or she is explaining. This view of the role of the observer is different from a first-
order cybernetic view where an observer is seen to be isolated from the subject in question, and 
thus is seen to be describing an individual or family “out there” (see Figure 3.1 versus Figure 
3.2). A first-order cybernetic view then closely corresponds to positivistic views of an 
independent, discoverable reality (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). 
The implications of a second-order cybernetic view then hold that the idea that one 
individual can affect unilateral influence on another (as proposed by evidence-based 






                                  Therapist 
 





      Family 
 60 








                                




Figure 3.2 - Second Order Cybernetic View of Reality 
 
Furthermore, the simultaneity of interactions that exist in whole systems also propose 
that a change process is both the cause and the effect of a client’s reframed understanding of 
his or her problem, and that this change process feeds off the simultaneity of interaction 
between client and therapist. In other words, the client’s reframed understanding of the problem 
is both caused by and causes the therapist’s reframed understanding of that problem, and vice 
versa. This is because client and therapist are engaged in an (inter)-active process to construct 
the reframed understanding.  
When considering the latter, and if one accepts that a therapeutic system functions as a 
whole system (Fourie, 1994; Lifschitz & Fourie, 1990), then simplified and reductionistic 
explanations of the therapeutic relationship is nonsensical from an eco-systemic worldview. 
Such a worldview not only challenges the notions of a unilaterally influenced 
psychotherapeutic relationship such as that proposed in certain evidence based and common 




       
Therapist includes self in description 
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more sensitive to the local relational context that serve to construct new ways of viewing the 
therapeutic problem.   
As Efran et al. (1990) comment: 
[Reductionistic] explanations attempt to condense and encapsulate still larger 
living patterns. In the mental health field, such condensations erroneously amplify 
the determinative importance of particular incidents over everyday drift. They yield 
a false picture. In life as it is lived, all successive moments “count” – not just the 
special few that are embroidered into our narrative tapestry (p. 92). 
Furthermore, Kugelmass (1987) argues that the labelling of clients as deviants suffering from 
diseases (as is often the case in psychotherapy through the act of diagnosis) should rather be 
substituted by descriptions that seek to view the problem behaviour in its proper ecological 
context. 
As an example, Du Plessis and Strydom (1999), Rafalovich (2005) and Reid (1996) 
observed that ADHD childrens’ impairments in attention and behaviour often manifest only in 
some situations (usually school). On the contrary, however, when such children are immersed 
in a stimulating activity, they are virtually undistinguishable from their undiagnosed peers. One 
can see the importance of local context then, since the deviant behaviour acts as a signal of 
“discordance” in the system in which it is rooted (Kugelmass, 1987, p. 19). 
 
3.4       SYMPTOMS AS FUNCTIONS OF STABILITY 
 
Eco-systemic theorists (e.g. Haley, 1963; Keeney, 1979; Tomm & Sanders, 1983; 
Watzlawick, Bavelas & Jackson, 1967) have paid much attention to the concept of symptoms 
as communicative signals of the nature of interpersonal relationship systems such as the family 
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or community. Keeney (1979) conceptualises symptomatic expression as relationship 
metaphors, a term that emphasises the communicative value of symptoms as compacted hints 
of what is going on in a relationship. Furthermore, Haley (1963) showed convincingly, in 
numerous of his texts, how symptomatic and deviant behaviours are strategic in nature. 
Said differently, Hayley (1963) purports that symptomatic behaviours are tactics in 
human relationships because these behaviours serve a specific function in the interpersonal 
system in which it is embedded (Haley, 1963; Watzlawick et al., 1967). In simple terms, 
symptoms can be thought of as “a way of dealing with, perhaps disarming, another person” 
(Haley, 1963, p. 5). 
The eco-systemic conceptualisation of symptoms that hold strategic and 
communicative value implies that symptomatic behaviour is often a stabilising force in a 
relationship state and therefore supports a frequently rigid stable relationship state. Bradford 
Keeney, in fact, observed how treating a client’s complaints without addressing their 
problematic relationship dynamics, often results in “a transfer of symptomatic expression to 
another site [in the system]” (Keeney, 1979, p. 120). To make matters worse, Tomm and 
Sanders (1983) maintain that the use of diagnostic labelling (i.e. diagnosing the ‘identified 
patient’ (IP)) actually threatens to entrench the ‘unhealthy’ relational patterns, so much so that 
the IP becomes fixed in his or her role as the ‘sickly one’ and thus the usual one to express 
psychological symptoms.  
Due to its power to direct perceptions of, and interactional patterns towards, a diagnosed 
individual, diagnostic labelling may have the effect of restricting alternative (‘more healthy’) 
behaviours in the IP (Tomm & Sanders, 1983). Efran et al. (1990) sum up the unintended perils 
of diagnostic labels: “…in their quest to be precise – to pin problems down in objective, 
concrete terms – people are labeled, problems are named, and flexibility is lost” (p. 89). 
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Applying the latter thoughts to evidence-based approaches, one can readily see how the 
quest to promote the use of specific therapeutic techniques for specific ‘disorders’ can lead to 
rigid understandings of a client’s problem and may hence be restrictive to our creativity in 
constructing new paths to solutions. To state it differently, by fixating on evidence-based 
treatments for specific disorders a specific pattern of relating in the therapeutic context is 
reinforced that may limit alternative ways of framing the problem and restrict alternative ways 
of relating in cases where this may be beneficial. It would seem then that the power of 
therapeutic actions (including acts of diagnosing) to ‘disable’ emanates from the 
communicative value they serve to promote very narrow understandings of psychiatric 
problems and their possible solutions.  
 
3.5       THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN CONSTRUCTING REALITY 
 
The value of recognising the communicative value of conceptualisations of clients’ 
problems and therapeutic actions that spring from such understandings, can best be appreciated 
when considering the recent shift towards acknowledging the constructive power of language. 
By shifting their focus to language, social constructionists recognised the important role of 
language in shaping social reality (Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Fourie, 1994).  
More specifically, social constructionism postulates that reality is constructed through 
a social process characterised by mutual agreement between people on the nature of reality, 
whereby shared meanings, beliefs and values are attained (Brown & Augusta Scott, 2007; 
Young & Collin, 2004). To achieve this social ‘contract’, Sey (2006) suggests that social agents 
depend on linguistic structure to produce the resulting reality constructions. Language and the 
strategic use thereof is the powerful force that shapes social realities and it is through language 
that these realities are transmitted from one generation to the next through a system of shared 
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meanings, known as culture. It is this idea of the communal production of social reality that 
forms the foundation of social constructionist epistemology: That different realities are created 
by means of a social process of shared meanings that then also implies the probability of 
multiple and contextually-informed realities. 
Jacques Derrida’s works (see Derrida, 1973; Derrida, 1982) for instance draw attention 
to the importance of questioning western society’s assumptions on various levels (ethics, 
politics, social and human sciences, etc.) by unravelling the texts that serve to uphold the order 
of the day. He asserts, among other things, that assumptions are carried, sometimes 
imperceptibly, by the vehicle of language to construct certain accepted ‘truths’, that is the status 
quo to the detriment of other equally valid ‘truths’ (Montero, 1997).  Derrida’s work serves to 
expose this insidious power of language to promote certain conceptions above others through 
deconstructive analysis.  
Of particular interest is Derrida’s focus on binary oppositions, that he believes 
frequently remain unarticulated in scholarly language, especially in social sciences, and may 
assist in the uncritical promotion of certain views over others. For the social sciences, among 
other sciences, to overcome this deficiency, Derrida is of the opinion that scientific texts need 
to be deconstructed to expose the value-laden assumptions that are embroiled in their narratives 
through unspoken binary oppositions (Montero, 1997). The articulation of binary oppositions 
(such as normal versus crazy or competent versus incompetent) then allows for the speakers to 
consider how different conceptualisations of their experiences may expose other, previously 
concealed meanings. In the practice of psychotherapy, Derrida’s ideas on the deconstruction of 
meaning have important and powerful implications.  
As an example, Terre Blanche, Durrheim and Kelly (2006) highlight the subtle power 
of implicit binary oppositions, where one part of the binary opposition is explicitly stated and 
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the other part is implied but silenced. This practice can have immense directive power in the 
hands of a biased or ignorant psychotherapist. Such silencing is illustrated when a 
psychotherapist says to a client that she is pleased to see that his complaining has subsided and 
that it is a sure sign that his depression is lifting. The implicit message is that his complaints 
are unpleasant and a sign of dysfunction, signalling the possible functioning of the ‘no news is 
good news’ discourse.  
Such binary oppositions can have the effect of setting boundaries in the therapeutic 
dialogue as to what is acceptable versus unacceptable ways of conceptualising the client’s 
problem. By uncritically upholding a binary opposition the psychotherapist, often blissfully 
unaware, may appeal to her audience (i.e. the client) to align himself or herself to a particular 
side of the opposition (usually the side advocated in the psychotherapist’s text) and therefore 
have immense power in creating a particular worldview of the problem and closing the 
possibilities for alternative worldviews of the problem (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). 
In the arena of family therapy this shift in thinking about the power of language to 
construct reality is illustrated in Gregory Bateson’s ideas. Bateson, who echoes Foucault’s 
(1980) idea that power is a social construction, was one of the first to apply these thoughts in 
the treatment of families (Cecchin, 1992). This power, that families were said to battle for, was 
no longer seen as an entity to possess, but rather became a creation of people relating to one 
another in a specific context and who act as if it exists.  
For example, the power an abusive husband holds over his wife is partly a result of her 
submissiveness towards him, whereas her submissiveness is partly a result of his dominance 
over her. The different roles each plays cannot be separated since these form the basis of the 
mutual agreement between them regarding the nature of their relationship. Both play their 
respective roles in constructing the husband’s power through what Maturana (1975) calls 
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structural coupling. This means that individuals couple their behaviour to fit with the family 
environment so that the relationship of one segment of the family provides a context for the 
behaviour of another member. The sum of the coupled behaviour in turn forms the family 
environment. This means that no individual member’s behaviour can be seen as being isolated 
from the family environment and the family environment cannot remain what it is without the 
said individual’s coupled behaviour.  
As can be seen thus far, social constructionists reject the idea of an underlying structure 
in any phenomenon being studied (Andersen, 1992; Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Cecchin, 
1992; Fourie, 1994; Hoffman, 1992). For instance, this view would suggest that any structured 
patterns observed in a family are not inherent qualities of that family, but rather constructed 
through social negotiation via the medium of language.  
The order and meanings we observe when we look at a family interacting, is in fact the 
result of an interactional process whereby order and meanings are constructed (Fourie, 1994) 
and that is likely to change over time. Said differently, because our observations are informed 
by the language we use to describe them, these observations will always reflect political and 
ideological power relations among those who observe and those who are being observed 
(Hoffman, 1992). Also, the meanings attached to these observations may change relative to 
changes in society. 
In a similar vein, Efran and Clarfield (1992) and Brown and Augusta-Scott (2007) argue 
that, from a social constructionist viewpoint, it is probable that no-one can ever claim to 
observe a truly objective reality. On the other hand, these authors insist that each person is 
entitled to a preferred way to view reality, and that such a reality should never be represented 
as the truth, but rather one of many truths. 
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In her work, Frugerri (1992) emphasises the self-referential nature of observing 
systems, whereby knowledge of a subject relies heavily on the observer’s descriptions and 
choice of language, thus making the product of observation naturally subjective and value-
laden. The observer therefore constructs and joins the system being observed, purely through 
the act of observing (Fourie, 1994). This act of observing then continuously changes the 
observer’s relationship to the system in an interactional, circular process whereby each 
subsequent act of observation creates new information about the system (Fourie, 1994; 
Frugerri, 1992). By applying the latter discussion to psychotherapy, one can see how important 
it is for a therapist to attend to his or her relationship with a client in a self-referential fashion. 
Andersen’s (1992) words on self-referential observations hold particular value in the 
field of psychotherapy, since he states that: 
 
… we do not relate to life ‘itself’ but to our understanding of it … [and furthermore] 
we strongly participate in creating our understanding of life… [and consequently] 
there are as many versions of a situation as there are persons to understand it (p. 
61). 
 
These words imply that, from a social constructionist epistemology, a psychotherapist 
can no longer be seen as separate from his or her client or seen to be objective with regard to 
the techniques he or she employs. This is because the therapist as a self-system possesses the 
quality of organisational closure (Becvar & Becvar, 2000).  
This means that the therapist cannot observe the client without referring to his or her 
own subjective experiences of that client, and thus the therapist cannot make treatment 
decisions without taking into account his or her subjective experiences of the client. The 
concept of evidence based treatments that are chosen objectively by a therapist, based on its 
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proven efficacy, therefore becomes a seriously problematic concept from a social 
constructionist epistemology.   
On the other hand, much criticism has been aimed at social constructionists’ rejection 
of true objectivity. Critics often argue that social constructionism amounts to solipsism, as each 
individual is allowed to relate to his or her own version of reality (Efran & Clarfield, 1992). 
The danger of this line of thinking is that since there is no objective truth, there is no standard 
against which to evaluate the validity of any assumptions about reality. In its defence, however, 
it should be noted that social constructionism assumes that any individual’s assumptions about 
reality is embedded in a social context (Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Cecchin, 1992). This 
implies that our assumptions are kept in check by the broader social narratives that set the 
boundaries of our assumptions of reality (Efran & Clarfield, 1992). 
Cecchin (1992) further argues that in addition to facilitating the construction of 
meanings to help people make sense of reality, social interaction also becomes a way for a 
person to define the self in a relationship with the social and physical environment. People’s 
social exchanges (and by extension, therapeutic exchanges), therefore also represent attempts 
to construct realities that hold with it the limits and possibilities they face as individuals related 
to that environment.  
 
3.6     LANGUAGE: THE DOUBLE EDGED SWORD 
 
In the foregoing discussion it was argued that the language an individual uses to describe 
his or her experiences is pivotal in setting the boundaries for his or her behaviour. From this 
line of arguing it can further be said that language then forms the basis for the creation and 
resolution of psychological problems in the form of problem- and solution narratives (Brown 
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& Augusta-Scott, 2007; Efran et al., 1990; Payne, 2006; White, 2011). Anderson et al. (1986) 
explains the formation of an ecology of ideas around: 
 
…the shared, cognitive, and linguistic discourse through which we derive meaning, 
and out of which we create the realities of coordinated action systems. Through 
language individuals interact with and coordinate behaviour with others in a 
variety of ways. This can even be ways that are thought of as problems (p. 6). 
 
Therefore, the quality of an individual’s behaviour (in terms of deviance and normality) 
is determined by the way that behaviour is languaged as deviant or problematic (Fourie, 1994; 
Terre Blanche, 1998). The observer attributes value (normal or abnormal) to the said behaviour 
that he or she derives from his or her identification with a specific cultural (or subcultural) 
value system.  
For instance, any person’s fear response is merely a bodily reaction to objects or 
situations. The body responds to a stimulus without evaluating the appropriateness or intensity 
of that response. It is the client’s or therapist’s mind that determines (in the form of cognitive 
evaluation and comparison to a cultural standard) the appropriateness and intensity of the 
behaviour and categorises it as either deviant or normal. Efran et al. (1990) argue that “fears 
only seem disproportionate to danger when they belong to another person or are evaluated from 
another perspective” (p. 91). 
Therefore, a person enrols the position of phobic when his or her behaviour is assessed 
to be outside the limits of normality from an external perspective. Through this evaluation 
against an external value system it is negotiated that the person has a disorder that leads to the 
formation of a ‘coordinated action system’ that directs behaviour towards the identified 
problem. Anderson et al. (1986) terms this a ‘problem-determined system’, since the 
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organisation of the system, including IP’s function in it, is now being determined by the claim 
that there is a problem that needs attention. 
An example of a problem-determined system is when a couple (as an organised system) 
concludes that their child’s clingy behaviour needs to be addressed. Since the child’s clinginess 
can be viewed as a normal attachment to the parent, it is likely to be framed as problematic 
only once it leads to a disruption of the parents’ harmonious inter-relations, especially if one 
or both start(s) to experience frustration as a result of the behaviour. This usually occurs when 
one parent, for example the father begins to evaluate the child’s behaviour against the ‘normal’ 
expectation of how children should behave: for example “children should play outside”.  
The mother may disagree, and defend the child’s need for nurturance. Strain in the 
marital relationship is likely to arise on how to manage the child’s “clinginess”. This may lead 
to conflict and a rise in the child’s anxiety levels. Before they wipe their eyes, the parents are 
faced with a problem that continues to exacerbate, until they decided that “our child is abnormal 
and needs to see a therapist”.  
Thus the initial description of the child’s behaviour as being ‘clingy’ sets in motion a 
distinct pattern of organisation in the family system to address the child’s problematic 
attachment patterns. The identified problem (framed as residing in the child) determines the 
workings of the system (Anderson et al., 1986). Alternatively, if the father frames his 
frustration as emanating from a lack of affection from his wife, instead of from an interfering 
child, the problem-system would likely direct the family to couples therapy instead of play 
therapy for the child. 
Since most social problems are a product of the language used to describe them, there 
is no sound agreement on what aspects of language account for its power to construct social 
reality. Some critical approaches (e.g. Foucaultian theories) highlight the power of actual words 
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and phrases to construct the power that some group (e.g. doctors and psychologists) hold over 
another group (e.g. psychiatric patients). On the other hand, Searle (as cited in Terre Blanche, 
1998) is of the opinion that language derives its constructive power from “speech acts” (p. 
144).  
According to Terre Blanche (1998) the process involved in the performance of a 
conversation is more important than the contents (i.e. spoken words) of that conversation. For 
meaning and power to exist in words, there needs to be meaningful interaction between a 
‘speaker’ and a ‘hearer’. The speaker needs to say something powerful or overpowering and 
the hearer needs to understand what is said as being powerful and overpowering in order for 
meaningful power to come into being.  
Apter (as cited in Kugelmass, 1987) demonstrates how the interaction between the 
individual and social environment leads to the identification of a deviant person, where the 
deviant behaviour is created via:  
 
… a disparity between an individual’s abilities and the demands and expectations 
of the environment – a “failure to match” between the child and the system. It is 
not the child alone or the environment alone that causes emotional disturbance. 
Rather it is the interaction between them that creates a discordance and disrupts 
the system (p. 19). 
 
When viewed from an ecological perspective, language is accepted to be the vehicle for 
generating and resolving problems (Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Fourie, 1994). However, 
by saying that psychological problems are constructed through language, it is not meant that 
these problem behaviours do not exist. Instead it is suggested that the language people use to 
describe behaviours can lead to the exacerbation of those behaviours as problems, or to the 
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resolution of those behaviours by adopting descriptions that allow for more flexibility to adopt 
alternative behaviours (Efran et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, the conceptualisation of clients’ problems as being embedded in a 
narrative framework does not imply that clients’ problems are not real (Efran & Clarfield, 
1992). In fact, Cecchin (1992) argues that since people utilise narratives to negotiate the limits 
for their personal agency, the use of very restrictive language to make sense of an experience 
can lead to that individual experiencing very real problems.  
Checchin (1992) further suggests, that it is through engaging in social interactions that 
individuals are afforded the opportunity to extend their definitions of themselves as well as the 
problems they face. It is through this extension of their narratives of the self and their problems 
that individuals become aware of new possibilities to expand their personal freedom. Linking 
to this idea, Andersen (1992) postulates that psychotherapeutic conversation can be defined as 
an individual’s search for new descriptions and definitions of the self with which he or she 
would be most comfortable. 
 
3.7      NARRATIVE CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
Given that psychological problems are defined, from a social constructionist viewpoint, 
as the product of overly rigid problem narratives that restrict an individual’s ability to recognise 
clear paths to its solution, it is accepted that the resolution of psychological problems can also 
be achieved through the medium of language. The therapist could thus seek to utilise 
discrepancies in meaning that exist between his or her own and client’s descriptions of reality 
in order to negotiate a new problem narrative that is less restrictive in its potential paths to 
solutions (Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Cecchin, 1992; Fourie, 1994; Payne, 2006; White, 
2011). 
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For instance, consider the dilemma of a man confronted with the conflict between his 
wish to get divorced and his religious conviction that prohibits the dissolution of marriage. Due 
to his religious convictions, he finds himself trapped in a loveless and frustrating marriage. His 
context is thus a breeding ground for a whole list of psychological problems including 
depression, anxiety, sexual dysfunction, somatic complaints, infidelity, aggression, etcetera.  
Given this life contradiction, the man is faced with the following conundrum: “do I stay 
true to my beliefs and be miserable for the rest of my life, or do I forsake my beliefs in favour 
of happiness?” Obviously, one can sense that neither of the choices he has languaged for 
himself would resolve the issue of his unhappiness. The social constructionist aim of 
intervention in such a case seeks to expand the problem definition so that more options become 
available in the search for a solution that accommodates both of the client’s contradictory 
preferences.  
By reflecting on the different ways that the client and therapist define various aspects 
of the problem, a negotiation takes place where both start to redefine their personal view of the 
problem based on feedback by the other. Over time and through reflecting on their differences, 
a shared narrative starts to develop through a negotiation between client and therapist on their 
different viewpoints of the problem (Andersen, 1992; Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007; Cecchin, 
1992; Frugerri, 1992; Payne, 2006). The man’s dilemma discussed above, may be resolved 
when his definition of what it means to be religious is expanded to allow for the possibility of 
divorce. Alternatively, his definition of marriage might expand, making it possible for him to 
see his marriage in a different (perhaps even more satisfying) light.  
If the process of change, as conceptualised from a social constructionist viewpoint, is 
to utilise discourses to reframe personal narratives and extend the limitations placed on a 
client’s agency, it could be hypothesised that all ‘effective’ models of psychotherapy are based 
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on a similar process. In fact, as Fourie (2012) points out, behaviour change across divergent 
approaches relies on two processes:  
 
…the development in conversation of a shared understanding of the 
problem…which is somewhat different from the client’s original 
conception…followed by action which is considered to be coherent with…the 
developed understanding (p. 131).  
 
As seen from the foregoing argument, relying on reductionist conceptualisations of 
psychotherapy (as proposed by evidence-based approaches) would seriously restrict the 
creativity needed for such a co-constructive process. Also, it is has been argued that being 
aware of lists of common factors and their statistical values is not enough. Without a guiding 
model of a change process that provides opportunity for a therapist to incorporate common 
factors into a coherent yet flexible approach, such a creative co-constructive approach may be 
difficult to achieve.  
 
3.8       SOCIAL DISCOURSES: OUR MAPS TO FREEDOM OR STAGNATION 
 
It is accepted here, as suggested by Fourie (2012) that the common factors and specific 
techniques have equally important roles to play in effective psychotherapy, but that the 
magnitude of those roles would differ from client to client. An effective model in this regard 
would allow the therapist to reflexively introduce common factors relevant to the 
psychotherapy process into the interactive space between himself or herself and the client for 
reflection of the meaning of said factors. Also the model should allow the therapist to 
reflexively respond to factors that the client spontaneously or purposely introduce for 
discussion.  
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Such a model would then allow for a creative interaction between client and therapist 
to negotiate on the impact of various factors on his or her understanding of the problem and by 
so doing co-construct a shared worldview of the problem that allows the client more personal 
agency and that extends the limitations placed on their personal freedom by the previous 
meanings he or she attached to his or her problem. 
In other words, just as a client’s constructed realities (as mediated by the language and 
discourses available to them) have the potential effect of defining himself or herself as 
‘deviant’, ‘victim’ or ‘outcast’, a different reality construction (as mediated by the language 
and discourses provided in the context of psychotherapy) could have the effect of helping a 
client define himself or herself in new ways that lead to obvious and reachable solutions to his 
or her problems. In such a model, interaction (both verbal and non-verbal) between therapist 
and client is what leads to the introduction of certain discourses by either client or therapist. 
These discourses may direct the therapeutic narrative, but the client and/or therapist may also 
redirect the therapeutic narrative by introducing new or different discourses.  
Since discourses have the power to direct our understandings of ourselves and others, 
our place in the world and thus also our behaviour (Van Zyl, 2009), they may be accurately 
described by using the metaphor of a map. Maps in themselves are harmless pieces of paper 
with little power of their own. However, when used by an individual, maps may gain certain 
powers that can be thought of as benevolent or devious.  
Take for example, a woman who is lost and uses a map to find her way again, probably 
thinks to herself ‘Thank you map!’ On the other hand, a man who automatically tunes his GPS 
to take him home, may later curse his map for leading him straight into a traffic jam. If he had 
been more thoughtful of his interaction with the map he may have detected earlier that it was 
leading him on a route that spells trouble and altered his direction. In a similar manner, social 
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discourses, when followed uncritically, may be very devious in directing our thoughts and 
behaviours. This is especially true in the context of psychotherapy, where navigating social 
discourses forms the bulk of the therapeutic process.  
Therapeutic common factors, including diagnostic labels, therapeutic techniques, 
theoretical models, etcetera. are rich sources of social discourses that may have an insidious 
way of directing the client’s personal narrative as well as the therapeutic narrative (Van Zyl, 
2009). It is very important, therefore that the therapist remains reflexive when discourses are 
introduced so as to avoid the reification of dominant and/or debilitating discourses in the 
therapy process.  
For instance, a man diagnosed with an anxiety disorder is faced with a multitude of 
discourses surrounding his diagnosis. First, gender discourses accompany the fact that he is a 
man and advocate that men should exude rationality, courage, masculinity, fearlessness and the 
like. Second, medical discourses, which accompany anxiety disorders, suggest that phobias are 
exaggerated, irrational and unfounded fears. When utilising these discourses in framing his 
experience of being diagnosed as a ‘phobic’, he can easily define himself as a ‘wimp’, since he 
is excessively fearful, overreacts when faced with the object he fears and, in addition, his 
actions seem to be irrational and illogical. 
Therefore, the discourses, when organised in this way, present the man with an 
emotional contradiction, in that his fears cannot be reconciled with his masculinity, which 
would likely heighten his distress. However, by reorganising these discourses, the meanings he 
attaches to his ‘disordered’ behaviour can be framed in a more useful way, as when he might 
recognise that he is faced with most men’s biggest fear, namely being emasculated by a ‘mental 
disorder’, and might rise to face that fear head-on. This reframed explanation of his experience 
serves to expand the limitations placed on his masculinity by the former framing and 
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consequently resolves the emotional contradiction that existed before. He can now define 
himself as a very brave man who stood up to and conquered the fear of being emasculated by 
an anxiety disorder. 
Notice that the discourses in the example above can be seen as being representative of 
various therapeutic factors. The gender discourse may be representative of a client factor (e.g. 
client fears or weaknesses), whereas the medical discourse may be representative of a 
therapeutic factor (e.g. model factors such as diagnosis and assessment). Also, the specific 
formulation of the problem from the therapist’s worldview and techniques such as positive 
connotation may represent therapist- and technique- factors respectively. Common- and 
specific factors then are conceptualised as rich sources of discourses and metaphors that can 
be reflexively employed in the therapeutic interaction to assist with the co-construction of a 
new understanding of the client’s problem.  
 
3.9      IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE 
 
Given the role of language (in this case, specifically the language surrounding 
psychological problems) in constructing interpersonal realities, it follows that language also 
holds important implications for the definition of self of an individual. When referring to the 
notion of self, social constructionists reject the modernist tendency to define the self as a 
structure-determined inner reality, consisting of emotions, cognitions, etcetera, that assumes a 
fairly rigid form over the lifespan.  
Rather, according to Hoffman (1992), the self is viewed as a continually evolving entity 
that waxes and wanes over time, much like a “stretch of moving history” (p. 10). She maintains 
that any person’s experience of himself or herself is imbedded in a relational field where 
changes in others’ reactions to him or her affect the way he or she experiences the ‘self’, and 
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vice versa. Therefore, the ‘self’ is described in terms of circular interactions that cause it to 
evolve and change shape over time. 
Andersen (1992) also highlights the interactional nature of the concept of self and 
maintains that by using language, people express and construct their being by defining 
themselves in discussions with themselves and others. Thus, any interactions or events are 
related to one’s construction of the self through the language that is used to describe oneself in 
relation to such events. Andersen (1992) goes so far as to say that “talking with oneself and/or 
others is a way of defining oneself. In this sense the language we use makes us who we are in 
the moment we use it” (p. 64). 
Related to the concept of self as a continuously evolving process, the idea of normal 
human development also takes a different meaning when viewed from a constructionist 
viewpoint. Hoffman (1992) posits that the traditional psychological notion that normal human 
development occurs in developmental stages is unwarranted in that there is great variability 
regarding human development and to single out one ‘optimal’ route is to step into the same 
trap of a singular truth (Payne, 2006; White, 2011).  
When applied to the field of psychotherapy, the rejection of the idea of a singular 
optimal developmental route would extend to the rejection of a singular optimal therapeutic 
intervention. Moreover, since language becomes the force that defines individuals’ identities, 
one can argue that a specific therapeutic model may at most provide the therapist and client 
with a specific set of concepts, metaphors and rituals to assist with constructing an alternative, 
problem free identity.  
Given the social constructionist view of the self, and the multitude of developmental 
pathways open to people, it seems to open new avenues for thinking about therapeutic effects. 
In fact, it brings into question the whole assumption that specific techniques and models may 
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hold certain desired therapeutic effects over others. It calls for shifting focus away from the 
model or technique applied to how this model or technique is applied by this specific therapist 
in interaction with this specific client in this specific context. The value of models and 
techniques then is still retained, but responsibility for change shifts to the therapist (and client) 
in the way they use the concepts, metaphors and discourses contained in the model or technique 
to construct a new view of the problem that make satisfactory solutions more apparent.  
 
3.10     MODELS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: METAPHORS FOR CHANGE 
 
The common factors approach suggests more/less equality among psychotherapeutic 
models and approaches, in that their usefulness is based on the psychotherapist's evaluation of 
what each might offer him or her in the specific psychotherapeutic situation. Of course, given 
the importance of language and narratives in social constructionist epistemology, it is assumed 
that, at a fundamental level, any psychotherapeutic model represents a frame for viewing the 
client's difficulties (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). As reality constructs, different therapeutic models 
provide different systems of narratives, discourses and metaphors that allow for the negotiation 
of a larger frame of reference in which the client's problematic (i.e. competing & mutually 
exclusive) narratives/wishes/morals/drives etcetera can be resolved.  
The psychodynamic school of therapy, for example, produced various models of 
personality, human behaviour and its pathologies as well as means of remedying abnormalities 
in behaviour and character (Viljoen, 2003b). In this sense the Freudian conceptualisation of 
personality as a steam engine can be seen as providing a framework for organising the 
therapist's and client's understanding and observations of otherwise abstract and intangible 
behavioural percepts.  
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For example, when subjected to discourse analysis, the concepts of unconscious drives 
and motives suggest that the person's behaviour stems from an unknown 'power source' that 
pushes the client's behaviour and experiences in a particular direction, that is a direction aimed 
at achieving specific underlying (not-yet-known) goals. These apparently simple terms have 
numerous implications for the construction of the agency of the client and therapist. First, a 
reality is constructed wherein the client is framed in a passive subject position, and is subjected 
to impositions from an unknown (ego dystonic) source. Second, the client is framed as being 
dependent on this ego dystonic source for his vitality, immediately placing him in debt of the 
unconscious. Also, a schism is constructed in the identity of the client so that two sets of 
motives and drives are probable, the conscious (known) and the unconscious (not-yet-known), 
yet the vitality for accomplishing these motives emanates from one source only (i.e. the 
unconscious).  
This conflict of interest, coupled with a limited energy resource and the obscurity of 
one agent (i.e. the unconscious), lays the grounds for an inequitable power struggle, one that 
the 'conscious' client is not even aware of. Note also that the paradoxical phrasing of the 
'conscious yet unaware' client is utilised to illustrate how the 'conscious' lacks true personal 
agency precisely because it is unaware of its lack of personal agency. Thus any control that the 
conscious person believes he or she has, is pseudo control, as it is exactly this 'control' that 
maintains the obscurity and power of the unconscious. 
It is then clear how these psychodynamic concepts, as described above, construct the 
client as someone with little agency and personal knowledge apart from that allowed by the 
unconscious. Thus the dominant narrative in such a model of human behaviour leans toward 
the image of the conscious person caught in a ruse to believe he is navigating his path, while 
all along he is the vehicle driven by an inconspicuous driver (i.e. the unconscious) with its own 
motives on which direction to take.  
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The latter way of languaging the psychodynamic construction of the client then evokes 
certain discursive questions: What contributes to the power imbalance between the client and 
his unconscious? What or who allows the unconscious to have unilateral control of the client's 
source of vitality? Finally, given that the unconscious is predominantly out of sight and out of 
conscious mind, what contributes to and maintains this schism? The model as a therapeutic 
factor provides the therapist and client with the discourses and metaphors to critically entertain 
and reflect on such issues as mentioned. In this way the specific model (with associated 
discourses and metaphors) impacts on the co-evolving and mutually constructed new meaning 
of the problem.  
The pursuit to answer the above-mentioned questions, at least from a social 
constructionist perspective, is what forms the basis of a therapist’s understanding of the intra-
psychic power relations of the client. Note that a simple concept can serve to satisfactorily 
answer all of the above three questions: that is knowledge (or a lack of it) is what contributes 
to the power imbalance between the conscious and unconscious structures of the personality. 
The unconscious has access to all, the conscious has access only to what is deemed as conscious 
knowledge. Whatever the conscious knows of the unconscious depends on the generosity of 
the unconscious. Since the unconscious ‘knows’, it is in a position to control (i.e. has power 
over the needs, drives and the vitality to pursue these).  
The schism between the conscious and unconscious is also a product of knowledge (or 
the lack thereof), much like a captain who is unable to address mutiny when unaware of it, so 
the conscious cannot address the schism if unaware of it.  
From a social constructionist perspective then, it can be said that numerous social 
discourses operate in the psychodynamic construction of the personality: Knowledge is power, 
internal origins of power, etcetera. These discourses then inform the client's understanding of 
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his own personality functioning and the dynamics of his relationship with his unconscious. In 
other words, the client gains knowledge of the existence of the unconscious, its power and his 
own lack of power. Using the psychodynamic model as a metaphor, one might say that 
therapeutic talk engages the client in the process of resolving unconscious (not-yet-known) 
conflicts by gaining insight and acceptance of the nature of the self and the power of the 
unconscious to direct behaviour.  
Contra-intuitively, the client's growing knowledge of his lack of knowledge and power 
in relation to the unconscious actually allows the therapist and client to construct a worldview 
of the problem that provides the client with options, and hence the agency, to redress this power 
imbalance. Likewise, a captain's awareness of mutiny gives him opportunity to deal with the 
mutineers, so the insight of the client provides opportunities to exercise more control by 
changing his relationship with the unconscious. According to the psychodynamic construction 
then, knowledge (awareness) equals power, and a clear implication for the agency of both 
therapist and client is the pursuit of awareness in the form of insight. 
It is argued here that a therapeutic model, as a therapeutic factor, acts as a source of 
discourses that can be activated in the therapeutic process to inform the therapeutic narrative. 
The responsible utilisation of a specific therapeutic model requires the therapist to critically 
and reflexively invoke, or respond to, discourses and metaphors that are activated in the 
interactive space. For example, the hero discourse, when activated with the help of a therapeutic 
model, may prompt a client to construct her identity by thinking in terms of the hero/villain 
contingency regarding the self-definition. It calls on the client to align herself in relation to 
either, and both, of the poles of this hero/villain contingency.  
Other related discourses, in turn, when activated, may influence this alignment of the 
client. For example, the individuality discourse versus the 'flock' discourse may combine with 
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a rebellion discourse versus a conformity discourse to construct the client’s worldview of the 
problem and her relation to it in various ways, so as to inform possible paths to action. By 
adopting a critical and reflexive stance, the therapist may question, in the client’s presence, 
whether the resulting narrative construction of the self and the problem is positive or negative 
for her, thereby implicitly reinforcing the idea that such narrative constructions are not 
necessarily fixed and inflexible.  
 
3.11    THE CRITICAL NATURE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 
 
In explaining the critical stance that social constructionism takes, Young and Collin 
(2004) contend that “most social constructionisms overtly challenge orthodox, positivist 
assumptions” (p. 377) and also cite Gergen saying that “social constructionism asks a new set 
of questions – often evaluative, political, and pragmatic – regarding the choices one makes” (p. 
377). 
When adopting such a critical stance it is important to consider the important distinction 
that Anderson and Goolishian (1992) draw between local meanings and dialogue and broadly 
held cultural sensibilities, the former referring to “the language, the meaning, and the 
understanding developed between persons in dialogue…” (p. 33). Anderson and Goolishian 
(1992) recognise the importance of local meanings to be situated in the fact that “there is a 
range of experiences and a way of knowing these experiences that is sufficiently different from 
‘knower’ to ‘knower’…” (p. 33).  
It therefore becomes apparent that, from a social constructionist perspective, the effects 
of a specific psychotherapeutic interaction cannot be abstracted from the relational context in 
which the new meaning that informs the problem as well as the resulting behaviour change is 
co-constructed. Taking these points into consideration, it becomes a wasteful exercise to debate 
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the superiority of any given technique for any given diagnosis, as the local meanings and 
dialogue surrounding technique, diagnostic label and any other factor in psychotherapy are 
highly likely to differ considerably from one therapeutic process to another, even where the 
technique and diagnostic label remains constant.  
In a social constructionist model of psychotherapy, technique and diagnostic labelling 
do not form the context for psychotherapy, but can rather be seen as being part of a range of 
other factors that all contribute to the context of change in the psychotherapy process. The 
degree of importance each of these factors holds in the overall process, depends on the co-
evolving narrative that develops continually between the client and therapist as each contribute 
to it by emphasising factors and reflecting on its role in the evolving narrative.  
For instance, a client diagnosed with MDD may change his perspective of MDD from 
a label that signals underlying abnormal brain processes to one that signals a discord in his 
relationship with his introjected self-object. Utilising this co-constructed new understanding of 
MDD leaves more opportunity for the client to exercise personal agency upon the problem by 
addressing the relational difficulty with himself. The client and therapist may construct the 
narrative as follows: That the client has ‘unconsciously’ forsaken an alliance with ‘the self’ in 
order to build an alliance with others. This neglected relationship with the self then caused 
unspoken resentment between the client and his introjected self-object, leading to heightened 
levels of self-loathing, hopelessness and depressed mood.   
On a wider systemic level, the real-time effects of the ongoing new construction of 
meaning forms another factor that may be introduced into the therapeutic conversation as a 
matter that shapes the continually evolving narrative. In other words, the ways in which the 
client’s social world organises itself in relation to the client’s newly evolving understanding of 
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the problem (i.e. effects of therapy) is fed back into the therapeutic system in a way to further 
impact on the therapeutic process of interaction.  
Feedback, as a therapeutic factor, is extended beyond the client’s experience of 
difference and also incorporates others’ reactions (including the therapist’s reactions) to 
differences in the client. Feedback, from a social constructionist approach to psychotherapy, is 
not linear (from client to therapist), but circular, meaning that both therapist and client receive 
simultaneous feedback on their effects on each other as well as their effects on the wider social 
system of which the client forms part. This information then shapes further co-evolution of the 
local meaning attached to the problem. 
The client discussed above, may start to address the forsaken alliance with the 
introjected self-object by verbalising the unspoken resentments and developing new trust and 
empathy with the introjected self-object. The therapist’s role is crucial in that he or she tracks 
this narrative by providing reflection and feedback given his or her expert knowledge on 
mending broken relationships. This feedback may strengthen the client’s sense of personal 
agency, but also may foster a sense of interpersonal validation and normalisation by 
legitimising the more empowering narrative of a broken relationship versus the narrative of 
intrapsychic dysfunction.  
As a result, the client may start to consciously address imbalances in his  alliance to the 
self by standing up for the self in relation to others. The therapist may utilise the factor of 
feedback here by enquiring about significant others’ reactions to this change in the client’s 
behaviour. The client’s experience of others’ reactions to his increased self-assertiveness (i.e. 
whether he experienced it as positive or negative) is also feedback to the therapist. The 
information that both the client and therapist obtained from this feedback process is useful in 
further refining or redirecting the evolving narrative as required.  
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By maintaining and fostering a critical and reflexive stance then, the psychotherapist 
shapes a therapeutic process that is creative rather than limiting and restricting. To achieve this, 
he or she needs to let go of attachments to preferred ways of explaining reality and embrace 
the post-modern concept of multiple realities. Such a therapist will come to appreciate that the 
value of a specific explanation of a specific problem is determined by the local context and 
dialogue rather than by universal laws.  
A therapist that is appreciative of local context and dialogue will be free to question 
and reflect on restrictive ‘one size fits all’ worldviews in the search of a worldview tailored for 
the specific individual in his or her specific context. The therapist’s major contribution to the 
process of psychotherapy is to transfer and foster this reflexive and critical stance in the 
therapeutic process and eventually to the client as he or she ventures forward independent from 
the therapeutic relationship (Hoffman, 1992; White, 2011).  
Considering the foregoing discussion on psychotherapy as a collaborative attempt to 
reframe a problem in order to allow for flexibility and alternatives, it becomes clear that a social 
constructionist model is critical of universally imposed techniques. In search of a social 
constructionist model of common factors which also encapsulates critical and reflexive 
attitudes that are crucial to the process of therapy, it is important that users of such a model 
remain aware of their responsibility to appreciate it as a guiding model and not as a universal 
method.  
As Efran et al. (1990) propose, one can get caught up in an ideological debate on 
complex issues of trivial importance when one takes too serious the idea that certain 
distinctions are so fundamental that they can yield permanent objective truths. Therefore, 
scientific endeavour in this view ceases to be a quest for the question that would yield the 
answer. Rather, the goal becomes to ask questions in such a way as to open new doors for 
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alternative answers to become a possibility, steering clear of those absolutes that are no better 
than wool over the eyes. 
 
3.12     CONCLUSION 
 
The post-modern paradigm had widespread effects on scientific thinking, especially in the 
realm of human sciences such as psychology. Social constructionism and constructivism are some of 
the post-modern movements that contribute to a critical reflection on the state and nature of scientific 
knowledge as well as questioning the scientific observer’s role in constructing knowledge. This chapter 
focussed on outlining the various contributions of the post-modern paradigm to the field of 
psychotherapy with specific attention on critiques from a social constructionist epistemology.  
Despite the many questions raised regarding the legitimacy of accepted psychotherapy policies 
and practices based on positivist assumptions, social constructionist researchers are often criticised for 
being critical while not offering much in the form of practical and viable inputs or solutions to the 
identified problems. Baring this critique in mind, the next chapter focuses on outlining a social 
constructionist model of therapeutic factors in an attempt to address existing shortfalls of evidence 
based- and common factors approaches. 
  
 88 
© University of South Africa 2015 
 
CHAPTER 4  
 
A  S OC I AL CO NST R UC TIO NI ST MO DEL  O F THE RAP E U TI C 
FA C T ORS  
 
The foregoing discussion outlined elements of postmodernism as well as social 
constructionist and constructivist understandings that inform the process of psychotherapy. 
Embedded in this discussion were critiques of positivist conceptualisations of psychotherapy 
that tend to reduce its complexity to the performance of specific techniques to specific 
populations of clients, or to common factors that are relatively unintegrated and mainly 
quantified.  
Various implications for a social constructionist model of psychotherapy based on 
therapeutic factors were considered. In this regard a general argument is espoused that suggests 
that a purely positivistic worldview, and as a result a purely empirical method, may restrict a 
therapist’s critical self-reflexivity. It is then important for a social constructionist view to offer 
some constructive input to promote psychotherapists’ reflexivity and encourage their 
acknowledgement of a multiverse of possible roles.  
These inputs come in the form of a social constructionist model of therapeutic factors 
that discards the idea of ultimate truths, encourages reflexivity in both client and therapist and 
asks the therapist to embrace the idea of actively constructing therapeutic problems and their 
solutions together with clients. This section focuses on summarising and integrating elements 
of the foregoing discussion into a formal model of psychotherapy from a social constructionist 
perspective utilising therapeutic factors.  
Within this model, the therapeutic supra-system can be defined as the overarching 
factor that is responsible for therapeutic outcome (or equals the sum of all the other factors) 
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and can thus be thought of as the therapeutic supra-factor. The client and therapist form the 
next level of factors as agent-factors who interact by reflecting on themselves as factors in the 
therapeutic process, reflecting on each other as factors in the therapeutic process and reflecting 
on all the sub-factors of the therapeutic process (including diagnostic labelling, technique, 
alliance, feedback, etc). This model is presented graphically in Figure 4.2. 
 
4.1      PRE-THERAPEUTIC STAGE 
 
In this stage, the client functions as a predominantly closed system. He or she becomes 
aware of a problem via feedback from the social environment. The nature of this problem is 
coloured by the client’s worldview (i.e. informed by some or all client factors) and thus the 
worldview serves to form an explanatory mode for the difficulties experienced either internally 
or through environmental feedback. This explanatory mode serves a purpose of directing action 
in order to resolve the problem.  
For example, consider a woman that who has had a fear of spiders for most of her life 
but without much interference on her daily functioning. When she suddenly starts dreaming of 
spiders and experiences panic when she wakes, she finds it hard to divert her attention away 
from the images of spiders and the anxiety associated with it. Her preoccupation may seem 
‘normal’ at first, until friends start to give her feedback that she has lately not been herself. She 
may also start to notice that her work performance has decreased, that she feels constantly tired 
and has become dependent and needy of those close to her.  
Given her worldview informed by westernised culture, she knows a bit about 
psychology and it all starts to fall in place: She has developed a phobia of spiders and needs to 
find ways to deal with her ‘irrational’ fear. Her explanation of the problem, however, is limited 
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by her personal worldview, and will continue to remain a closed system for as long as she keeps 
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Figure 4.1 – Pre-therapeutic Stage  
 
“I am irrational” 
“I am weak” 
“I am crazy” 
Problem Narrative 
Worldview restricted by problem narratives 
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Figure 4.2 – A Social Constructionist Model of Therapeutic Factors 
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 Considering her derived explanation, she may now ask for advice from friends and 
family or attempt to google the problem away. Any of these paths to a solution may be helpful 
since they may serve to broaden her worldview enough to allow for satisfactory solutions to 
become available. If not satisfactory then she may consider professional help in the form of 
medical consult or psychotherapy to ‘treat’ the problem away. 
Thus, during the pre-therapeutic stage, the client experiences a problem for which there 
are not any satisfactory explanations that lead to satisfactory solutions. She finds herself in an 
experiential conundrum that requires a different opinion, perhaps a professional opinion in 
order for the problem to be resolved. This expectation of the client first signals that her own 
worldview is constricted and so were her prior attempts to broaden it; and second that there is 
hope that the psychotherapy process will provide something different in terms of explaining 
and solving the problem. In other words, through the act of consulting a psychotherapist the 
client communicates that she is open to reflection and that the relatively solid boundaries 
enclosing her worldview have turned into relatively permeable boundaries that will allow new 
perspectives to expand her existing worldview. 
 
4.2      FORMATION OF THE THERAPEUTIC SUPRA-SYSTEM  
 
The therapeutic supra-system forms when the client and therapist agree that they will 
engage in interactions to discuss the client’s problems. The joining of the client and therapist 
gives rise to the definition of the nature of their relationship. This therapeutic supra-system 
cannot exist without mutual acceptance of its existence and nature by both therapist and client. 
Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Checchin and Prata (1980) and later Cecchin (1992) describe how 
this negotiation of the nature of the therapeutic relationship generally occurs on covert levels 
to define the client’s and therapist’s interactive roles in relation to one another (e.g. expert vs. 
leek; provider vs. consumer; equal allies; etc.) and determines alliances. When a therapist 
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remains unaware of the role he or she assumes in relation to the client, it may lead to the 
reinforcement of the existing worldview of the client and of the problematic patterns of 
behaviour.   
During the formation of the therapeutic supra-system, the client reveals that there is a 
problem and shares her worldview of that problem with the therapist. The therapist in turn 
adopts a curious stance, what Anderson and Goolishian (1992) call a not-knowing stance, in 
order to understand the problem from the client’s perspective. At this point, the social 
constructionist therapist should acknowledge that the client’s worldview is one of a multiverse 
of worldviews that is informed by her previous experiences, personality characteristics, 
relationship history, character strengths and weaknesses, including all other client factors.  
The therapist should also understand that the client’s worldview colours her perception 
of the problem and sets parameters of the problem definition. These parameters of the problem 
definition then also delimit the possible solutions that are readily palpable to the client as well 
as to the therapeutic system at that point. Thus, in order for different solutions to become 
available, the therapeutic supra-system is reliant on an expansion of the definition of the client’s 
worldview of the problem. 
In the joining phase then, the client’s and therapist’s activities are centred on examining 
and reflexively considering all of the client-factors (including the client’s problem definition) 
in the interactional space between the client and therapist. The therapist at this point may start 
to consider how the client’s definition of the problem differs from his or her own understanding 
as informed by his or her knowledge of psychological theories, techniques and various other 
personal ‘therapist factors’.  
Through this process of sharing, the client (through sharing) and the therapist (through 
listening) open possibilities for negotiating and redefining their worldviews on the problem. 
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This is made possible only by the differences between the client’s and therapist’s worldviews. 
In the model presented in Figure 4.2, the joining process opens the space between the client 
and therapist as is represented by the reflection slot, the technique slot and the problem 
definition.  
Because the therapist forms a worldview of the client’s problem through the act of 
critically and reflexively listening to the client’s explanation of the problem, the act of listening 
reflexively can be seen as a technique performed by the therapist. In the model described here, 
listening reflexively and various other therapeutic activities are conceptualised as techniques 
that are represented in the technique slot.  
By sharing the problem, both therapist and client work towards reaching a mutual 
agreement of what the nature and definition of the problem is. Thus, by this collaborative effort 
to redefine the problem, it is no longer the sole property of the client’s, but becomes the mutual 
property for which both client and therapist now take responsibility. Of course, it could also 
happen that the therapist creates the impression that he or she intends to take full responsibility 
for the problem, but this is not recommended.  
Through developing a worldview of the client’s problem, the therapist opens certain 
possibilities to explain the problem and how it may be solved. This brings into play both 
therapist factors and model or technique factors that can now be utilised in the therapeutic 
interaction. It is of crucial importance that the client also has an existing worldview for 
explaining the problem as well as having some ideas about the solutions he or she expects. The 
therapist can assist the client to articulate these expectations, if not already clearly defined. The 
client’s worldview and expectancy factors form a crucial part of the negotiation between client 
and therapist in order to expand the shared worldview that develops as a function of the 
therapeutic interaction.  
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As a means to signal to the client that negotiations on the definition and nature of the 
problem has commenced, the therapist makes known his or her worldview as a possible 
explanation of the problem. The therapist’s attitude becomes important here, in that the rigid 
therapist who believes in universal truths is vulnerable to adopt an authoritative role by 
imposing a worldview on the client. The overly flexible therapist on the other hand, may be 
vulnerable to forego his or her own worldview and adopt that of the client in order to reach 
agreement. This premature agreement actually undermines ongoing collaborative negotiations 
that lead to the expansion of the shared worldview. 
In this model, it is important that the therapist reserves the right to hold his or her 
worldview of the problem, whatever its form may be. If his or her worldview is too similar to 
that of the client’s, it may lead to therapeutic impotence. If the therapist’s worldview of the 
problem is too different, it will not be compatible with the client’s worldview. This refers to 
the orthogonality of the therapist’s worldview and is determined through negotiation with the 
client. The therapist should thus be prepared to be flexible in the way his or her worldview is 
presented to the client.  
Once the orthogonal worldview of the therapist is presented to the client, it provides 
the client with news of difference. Since the therapist’s explanation of the problem is intended 
to affect the therapeutic interaction, the act of explaining can too be seen as a therapeutic 
technique performed by the therapist. The conceptualisation of explanation as a technique, 
implies that the therapist employs his or her worldview and explanation of the problem 
strategically and reflexively. Having awareness of each other’s views and explanations of the 
problem, the client and therapist’s worldviews on the problem can be reflected on in the space 
between them as a means to affect the mutually constructed, co-evolving problem definition.  
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The difference in their worldviews of the problem forms the basis of a structural 
coupling of ideas about the problem that allows for the gradual emergence of a shared 
worldview of the problem. This co-evolving shared worldview is different from both the 
client’s and therapist’s original worldviews of the problem, yet still contains elements of their 
original worldviews. In the model presented in Figure 4.2, the original worldviews are initially 
separate and as they move closer together over time, and as a function of the interaction 
between client and therapist, these worldviews eventually converge.  
The converged problem definition is graphically presented to be different, in shape and 
shade, from the original problem definition to illustrate that it changes as a function of the 
negotiation between client and therapist (see Figure 4.2). It should also be noted that in practice, 
it is not necessary for the client’s and therapist’s worldviews to converge perfectly. Rather, 
what is sought in therapy is for the client’s worldview of the problem to converge enough with 
that of the therapist so that the new frame would make alternative solutions available. This new 
explanation should make enough sense to the client so that the solutions that spring from it 
seem appropriate and satisfying to the client.   
If this structural coupling between the client’s and therapist’s worldviews of the 
problem is negotiated successfully, it leads to the emergence of a new narrative that may serve 
to illuminate possible solutions to the problem. In other words, psychometric testing, specific 
theoretical descriptions, therapeutic techniques, interventions and/or rituals can now become 
plausible as useful elements that may form part of satisfactory solutions to the problem. 
Sometimes, however, the mere ‘insight’ gained from the new explanation of the problem opens 
a world of new solutions to the client. Thus, it is questionable if the enactment of a ritual or 
specific intervention, as envisioned by Fourie (2012) is necessary for all clients.  
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Having discussed the formation of the therapeutic supra-system, the various elements 
that form part of this system will now be discussed. These elements embody the common 
factors of psychotherapy and the model allows for them to be utilised in a flexible, yet 
meaningful way in a therapeutic interaction.  
 
4.2.1     Therapist and Client as Persons vs. Factors 
 
When the client or the therapist are spoken about as ‘factors’ in the therapeutic process 
it may be easy to forget that they also remain persons and that persons as factors are not to be 
confused with the persons themselves. Within this model, the distinction between a person and 
a person as a factor is based on the assumption that no therapeutic factor, including the person 
as a factor, has the ability of holding a worldview7 or of reflecting on matters. It often occurs 
that factors become personified or persons become dehumanised in the technical language of 
science (Prilleltensky & Fox, 2009). 
By making such errors, our focus in research and psychotherapy shifts away from the 
persons involved in the therapeutic interaction to the models, techniques and other factors as if 
these were the active agents in the therapeutic process.  
The client and therapist as persons embody beings with subjective opinions, 
worldviews and capacities to reflect and communicate about therapeutic factors and about 
themselves and each other. As persons they possess agency to act, something that sets them 
apart from the therapeutic factors and gives them power over these factors. As persons, the 
client and therapist also holds the capacity to reflect on themselves as factors in the therapeutic 
process. Client and therapist as factors then embody the sum of how they perceive themselves 
                                                          
7 Therapeutic models as factors are often personified as if they ‘hold’ certain worldviews and that the client 
interacts with a model rather than with a therapist, i.e. another person (E.g. Blow, Davis & Sprenkle, 2012; Simon, 
2012a & 2012b). This error causes the focus to shift away from the persons involved in the therapeutic interaction 
to the models, techniques and other factors 
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and are perceived by the other, and as factors do not possess agency to perform, but are rather 
seen as objects of their own and each other’s reflections.  
A distinction of this nature implies that the client as a person may form a perception of 
the therapist as a factor. The client’s perception of the therapist as a factor is important because 
it allows the client and therapist, as persons, to place this factor (i.e. the therapist as factor) in 
the interactive space between them to reflect on. Through this critical reflection, the persons 
involved are able to negotiate how the therapist as a factor impacts on their personal 
worldviews of the problem as well as on the co-evolving shared worldview of the problem.  
By remaining an individual, but at the same time reflecting on the self as a factor in the 
therapeutic process, places the therapist in a position where he or she is able to receive feedback 
from the client about how his or her therapist behaviour and character impact on the client’s 
worldview. Simultaneously, the therapist is able to talk about, and reflect on, himself or herself 
as a factor from an external meta-perspective, as if he or she were talking about another person 
entirely. Of course, the therapist can engage in a similar conversation with the client as a person 
about the client as a factor from a meta-perspective, and in doing so encourages the client to 
develop the skill of self-examination (also known as introspection).  
Having a conversation about themselves as factors that influence each other may be 
quite powerful as it creates opportunities for both the therapist and client as persons to be 
critical of each other as factors, but at the same time be supportive of each other as persons. 
This allows for the provision of feedback while still nurturing the therapeutic relationship.  
For example, a client complaining of ‘depression and low self-esteem’ may express 
anger towards the therapist for not having been responsive to her need for sympathy in a 
previous session. The therapist may seize this opportunity to invoke himself or herself as a 
factor in the therapeutic process to be reflected on and discussed in the space between. The 
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‘therapist as an individual lacking sympathy’ now becomes a potent factor that can potentially 
affect the client’s worldview of her problem, but also the co-evolving shared worldview of the 
problem. The therapist as person may ask questions such as: “How has my failure to be 
sympathetic affected how you think of our relationship?” Followed by: “Would it change how 
you perceive yourself if I gave you more sympathy?” And finally: “How would it affect how 
you see your problem if I were to continue being unsympathetic?”  
In all three of the foregoing questions the therapist as person adopts a curious stance 
regarding the effect of himself or herself as a factor on the therapeutic relationship, the client’s 
view of herself as a factor and then the client’s worldview of the problem. By providing 
answers to these questions, the client as a person gets to reflect on himself as a factor that 
affects his worldview of the problem. The problem, as defined from the client’s worldview, is 
also being challenged in that the therapist suggests that it is malleable and dependent on how 
the client answers his or her questions. The therapist’s reflexivity on himself or herself as a 
factor, also invites the client to critically reflect on her own problem narrative: “I [as a factor] 
need sympathy from others to feel that I am appreciated and worthy”.  
The reader is also encouraged to see that by adopting a meta-view of himself or herself 
as a factor, the therapist as a person is able to remain allied with the client as a person and thus 
avoids opposing the client in defence of himself or herself the therapist. The therapist merely 
acknowledges the client’s experience of him or her as a factor and through the therapist’s 
reflexive questions encourages a process of constructing meaning from this experience to add 
to the eventual goal of negotiating a shared worldview that allows for narratives with more 
satisfactory solutions.  
By making this distinction of the self as a person and the self as a factor, the therapist 
is able to lead by example, defining the interactive space as one where it is acceptable to 
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acknowledge the self as a factor that at times impacts ‘negatively’ on the other and that there 
is something to be learnt by reflecting critically on the self as a factor while still appreciating 
each other as two persons engaged in a meaningful therapeutic relationship.  
 
4.2.2     Reflexive and Critical Dialogue 
 
In the foregoing text, much is said of reflexivity and critical dialogue as it pertains to 
the practice of psychotherapy. Reflexivity as a therapeutic stance has been widely advocated 
by social constructionists (e.g. Andersen, 1992; Hoffman, 1992; Tomm, 1987; Tomm, 1988) 
as being useful in the co-construction of new meaning.  
The notion of the reflexive question stems from the philosophical ideas of Derrida 
(1982) surrounding the deconstruction of language in order to question the validity of the 
assumptions concealed therein. Tomm (1988) is of the opinion that any question a therapist 
asks stems from an intent that is either acknowledged or unacknowledged. As such a reflexive 
dialogue is intent on questioning the automatic presumptions that are revealed in the client’s 
dialogue about the problem, the self and his or her relationship to the world and others (Tomm, 
1988). For this type of reflection to occur, it is necessary that the dialogue is critical, meaning 
that its participants (or at least one of them) are/is committed to entertaining the possibility that 
the held assumptions may be unwarranted.  
Such a critical and reflexive dialogue then sets a conversational context in which 
alternative definitions, narratives and worldviews may be considered in addition to the initially 
accepted ones. Of course, through reflexive and critical dialogue these alternative definitions, 
narratives and worldviews of the problem can and should also be scrutinised for the client to 
consider whether these may be more or less satisfactory, useful or healing. Tomm (1987) 
therefore believes that a reflexive dialogue is less confrontational and more inquisitive and 
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invitational, whereby the client is invited by the therapist to engage in a scrutiny of the effects 
of that client’s generally accepted and unquestioned narrative of the problem, the self, the world 
and others. The effects of reflexive questions tend to turn dialogues into creative and generative 
interactions from which new meaning can emanate.  
Tomm (1987) outlines and discusses in depth various forms of reflexive questions that 
may be utilised in a reflexive and critical dialogue. These include, but are not limited to: 
 Future oriented questions 
 Observer perspective questions 
 Unexpected context change questions 
 Embedded suggestion questions 
 Normative comparison questions 
 Distinction clarifying questions 
 Questions introducing hypotheses 
 Process interruption questions 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the structure and purpose of every form 
of reflexive question, but rather to explicate the general structure and effects of reflexive 
questions. As mentioned before, through posing a reflexive question, the speaker announces 
his or her critical stance of a subject, thereby inviting his or her audience to engage with the 
doubt raised. For instance, a therapist may invite a client into a reflexive dialogue on the 
meaning of his anxiety disorder for his perceived sense of self by asking a normative 
comparison question such as: “What do you understand by the term disorder and how does this 
understanding affect where you fit in in relation to others [who are presumably normal or 
anxiety ordered]?”  
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The reflexive question communicates a speaker’s intention to critically reflect on the 
effects of utterances (as carriers of our assumptions) on our understandings of our problems, 
ourselves and the world. As a by-product, the reflexive question also serves to stimulate the 
dialogue as to how the aforementioned notions about problems, ourselves and the world may 
be different if we held different assumptions. The reflexive question is different from a negating 
question in that it raises doubt in a held assumption and invites a participative generation of 
unspecified alternatives. A reflexive stance then closely approximates the not-knowing stance, 
indicating that the therapist does not presume to have the luxury of knowing the correct 
assumptions to hold, but rather accepts that there may be numerous assumptions with varying 
effects on the client’s view of the problem, the self and the world.  
A negating question on the other hand communicates that the speaker disagrees with a 
specific assumption and seeks to impose an alternative view on his or her audience. The latter 
type of question serves to negate one perspective (i.e. that of the audience) and promote the 
perspective of the speaker, thereby framing the interaction as one of opposition. As an example, 
the said therapist may respond to the client’s notion of being anxiety disordered by asking the 
negating question: “Why not substitute the rather debilitating word disordered with the word 
challenged?” Although such a question may challenge the assumption of the client, it invites 
the client to adopt a different assumption (i.e. that of the therapist), without engaging in a 
reflexive dialogue of what these different phrases would mean to the client or how it would 
impact on his perception of the problem, the self or the world. 
In the social constructionist model of psychotherapy outlined in this thesis, a general 
reflexive and critical stance is promoted in order to stimulate a critical and reflexive dialogue 
between client and therapist. By utilising the power of reflexive questions, a therapist may go 
a long way to facilitate a reflexive dialogue. However, as with all therapeutic techniques, 
reflexive questioning is one among an array of types of questions (i.e. techniques) that the 
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therapist may enlist. It should, however, be noted that by merely asking reflexive questions, 
the therapist is not guaranteed that the conversation will be reflexive and critical. Conversely, 
by asking other types of questions (such as strategic, lineal or circular questions) the therapist 
may still retain a generally reflexive stance through his or her commitment to acknowledge and 
articulate the assumptions that are promoted by any form of question posed in the dialogue. 
Thus, the model discussed here discriminates between a reflexive question and a 
reflexive dialogue, the former embodying a therapeutic technique, while the latter signifies the 
therapist’s commitment to critically and reflexively engage in participation with the client on 
whatever question is raised in therapeutic interaction (including all types of questions, 
techniques and other common factors).   
 
4.2.3     The Space Between 
 
As discussed above, the therapeutic relationship is established when agreement is 
reached between a client and a therapist to reflect on and exchange worldviews of the client’s 
problem. This process of communicating their inner experiences and understandings of reality 
results in a shared or mutual space between client and therapist where their worldviews meet 
(Becvar & Becvar, 2000). In the model proposed here, this space is called the space between 
as it refers to the point of intersection of the client’s and therapist’s inner worlds.  
The ‘space between’ is of utmost importance in the therapeutic process, as it is here 
where client factors, therapist factors and all other therapeutic factors converge when the 
therapist and client reflexively discuss and negotiate the meaning of these factors for them as 
persons and for the problem of therapy. Considering the concept of structural coupling, it is in 
the ‘space between’ where the client and therapist become structurally coupled in the hopes of 
influencing each other’s worldviews in ways that may benefit the client.  
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The therapist assumes much responsibility in this regard, as it is he or she who must 
remain consistently aware of this ‘space between’ so that it may be utilised optimally and 
reflexively in the process of therapy. When certain factors bearing on the worldviews of client 
and therapist become salient, the therapist should bear the responsibility of placing those 
factors in the ‘space between’ so that it may be critically and reflexively examined for its part 
in constructing the current worldview of the problem. It is also in the ‘space between’ where 
new meaning may be ‘discovered’ in relation to any specific factor that is reflected on. The 
‘space between’, therefore, is useful for the ‘discovery’8 of metaphors, images, discourses, 
etcetera that can be utilised in the construction of a new narrative to inform a different 
worldview of the client’s problem.  
For instance, a client may be unaware of the extent to which her support system, as a 
factor, bears on her worldview (and narrative) of a problem such as a post-traumatic stress 
reaction. In discussing her experiences following her trauma, the client may discuss how she 
becomes easily irritated by others and how this difficulty impacts on her significant others, 
leading to guilt. Here the therapist has a multitude of client factors to which he or she can react 
(i.e examine in the space between), including diagnostic factors (PTSD), personality factors 
(irritability), interpersonal factors (relationship with others). Each of these factors may 
reinforce the existing worldview of the client or they may be utilised to critically and 
reflexively question the current worldview.  
By critically reflecting on her irritability in the space between, it may come to light that 
the client’s irritability stems from her worldview that others are not concerned about her 
troubles, but that their enquiry of her emotional status rather communicates an expectation to 
                                                          
8 It should be understood that, from a social constructionist worldview, discourses, etc. are not discovered, but are 
co-constructed by a client and therapist’s interactive negotiation in the space between. It may appear, however, 
that these elements emerge as if ‘discovered’ and for the sake of therapy it may even be useful to tolerate this 
illusion of ‘discovery’ as long as this does not restrict the therapist’s openness to other useful discourses, images, 
metaphors, etc.  
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be “okay” as quickly as possible in order to reduce the burden on others. The reflexive and 
critical stance of the therapist provides a context for the revelation of previously unquestioned 
discourses such as ‘personal worth’ and ‘burdening of others’ and the image of the self as ‘an 
unfortunate inconvenience’. Such discourses may dictate the client’s personal narrative and 
worldview of the self as being secondary to others. The critical and reflexive examination of 
these discourses and images and their effects on the client’s worldview of the self is likely to 
expose new discourses such as ‘alliances to the self versus others’ that can be weaved into a 
narrative and worldview that reveals a different conceptualisation and solution to the problem 
of irritability.  
Such different narratives may include that the client’s irritability may not necessarily 
stem from others’ lack of understanding and concern, but from the fact that she places herself 
second to others and thus has neglected her own needs by being more concerned with the needs 
of others. Specific therapeutic techniques, such as guided relaxation, may now be employed as 
a means to reduce the client’s irritability with herself in order to set the context to restore her 
alliance with, and make peace with, herself. If the therapist merely chose to reduce the client’s 
irritability by invoking a therapeutic technique of guided relaxation, it may likely reinforce the 
client’s worldview that she is an inconvenient burden to others and it is thus questionable as to 
whether any satisfactory long-term relief would result.  
It is important to note that the space between should be utilised for the revelation of the 
client’s current worldview and to construct a new worldview. It may be tempting for the 
therapist to develop a narrative and worldview of the problem that he or she feels may be 
appropriate for the client’s problem and reveal this to the client without going through the fuss 
of reflection with and questioning of the client. However, a different narrative and worldview 
of the problem is much more likely to be satisfactory when the client feels she was part of the 
‘uncovery’ of that narrative and worldview through painstaking reflection in the space between.  
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Finally, it may be possible that the client seeks to place, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, specific factors in the space between for reflection. The therapist would do well 
to be responsive to the client’s attempt and reflect on its meaning at that specific point in time, 
instead of just allowing or dismissing it. If the client continually clashes with the therapist on 
what should be reflected on in the space between, it may be appropriate to reflect on the 
therapeutic relationship as a factor in the space between. Such a reflection may reveal certain 
interactive patterns between client and therapist that may bear on the worldview of the problem.  
For example, the client may tend to be argumentative or extremely agreeable which 
may provide clues to their worldview of themselves in relation to others when reflected on 
critically. This type of reflection closely resembles the psychoanalytic business of dealing with 
transference and countertransference.  
Depending on the need of the situation, the space between may be utilised to reflect on 
either the client’s or therapist’s experience of the therapeutic relationship. This process of 
giving and soliciting feedback to and from each other may impact emphatically on both the 
client’s and therapist’s worldview of the problem as well as on the co-evolution of their shared 
worldview of the problem. It is through this feedback in the space between where the client 
and therapist gets to view themselves as persons affecting another person and affecting a 
mutual process or worldview.  
By reflecting on themselves as factors in the process of constructing a mutual 
worldview, the client and therapist have an opportunity to experiment with different roles and 
different ways of behaving toward each other as well as feedback on what the effect of this 
experimentation was on the other. What is important is that the space between remains a mutual 
space that is not dominated by either the client or the therapist. 
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4.2.4     Worldviews as Factors 
 
The social constructionist viewpoint assumes that any awareness, explanation or 
formulation of human experience is unavoidably subjective and as such requires the person to 
order these experiences and interpret them in a meaningful way. Therefore, communicating 
what one knows about a specific experiential problem requires one to hold a specific worldview 
(i.e. theory about the world, oneself and others) from which to generate descriptions and 
explanations of that problematic experience.  
The worldview of a client may be informed by layman’s knowledge, superstitions, 
religious ideas, popular psychology, inherited knowledge, scientific knowledge and/or personal 
experience. The therapist’s worldview generally is informed by general philosophical 
assumptions (formal epistemologies), specific working models of psychopathology and 
psychotherapy and/or specific therapeutic techniques. However, the therapist’s worldview is 
likely to be influenced by subjective factors as well, including personal experience, likes and 
dislikes that affect how he or she is inclined to explain the problem from a scientific viewpoint.  
What is important to consider in terms of worldviews as factors is how a worldview 
may affect the possibilities for action of the individuals involved. Also the use of certain 
explanations, metaphors, discourses, techniques and all other therapeutic aids may be limited 
by specific worldviews or may be encouraged by other worldviews. The worldviews of the 
therapist and client therefore may affect how, and when, certain factors are reflected on and 
how, and when, certain techniques or explanations may be invoked to affect the shared 
worldview of the problem.  
For example, a therapist who formulates his or her worldview of the problem from an 
object relations therapy model may open possibilities of reflecting on the client’s internal 
representations of relationships with significant others and how this may impact on the problem 
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definition. On the other hand, a therapist whose worldview of the problem is informed by a 
behavioural model may open possibilities for reflecting on past lessons learned by the client 
about herself and how such lessons may impact on the problem. These different worldviews of 
the therapist may lead to a different shared worldview of the problem that may lead to different 
solutions. The first narrative (based on object relations) may inform solutions based on 
developing more realistic representations of relationships, whereas the second may inform 
solutions based on techniques to assist the client to learn new lessons about her worth as an 
individual. 
Although it may appear that the therapeutic model directs the therapist’s actions, such 
a unilateral punctuation is misleading and potentially disables the therapist’s agency. Instead 
of a worldview directing his or her behaviour, the therapist is advised to consider a worldview 
as colouring his or her perceptions and actions in certain meaningful ways. The worldview of 
a therapist gives rise to one of many potentially helpful narratives for making sense of the 
problem and solving it. When it directs a therapist’s behaviour, however, that therapist is in 
danger of mistaking a narrative for the truth and this may lead to rigid approaches to therapy. 
Conversely, the therapist’s interpretation of a model (as affected by his or her idiosyncratic 
worldview) necessarily changes that model so that his or her interpretation and execution of 
therapy from that model is different from that of any other therapist’s.  
Keeping these matters in mind, one can appreciate how client and therapist worldviews 
as factors hold potential for shaping the shared worldview of the problem. When taken for 
granted this effect on the shared worldview is insidious, but when the therapist is mindful to 
critically reflect on his or her own worldview and the client’s worldview in the ‘space between’, 
an opportunity is created for them to actively utilise their worldview to construct a shared 
worldview of the problem.  
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4.2.5      Model/Technique Factors 
 
Model and technique factors include any act that is deemed to be, or intended to be, 
therapeutic. Stated differently, these factors include any act that is strategically employed by 
the therapist to facilitate the process of negotiation of a shared worldview of the problem. 
Among these factors are specific theoretical explanations, models of therapy, research and 
research findings (including statistics), psychological testing and results, feedback, reflections, 
mirroring, listening, pausing, remaining silent, specific therapeutic stances (including 
directive-, not knowing-, empathic stances, etc.), hypnosis, EMDR, among many others.  
The model is designed to illustrate that the various therapeutic factors can be reflected 
on critically in the space between, so that the therapist and client express their respective views 
on how each of these factors impact on their worldviews of the problem as well as the problem 
narrative. As a result of this reflexive approach, the reflexive dialogue between client and 
therapist often focus on the therapist’s theoretical explanation of the problem. This entails that 
the therapist places his or her guiding model in the ‘space between’ for critical reflection.  
By making his or her problem narrative explicit, the therapist offers an alternative 
“scientific” explanation of the problem that may serve to alter the client’s problem narrative. 
The general idea of such a move is to present the client with a sufficiently different view of the 
problem so that it may stimulate dialogue on the differences in worldviews. 
Furthermore, in the model proposed in Figure 4.2, one can distinguish between the 
performance of a technique on the client (which may have a specific strategic value, e.g. to 
illustrate some point) and the reflection on that technique in the ‘space between’. The former 
has a unidirectional nature, (i.e. something the therapist does to the client for some or other 
purpose). The implementation of a technique, however, is usually accompanied by the latter, 
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that is a reflection on the technique and its effects in the ‘space between’ so that its impact on 
the worldview of the problem is considered reflexively and critically.  
Of course, failure to reflect on the performance of some technique and its effects in the 
space between does not preclude it from influencing the co-evolving shared worldview of the 
problem. Examples where the intentional employment of technique without reflection in the 
space between is carried out effectively are found in the directive therapies of Milton H. 
Erickson (see Haley, 1993; Haley, 1963). 
By its nature, the therapeutic interaction and the space between allows for the constant 
exchange of ideas based on the client’s and therapist’s differing worldviews. This implies that 
constant feedback and constant reflection occur between client and therapist. This is different 
from feedback and reflection when employed as techniques. The latter implies the strategic and 
timed use of feedback or reflection at a specific point in time with the mind-set of achieving 
some therapeutic goal. General feedback and reflection, on the other hand, are necessary 
components of any human interaction that usually occurs outside of our conscious awareness.  
For instance, to express an idea, a person needs to reflect on some matter, the self and 
his or her relationship to that matter so that an opinion or idea can be formed on that matter 
before it can be expressed. By expressing an opinion or idea, a person is necessarily giving 
feedback to the external world about his or her internal world. In this model of psychotherapy, 
the therapist is required to remain constantly aware of the ongoing reflexivity and feedback 
involved in the interactive process so that they may be employed consciously in the process of 
co-constructing a shared worldview of the problem. 
Given that the proposed model represents a social constructionist explanation of a 
change process in psychotherapy, it is aimed at promoting an understanding of how change can 
be facilitated through the reflexive dialogue on various therapeutic factors. As such, it should 
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allow a therapist to utilise any technique and model of psychotherapy, including cognitive 
behavioural models, psycho-analysis, family systems models, etcetera. It does, however, call 
on psychotherapists to reflexively accept these models and techniques as possible explanations 
of the client’s problems, rather than get attached to these as offering absolutely true accounts 
of the problem and its solutions.   
 
4.3      CONCLUSION 
 
Given the weaknesses of the evidence based approaches and the common factors 
models of psychotherapy that were discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter was 
dedicated to outlining a different model for viewing the process of psychotherapy. The 
epistemological assumptions that form the basis of this model emanate from a postmodern 
worldview and ideas from ecological and social constructionist perspectives were utilised to 
inform practical methods of utilising common factors in a social constructionist model of 
psychotherapy.  
It is argued that the difference in client and therapist worldviews form an integral part 
of the therapeutic process, in that a critical and reflexive discussion on their different views on 
various common factors allow them to co-construct a different worldview of the problem. This 
worldview may not be ‘more true’ than the client’s original worldview of the problem, but may 
be relatively more useful to the client as it may afford him or her a wider array of solutions 
than the original worldview. This model then assumes that there may be a variety of legitimate 
worldviews for explaining a specific problem, and that it is the task of psychotherapy to 
construct the most useful and satisfactory worldview for finding solutions for the client’s 
problem.  
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Thus, departing from the modernist view of ultimate truths, this model seeks to embrace 
different views and explanations of reality as having potential value for adding meaning to the 
client’s experience of his or her problem. This model then also seeks to incorporate both 
specific therapeutic factors as well as common factors of psychotherapy as crucial elements in 
the therapeutic process that may be utilised to construct a different, more useful worldview of 
the problem through critical and reflexive dialogue between two subjective and reflecting 
individual persons, (i.e. therapist and client).  
With the goal of demonstrating the application of the model described above, the focus 
in Chapters 5 and 6 shift to the presentation of case illustrations in clinical practice.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE ILLUSTRATIONS: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST MODEL OF 
THEAPEUTIC FACTORS IN PRACTICE  
 
 
In the foregoing chapter, a social constructionist model of therapeutic factors was 
explicated in terms of a pre-therapeutic stage as well as the formation of a therapeutic supra-
system. The latter consists of various therapeutic factors that can be mobilised in the co-
construction of the therapeutic narrative that is negotiated between therapist and client. These 
factors include everything and anything brought to the therapeutic process by both the therapist 
and client and then also contextual factors that arise as a function of their specific local 
interaction.  
The various factors were grouped together as client factors, therapist factors, 
model/technique factors, problem definition as a factor, interactional process as a factor 
(including the space between and the technique slot), and finally the supra-therapeutic system 
as a factor. Following from the theoretical discussion of these various elements of the social 
constructionist model in question, this chapter is dedicated to illustrating the workings of the 
model through various case illustrations.  
 
5.1     INTRODUCTION TO CASE CLIENTS9 
 
Each of the cases included in this chapter was chosen due to the clarity with which it 
highlights some part of the guiding model. Since there is much overlap between different cases 
in terms of the therapeutic process, segments of cases are emphasised as they pertain to the 
                                                          
9 All case clients were seen in psychotherapy with the author as the therapist and all clients gave consent for their 
narratives to be included in this thesis. All names and personal particulars have been changed to ensure the 
anonymity of clients.  
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element of the model under discussion. The reader is invited to keep in mind that a successful 
therapeutic process is likely to require the client and therapist to utilise multiple therapeutic 
factors in the construction of the new therapeutic narrative.  
 
5.1.1     Her Sister’s Keeper: Zanele’s Depressive Duties 
 
Zanele is a 29 year old black female who lives in the Johannesburg CBD with her niece. 
She is single and has recently ended an eight month long relationship. She has no children, but 
finances the care of her deceased sister’s five children as well as her mother who all live in a 
different province. She works in the project management field and holds a certificate in project 
management as well as a Bachelor degree in accounting. She describes herself as an active 
Jehova’s witness.  
Zanele first consulted the clinic10 in 2014 as she experienced difficulties “handling her 
own stuff” and felt like her “world was crumbling”. She was eventually diagnosed with a Major 
Depressive Disorder and co-morbid alcohol abuse and was admitted to a local private 
psychiatric clinic for treatment. Her psychotherapeutic process included inpatient sessions 
(three sessions per week over three weeks) and weekly outpatient sessions for a period of six 
months following her discharge from the hospital.  
 
5.1.2     Marcus Who Lost His Mojo 
 
Marcus is a 26 year old white male who lives in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg. 
He is single and despite having numerous friends has recently resorted to social withdrawal 
together with a somewhat apathetic and nihilistic attitude to life. He holds a good job in the 
                                                          
10 Sandton Psychology Centre 
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financial field in which he is quite successful despite never having completed a university 
degree. He does not have any children or dependents.  
Marcus first consulted the clinic in November 2013 with complaints of “feeling numb 
and disinterested in life”. He struggled to find any meaning in life and thus also did not feel 
passionate about any area of his life. He was previously diagnosed with a Major Depressive 
Disorder and had underwent therapy as a child to assist with behavioural problems at school. 
His psychotherapeutic process consisted of weekly outpatient sessions for a period of five 
months.  
 
5.1.3      Lost in Transference: Heinrich’s Path to Self-Acceptance 
 
Heinrich is a 45 year old male who shares a house with his long-time friend and her 
girlfriend in the eastern suburbs of Johannesburg. He has been single for a few months 
following a complicated short-term relationship with a younger Arab man in the Middle East. 
Before this he had been on the online dating scene where he pursued numerous no-strings 
encounters with men in a Middle Eastern city. His first relationship, which lasted for 10 years, 
was characterised by extreme physical and verbal abuse from his partner. Heinrich reluctantly 
admits to being gay, but has only told a select few people, excluding his parents and colleagues 
as he fears being judged for what he terms “unnatural sexual acts”. He has been working as a 
writer in the business sector since he returned from the Middle East in 2013.  
He first consulted the clinic in October 2013 to help prevent him from becoming 
suicidal yet again. His visit was prompted by a tumultuous history of abusive relationships, 
isolation, interpersonal rejection as well as severe financial debts he incurred in order to secure 
his relationship with the young Arab man he was secretly dating. Due to these extreme 
pressures he eventually reached a level of desperation that lead him to attempt suicide by 
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cutting his wrists. After a two week stay in a psychiatric unit and a few nights in an Arab prison, 
Heinrich eventually fled back to South Africa fearing prosecution for his suicide attempt. His 
psychotherapeutic process comprised of weekly psychotherapy sessions for a period of more 
than 12 months.  
 
5.1.4     When Love and Hate Collude: Mandy’s Emancipation 
 
Mandy is a 36 year old white female who lives in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg. 
She is separated from her physically and verbally abusive boyfriend after a relationship of 
seven years. She has a daughter of nine years old with her ex-boyfriend. She works as an office 
manager and reports that her boss is very supportive of her.  
Mandy first consulted the clinic mid 2014 after she had a fall-out with a colleague (also 
a friend of hers) at work. Her boss suggested that she seek professional help to deal with the 
tremendous anger she expressed during this fall-out. According to Mandy she agrees that she 
tends to become very emotional, aggressive and tends to overreact when provoked by other 
people. She attributes these difficulties to having had a generally ‘bad life’ where she was 
rejected by her biological father, molested by her step-father, accused by her mother as being 
a liar and raped at the age of 13 years, before resorting to a life of sexual promiscuity and a 
series of bad choices in men. Her psychotherapeutic process consisted of weekly sessions and 
concluded after a period of 2 months.  
 
5.2      THE PRE-THERAPEUTIC STAGE 
 
Primarily, the pre-therapeutic stage is characterised by a sense of discontent in the client 
regarding one or more incidents in their lives. This discontent sprouts from an unsatisfactory 
and restrictive problem narrative, meaning that the client’s mental frame for understanding 
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their life situation leads to negative feelings and/or symptomatic expression. In the context of 
the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors, restrictive problem narratives do not 
mobilise client factors sufficiently in order to resolve the client’s problem and thus clients 
frequently make statements such as: “I’m in need of a different viewpoint” when asked about 
the reason for their consultation. In eco-systemic terms, this signals the need for feedback 
geared towards disrupting the unsatisfactory status quo, and the therapist personifies the source 
of information that may hopefully achieve the desired systemic perturbation.  
In the case of Zanele, her restrictive problem narrative was communicated as a tendency 
to place her own needs last in order to take care of her family. As a result she experiences a 
sense of disappointment in herself for not progressing far enough in life. Already one can 
identify various client factors that are at odds with each other, causing a disharmonious problem 
narrative: The first client factor is Zanele’s personal desires, wishes and needs that are at odds 
with a second grouping of client factors, familial duties and -expectations. Both these factors 
later prove to be very important to Zanele, and thus it is a major task in the therapeutic process 
to construct a narrative where these factors are not at odds.  
Furthermore, Zanele’s case also illustrates how a restrictive problem narrative leads to 
symptomatic expression. After stating her problem narrative, the therapeutic conversation turns 
to explore how the restrictive problem narrative links to specific psychiatric complaints. Zanele 
reported the following psychiatric symptoms: Depressed and irritable moods, loss of interest 
and pleasure in hobbies and interests, social withdrawal, low energy, a lack of motivation, poor 
concentration, poor self-esteem, suicidal ideation and anxiety related to her feelings of 
inadequacy. It is important to note here that clients often do not make explicit associations 
between their restrictive problem narratives and specific psychiatric complaints. The therapist 
therefore has to facilitate this association, and thus starts with the construction of a different 
problem narrative.  
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In the case of Zanele, she attributes her difficulties to the unfair life situation that has 
befallen her after her sister’s death. In exploring this piece of life history it came about that 
Zanele, who had been a hard worker all her life (in order to pursue a successful career) had to 
put her dreams on hold to take care of her sister’s five children. She described feeling cheated 
by life as she now has to suffer as a result of her sister’s irresponsible behaviour. Zanele refers 
to the fact that her sister had been “promiscuous”, had five children before contracting HIV 
that later caused her death. In terms of therapeutic factors, the latter revelations introduce 
another client factor to be explored in later sessions: That is personal experiences of life and 
relationships (life is unfair and others cannot be trusted). 
Finally, the pre-therapeutic stage also frequently has an isolated quality as clients often 
report in the first session that their problem has left them feeling alienated from others or that 
others do not understand what they are going through or that they do not feel comfortable 
sharing their problem with significant others due to a variety of potential reasons. Whatever 
these reasons may be, the result is that clients tend to sit with the problem in their own hands 
and do not have the benefit of self-reflection with the assistance of an outsider’s opinions.  
Thus, clients tend to fall into a rut, using the same solutions to the same problems and 
expecting different results. For instance, Zanele reports experiencing poor social support and 
not having anyone she can speak to about her difficulties. She describes feeling too guilty to 
share her difficulties with her mother, as her mother is partly responsible for pressurising 
Zanele.  
From the above then, one can see that a combination of conflicting client factors 
(personal needs vs. family expectations, personal experiences in life and relationships, personal 
identities, etc.) lead to a restrictive and unsatisfactory problem narrative (“I am a failure as I 
have not achieved anything”) that then also restricts the possibility of further mobilising 
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potentially helpful factors due to the isolating nature of restrictive problem narratives. The 
result is that the client sits with a problem to which she feels there is no solution. Furthermore, 
the problem alienates her from the people who might potentially help resolve it. This state of 
helplessness is usually what motivates clients to seek professional help in the form of 
psychotherapy.  
 
5.3     FORMATION OF THE THERAPEUTIC SUPRA-SYSTEM 
 
The therapeutic supra-system theoretically forms the moment the client and therapist 
agree to discuss the client’s problem narrative in a therapeutic interaction11. The therapeutic 
supra-system can thus be defined as a system that usurps the boundaries that confines the 
client’s problem narrative, thereby allowing for new information to enter and perturb his or her 
system of understandings of the problem. The newly drawn boundary around therapist and 
client ideally should be closed enough to allow for a sense of safety, yet open enough to break 
the isolation caused by the initially restrictive boundary surrounding the client’s problem 
narrative.  
An example of this boundary expansion is illustrated in the case of Heinrich. Upon his 
first visit to the clinic he was notably tense and conversed in a reserved manner, being careful 
to word his complaints in such a way as to appear at least somewhat ‘socially appropriate’. The 
nature of the clinical intake affords the therapist with an interviewing structure that allows him 
to ask sensitive questions of a personal nature with the understanding that it is general protocol. 
                                                          
11 Therapeutic interaction here denotes any conversation and/or interaction that serves to broaden the clients’ 
problem narrative and thus their meaning is much broader than purely the employment of therapeutic techniques. 
As such therapeutic interaction may even include an intake assessment when this causes clients to experience their 
problems in a new way (also see the section on reflexive and critical dialogue in Chapter 4).  
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Of course these questions also serve a different interactional function as they allow for the 
breaking down of the boundary that isolates the client’s problem narrative. 
When asked about his relationship history, Heinrich was confronted with the cause of 
his initial tension. His efforts to appear ‘appropriately masculine’ was met with an explicit 
invite from the therapist to define his sexuality in terms of his sexual orientation. “Tell me 
about the last relationship you were in?” was met with: “The thing is, it is complicated…I was 
in a ten year relationship with my previous partner… [Pausing] he is a man… [Squirming in 
his seat while choking out the words]”. Heinrich’s discomfort in revealing his sexual 
orientation is a clue to the immense anxiety his restrictive problem narrative is causing him, 
and also of how isolating the rigid boundary surrounding that narrative can be.  
By asking these difficult and personal questions the therapist is not merely gathering 
information, but is presented with an opportunity to chisel through the boundary that isolates 
the client. Furthermore, the way the therapist goes about asking these questions and how he or 
she receives the answers to these questions also helps to define the nature of the newly 
expanded boundary that now encapsulates both therapist and client. 
In the case of Heinrich, the therapist, being aware of Heinrich’s discomfort in answering 
this particular question about his sexual orientation, was careful not to be overzealous in his 
approval of the information (as is often a social reaction to news of someone coming out), yet 
tried to communicate a casual acceptance of the information (as if it happens all the time). Of 
course different therapists will have different reactions as their reactions are a function of who 
they are as individuals and their values. This refers to therapist factors and will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section.  
The interaction between Heinrich and the therapist illustrates how Heinrich’s personal 
identity as a ‘deviant’ together with his expectations of social reactions (both client factors) 
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meets with the therapist’s reaction of casual acceptance of his sexuality (a therapist factor). The 
therapist’s acceptance then erodes the boundary around the restrictive problem narrative, draws 
a new boundary around himself and Heinrich and feeds new information into Heinrich’s 
restrictive problem narrative and challenges notions he holds about his own deviance (Am I 
really that deviant if he accepts me so easily?).  
It is interesting to note that, in a later session Heinrich revealed that he was perturbed 
by the therapist’s casual acceptance of his sexual orientation and felt he should have made more 
of this information than he had. This afforded the therapist with the opportunity to reflexively 
discuss that interaction with Heinrich so that they could define why the therapist reacted the 
way he did. Here the therapist chose to reveal his comfort with homosexuality as a function of 
him frequently engaging in contexts where homosexuality is a norm rather than an exception 
(another therapist factor).  
The therapist then continued to ask him about how he thought people close to him 
(client factor) might react to his sexual orientation (client factor) and shared stories about his 
personal experience (therapist factor) of friends ‘coming out’ to their significant others. By 
including outsiders in the therapeutic conversation, the safe boundary surrounding the therapist 
and client is being defined as relatively open to trustworthy outsiders and allows for Heinrich 
to consider in what set of circumstances he might feel more comfortable to let others in. This 
is important in order to prevent the therapeutic supra-system itself from becoming restrictive 
and closed to outside information, a circumstance that may lead to client dependence and the 
therapist getting stuck.  
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, many client, therapist and therapeutic 
factors are available to facilitate the process to expand the rigid boundaries that isolate clients’ 
problem narratives. These factors can be employed in creative and varied ways depending on 
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the therapist’s knowledge of these factors and his or her willingness to engage these in the 
therapy process. For these factors to be employed, it is necessary for them to be reflexively 
discussed in the space between. 
 
5.4      THE SPACE BETWEEN 
 
As soon as the client and therapist meet and agree to discuss the client’s problem, it 
opens a reflexive interactional ‘space between’12 them where various client, therapist and 
therapeutic factors can be discussed. The formation of the ‘space between’ depends on an 
agreement by two individuals that they are going to consider each other’s views while revealing 
their own. It is not necessarily a verbal agreement, but can occur when the presence of either 
one causes reflection on a matter in the other.  
As an example of the formation of the ‘space between’, consider the case of Mandy. 
Upon her first visit, much of the session was spent on gathering clinical information. This 
information included critical information on her childhood, including her being rejected by her 
father and then a period during which she was conditionally accepted and adored by men in 
her life (the condition being that they sexually exploited her). Although the conversation never 
explicitly formulated the impact of these events on her, the mere enquiry into these matters 
communicated to the client that somehow they might be related to her problem and thus had 
the power to unlock the reflexive space between.  
During our follow up session, Mandy very excitedly announced what a big impact our 
first session had on her. The therapist, feeling quite surprised, enquired into what had happened 
to ignite this shift and it was revealed that the questions asked surrounding sexual abuse in her 
                                                          
12 This space between is also referred to as a reflexive slot, indicating its purpose as a space for holding material 
(aka therapeutic factors) for critical and reflexive discussion. 
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childhood and later adult relationship choices incited her to think in her spare time: “Maybe 
somehow these things are related?”. Matters relating to her sexual behaviour and choice of 
partners, which used to perplex her, suddenly had some connection to earlier experiences and 
in this way shed light on her current behaviour.  
This reflexivity on the part of clients often occurs during the process of therapy without 
the therapist intending for it to occur. As such it is also considered to be a therapeutic factor in 
the form of therapeutic progress or feedback that needs to be reflected on in the ‘space between’ 
when it arises.  
The goal of such a reflexive dialogue would be to weave this progress into the evolving 
problem narrative, thereby ‘learning’13 something more of how this problem narrative 
functioned in the past and how its changes are shaping the client’s experience of her problem. 
This in essence broadens the client’s restricted and unsatisfactory worldview of the problem.  
It would have been easy to just let Mandy’s excitement slip by as a serendipitous 
success, but the therapist working within this model would do well to reflexively engage with 
any type of feedback (good or bad) in the reflexive slot. For instance Mandy was asked: “How 
do you explain this different feeling and/or perspective…what could have happened to bring 
this about?” Often clients are at a loss to explain what changed. In such a case, the therapist 
may comment: “You say it is just talking to someone, but you visibly look different and it 
makes me think that you perhaps have learned something new about your problem”.   
The latter comment draws on various factors including the client’s feedback on progress 
(therapeutic factor), therapist feedback (you look different), client’s opinions and changes in 
the problem narrative as a factor. These factors then become the focus of critical reflection in 
                                                          
13 The term ‘learning’ is used cautiously here, since the therapist and client are not actually learning something 
about the problem narrative as if it existed out there on its own, but in fact actually constructs its functioning and 
changes as their conversation unfolds. Often it is helpful to allow clients to hold on to the illusion that they are 
uncovering truths rather than constructing them, since it adds more legitimacy to their newly found perspective 
on matters.  
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the ‘space between’ for consideration of how they affect the client’s understanding of the 
problem.  
It is useful to point out here that the model is intended to illustrate that the various 
therapeutic factors can be placed in the space between for critical reflection, so that the therapist 
and client may examine these factors as if they were physically on the table between them. 
Such an externalisation of therapeutic factors allows them to express their respective views on 
how each of these factors impacts on their worldviews of the problem as well as on the problem 
narrative.  
In Mandy’s case, for example, the therapist utilised the space between to externalise his 
theoretical or clinical formulation of her problem (a therapist and/or model factor) in the space 
between:  
 
From everything you have told me about your past, one can say from a clinical 
viewpoint that you have experienced numerous rejections by men in your past 
and only found acceptance on condition that you are exploited by men. I’m 
wondering what you would make of such a statement, would it hold any value 
to you? 
 
In the latter comment, it is important to note how the therapist externalises the 
theoretical viewpoint without investing too much confidence in it as an ultimate truth. In 
essence, he is inviting Mandy to reflexively consider its usefulness to her in terms of her 
understanding of her problem. Here the differences between original client worldviews and 
therapist worldviews become important as the therapist needs to use whatever is in his or her 
arsenal of explanations to give the client something that is different, but not too different from 
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her worldview so that they may sufficiently alter her problem narrative to allow for change to 
occur.  
Mandy’s response to the therapist’s question was to burst out in tears, since she now 
recognised that she relinquished herself for exploitation in order to secure ‘love and 
acceptance’ by men. Here another client factor arises in the form of client feedback. Notice 
also that the problem narrative is changing shape from “I am a victim of abuse and rejection” 
to “I am contributing to my own abuse and rejection” (a position of more power). Although it 
is a painful realisation to make, it paves the way for constructing a problem narrative that 
provides Mandy with a clear and operational path to a solution.  
 
 
5.5     THERAPIST AND CLIENT AS FACTORS vs. THERAPIST AND CLIENT AS    
          PERSONS 
 
Since the ‘space between’ is utilised for critical reflection on various factors that inform 
the problem narrative, the client and therapist themselves are often the factors that need to be 
reflected on in the space between. It is useful then to distinguish between the therapist and 
client as individuals versus therapist and client as factors for reflection. This distinction allows 
for a person to be in a dynamic relationship with the self while maintaining a reflexive distance 
to observe the outcomes of this relationship with the self.  
For example, the therapist, following from Mandy’s emotional reaction mentioned 
above, taps into therapist factors of empathy and understanding but resists saving Mandy from 
her own condemnation. Instead he invites her to reflect on her intense emotion and self-
condemnation (client factors) in the space between: 
 
 I can see that this realisation is very painful for you to admit. I’m trying to 
make sense of why any person would make herself available for such abuse in 
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the first place and an image keeps popping into my head, an image of you being 
two people at the same time. The one appears to be angry and disappointed at 
the other for something she did and now is punishing her for these deeds. I don’t 
know why I am thinking of this, but tell me what you make of that image? 
 
By placing his imagined thought content (therapist factor) in the space between, the 
therapist again brings a different explanatory narrative to the space between, one that can 
account for Mandy’s self-damnation. By proposing the image of her as two distinct individuals, 
the therapist can invite the client to externalise these self-objects in the space between and 
empathically and critically reflect on both their sides of the story. Through reflexive 
engagement on this image the therapist and Mandy together constructed the narrative of an 
older self-object being critical and disapproving of a child self-object without having any 
empathy for what the child self-object experienced all on her own without any adult guidance.  
The therapist here made use of theoretical explanations (a model/technique factor) to 
legitimate this narrative:  
 
From a psychodynamic framework I often see clients who experience different 
parts of themselves being in conflict with each other. It is almost as if these 
different selves represent them at different ages in their lifespan. Thus an adult 
self can look at what the child self did back then and feel angry, whilst the child 
self can feel misunderstood by the adult self, thereby alienating them from each 
other. It is often times helpful for these different selves to develop empathy and 
understanding for each other’s viewpoints. Would you be willing to explore 
ways of how we can assist these different parts to accomplish that?  
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Here the client herself (or at least different parts of her) is being externalised and 
reflected on as a factor in the therapeutic process. This means that the client simultaneously 
holds the position of subject (i.e. a human person with reflexive capability) as well as object 
for reflection, that is two distinct self-objects that are in relation with each other). The next 
chapter offers an in-depth case study to fully explain this technique.  
 
 
5.6      MODEL/TECHNIQUE FACTORS 
 
In the case of Mandy, an object relations model was used as a potential explanatory 
framework to supplement her rigid problem narrative. However, within the framework of this 
model, it is possible to utilise different theoretical models and techniques as factors to be 
reflected on in the space between. The model or technique then is not merely a guiding force 
for the therapist, but becomes part of the evolving problem narrative that eventually suggests 
possible paths to a satisfactory solution.  
For instance, it was discovered that Marcus who was struggling with a sense of apathy 
and nihilistic depression has had a long history of being very hard on himself when it came to 
personal expectations. As a child he was keenly aware that they, as a family, were poor and he 
developed a sense of personal inadequacy as a result. He was also aware of how his parents 
tended to approve quite easily with anything that he did, and thus developed the idea that they 
were prone to approve of mediocrity, especially since in Marcus’ mind they never appeared to 
do anything to uplift themselves out of what he perceived to be poverty.  
Now as an adult, Marcus avoids spending time with his parents, readily admitting that 
he feels ashamed of them, and moreover feels pressure to uphold an image of superior 
masculinity and success among his friends. Although he is aware that his friends’ perceptions 
of him as a lady’s man are far from true, Marcus admits that he cringes at the thought of 
admitting that he is quite humanly flawed in his capabilities. 
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After these distorted thought patterns were ‘discovered’, the therapist made the 
following remarks to Marcus:  
 
I cannot help but notice that you appear to have exceptionally high standards, 
not only of yourself, but also of your parents. Now I am wondering whether 
these standards extends to other people as well, or do they only hold for those 
people you consider as part, or representative of you? 
 
After much exploration on this topic, consensus was reached that Marcus’ 
exceptional standards were aimed primarily at himself and at his parents as an extension of 
himself. Moreover, the problem narrative was expanded to include his anxieties of being 
perceived as poor and inadequate:  
 
How do you think your childhood experiences of poverty [client factor] impact 
on your current high expectations of yourself [client factor]? I am specifically 
thinking [therapist factor] about your view of how your parents dealt with 
poverty [client factor] and what lessons you learnt [client factor] from them 
about dealing with personal poverty? 
 
This question invites a reflexive dialogue on how past experiences may have formed 
core beliefs on how to deal with personal inadequacies. Marcus’ response suggested that he 
learnt as a child that he needed to do things differently from his parents should he want to 
achieve success.  
Since his parents were so easily accepting of poverty and mediocrity, he developed an 
extremely critical rejection of any signs of personal inadequacy, weakness and by extension 
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humanness. Upon reaching this problem narrative, the therapist made the following comment 
to Marcus:  
 
From our exploration of your thinking patterns around weakness, it strikes me 
[therapist factor] that you have constructed yourself exactly opposite your 
parents, and this distorted idea of them leaves me with the uneasy feeling 
[therapist factor] that they weren’t very good people. Is that an accurate 
perception? 
 
Here the therapist engages various therapist factors (personal feelings, images, etc.) to 
invite the client to consider the value judgments in his own representation of his parents as ‘bad 
people’. The therapist here utilises the cognitive behavioural concept of black/white thinking 
to facilitate a reflexive dialogue in Marcus’ distorted cognitive schema of his parents.  
By being confronted with the suggestion that his parents are purely bad, it indirectly 
activates thoughts of what good qualities they may possess. Marcus immediately defends his 
parents by pointing out how welcoming they have always been, how emotionally supportive 
they are and how they always managed to make most situations fun.  
By reflecting on these qualities in the space between, the therapist opts to adopt a 
specific role (that of devil’s advocate = therapist/technique factor) to amplify Marcus’ 
identification with the good qualities his parents possess before engaging him in reflecting on 
how his cognitive distortions regarding himself and his parents are linked to his complaints of 
apathy and nihilism:  
 
Interestingly, although my impression of your parents [therapist factor] have 
not been favourable, given all the bad you have told me about them [client 
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factor], I cannot help but notice something else. I am well aware of the fact that 
people in your position often engage in a psychological error known as black 
and white thinking [technique factor], where they identify with only the good or 
the bad in a particular situation. In your case it seems like you have associated 
your parents with all the bad at least when it comes to success, and as a result 
you’ve forgotten about all the good that they bring to your life. What is 
interesting to me, is that all the good they bring to your life, the emotional 
support, fun and welcoming nature are seemingly the things that you 
complained are missing from your life at the start of our sessions. If I recall 
correctly, you complain about not feeling much or caring about much, that you 
find no enjoyment in anything or see no meaning in anything. Given this 
coincidence, it makes me wonder whether your distorted view of your parents 
hasn’t led you to cut out the bad together with the good they bring to your 
identity, leaving you with a strong looking shell of an identity that currently 
contains no substance or meaning. These are overwhelming thoughts for me to 
sit with, so I am eager to hear your thoughts on the matter?  
 
By bringing cognitive behavioural concepts into the space between, the therapist invites 
Marcus to engage with this model as an explanatory framework for his problem where 
seemingly unrelated life events are now being tied together in a causal relationship. It also 
paves the way for Marcus later using techniques and ideas in the model to correct his distorted 
ideas of himself and his parents, thereby connecting with the human and flawed side of himself 
without experiencing the anxiety of being a failure for doing so.  
Again it should be pointed out that the therapist reveals much of his own opinions, 
thoughts and theories [all therapist factors] in the space between, but never imposes them 
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unilaterally on the client. The client is let in on what the therapist is thinking, but these thoughts 
are presented as having a life of their own, appearing spontaneously in reaction to what the 
client says. Of course, the client should then also have the opportunity to respond and have an 
opinion on these thoughts. It is exactly these differing ideas and opinions that spark the 
perturbation of old and rigid ideas and is such a potent facilitating force in the co-construction 
of a new problem narrative.  
 
5.7      TECHNIQUE SLOT 
 
Apart from the ‘space between’ where reflexive dialogue takes place, this social 
constructionist model of therapeutic factors also contains what is called the ‘technique slot’. 
As explained in more detail in Chapter 4, the technique slot denotes a process where the 
therapist employs a specific psychotherapy technique with some therapeutic goal in mind. 
Given that the technique slot is unidirectional, it indicates that a technique is performed on the 
client by the therapist without necessarily engaging in critical reflection, although it is often 
very helpful to reflexively consider the outcomes of techniques in the space between.  
As an example, Zanele, during her admission to a local psychiatric clinic had been 
experiencing intense panic attacks that were related to previously repressed memories of her 
being molested as a child. While the overall therapeutic process was focussed on co-
constructing a new problem narrative of Zanele learning to delegate responsibility and learning 
to trust in significant others, her intense anxiety made it difficult to focus on this therapeutic 
goal.  
In an attempt to contain Zanele’s anxiety, the therapist introduced Zanele to the 
technique of EMDR which was performed over several days in hospital. In conjunction with 
EMDR, Zanele was also taught to perform several relaxation techniques including guided 
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relaxation and systematic breathing techniques. Through her mastery of these techniques 
Zanele’s panic attacks eventually subsided. This allowed for a reflexive dialogue between her 
and the therapist regarding her experience and the outcome of these techniques. Specifically, 
Zanele found these techniques to be quite empowering especially since she was currently 
feeling quite alone and questioning the degree to which she could rely on significant others.  
Furthermore, during the course of the EMDR it was revealed that much of Zanele’s 
anxiety was related not so much to the sexual abuse itself, but to her concern over how 
significant others might change their opinions of her if they found out. Another concern of hers 
was whether significant others, including her mother, knew about the sexual abuse but chose 
to ignore it. These revelations that surfaced through the employment of a technique add 
valuable information that can shape the client’s problem narrative given that it is reflexively 
discussed in the space between.  
By reflecting on these outcomes of EMDR (technique factors) in the space between, 
the therapist and Zanele managed to expand the problem narrative to include her sexual abuse 
as another area in her life where others unintentionally failed her, instead of Zanele carrying 
the responsibility for these incidents all on her own. The new problem narrative made solutions 
to her problems very clear: Hand the responsibilities of others back to them. This included 
confiding in her mother about her sexual abuse and her feeling that she should have been 
protected by her mother. By opening up to her mother in this way, they were able to clear the 
air in their relationship and Zanele was able to open up and rely on her mother without residual 
fears relating to unresolved past events.  
 
5.8      THERAPEUTIC SUPRA-SYSTEM AS A FACTOR 
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At the conclusion of a therapeutic process, it is standard practice to terminate therapy 
by reflecting on the overall process of psychotherapy as a means to summarise what the client 
has taken from the process. On the other hand, it is often a crucial part of the therapeutic process 
at any given point to reflect on the process as a whole. This then means that the whole 
therapeutic system takes centre stage in the space between so as to affect the co-evolving 
problem narrative.  
In the case of Heinrich, it was often necessary to reflect on the therapeutic supra-system 
as a factor that affected the problem narrative. Since there were many issues to focus on in his 
therapy process, Heinrich was often resistant when the therapist commented on his tendency 
to be evasive when defining himself as an individual, especially in terms of his sexuality. “What 
does that have to do with anything?” is often a retort that would come from Heinrich’s mouth.  
Given that therapeutic success, in the context of this model, is dependent on expanding 
the client’s problem narrative, it is crucial to link several of the therapeutic factors together to 
form an explanatory frame that is less restrictive than the original problem narrative. In 
Heinrich’s case, his sexuality was a key component that prevented him from making 
meaningful connections with others and was thus indirectly linked to his suicide attempt. In 
reply to his dismissive retort, the therapist would reflect back on his experience of the overall 
therapeutic process:  
 
It seems that it is hard for you to commit to defining yourself in my presence 
[therapist reflecting on self as a person]? I say this because my experience of 
our time together has been that my attempts to get to know you on a more 
intimate/personal level is met with evasiveness followed by you shutting down 
completely [therapeutic relationship as a factor]. So I gather that this type of 
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situation [referring to the interactional situation as a whole] is quite 
uncomfortable for you? Do you find that the way I ask you [therapist factor] 
about yourself makes you want to isolate yourself from me? Also I’m wondering 
whether you find similar difficulties in other social situations. 
 
Here the therapist links the issue of isolation with his experience of the therapeutic 
supra-system as a whole and invites the client to reflect on his experience of the supra-system 
as a whole. The conversation that unfolds then clearly has implications for the problem 
narrative as it relates to the client’s avoidance of defining himself in social situations.  
 
5.9      CONCLUSION 
While this chapter focusses on illustrating the social constructionist model of 
therapeutic factors’ operational application by way of case illustrations, the next chapter will 
focusses on giving an example of an in-depth case formulation.  
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Chapter 6 
EXTENDED CASE FORMULATION 
 
 
Whereas Chapter 5 focussed on highlighting key elements of the social constructionist 
model of therapeutic factors with the help of practical illustrations from clinical case studies, 
the current chapter focusses on providing an example of how the model can be utilised by 
clinicians in an extensive case formulation. The case of Lindie14 was selected for this purpose 
due to the clarity with which it highlights the practical strengths of the model.  
 
6.1      ALONG CAME A SPIDER: LINDIE’S ANXIETY 
 
Lindie is a 33 year old female who lives on her own in Johannesburg. She was married 
for three months and divorced in 2007 due to having been physically abused by her husband. 
She has no children or dependents. She works in the legal field and has Honours degrees in 
Criminology and Psychology. She describes herself as being religious and is an active member 
of the Presbyterian Church. A full clinical interview formed part of the first session to gather 
information regarding various aspects of Lindie’s functioning.15 
 
6.1.1     Main Complaints 
 
Lindie first consulted the clinic16 late in 2013. During her intake session, she described 
her reason for seeking psychotherapy as stemming from a desire to “deal with past issues” that 
                                                          
14 The client’s name and other personal information were changed to protect her anonymity.  
15 In the model presented here, the act of gathering clinical and personal information sets a context 
characterised by purposeful exploration, as if communicating to the client that the therapist is gathering data 
with a specific goal in mind. As such, the therapist engages in the act of information gathering with the 
awareness of its strategic value in shaping the therapeutic interaction at a later stage.   
16 Sandton Psychology Centre 
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affect her choice of partners and friends. Specific complaints raised by Lindie included 
nightmares of her being rejected in past friendships and relationships. These nightmares 
preoccupied her thoughts and had a debilitating effect on her mood and general functioning for 
a few days following their occurrence.  
A second major complaint that Lindie wished to address, was her fear of spiders. She 
stated: “I have a phobia of spiders” and described how she was preoccupied with this fear to 
the extent that she tried to avoid any situation where she might be confronted with a real spider. 
Lindie reports having had numerous panic attacks when seeing a spider. Even coming across 
an image of a spider on Facebook led her to become extremely anxious, hyper vigilant and 
preoccupied with fear.  
Lindie reported that her fear of spiders impacted negatively on her daily functioning as 
her avoidance of situations where she might come across a spider limited her productivity at 
work and at home.  
 
6.1.2       History of Main Complaints 
 
Although Lindie was always somewhat fearful and cautious of spiders, she first started 
experiencing an excessive fear of spiders 10 years ago. Her first intensely fearful reaction to 
spiders developed in a context where she was living in a townhouse on her own in an area 
where she was confronted with rain spiders on a daily basis. As this was the first time she ever 
lived alone, Lindie was confronted with the reality of dealing with these spiders by herself 
since there was no one else to rely on for assistance. The idea of dealing with spiders on her 
own made her extremely fearful and avoidant of them. Her fears of spiders recently became 
unbearable for no reason that was discernible to Lindie.  
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6.1.3      Medical and Psychiatric History 
 
Lindie reports no history of significant general medical conditions that may affect her 
current functioning. This was her first contact with a mental healthcare professional. She was 
not taking any medications during the time of the therapeutic process. 
 
6.1.4      Substance History 
 
Lindie reports no history of substance use, abuse or dependence, including cigarettes 
and alcohol.  
 
6.1.5     Family History 
 
Lindie is the younger of two children. Her sister Danel is two years older than her. She 
reports that her family was characterised by a conflicted, resentful and distanced relationship 
between her mother and father. According to Lindie, her mother was very bitter and resentful 
towards her father for not providing enough and blamed him for their poverty. She also 
remembers that her parents never had any physical contact and lacked intimacy.  
Lindie reports that she had a very close relationship with her father as a child. However, 
her father died of a heart attack at the age of 42 years, when she was nine years old. After her 
father’s death, Lindie’s mother prohibited them from speaking, or asking any questions, about 
him. Her mother also became verbally abusive towards Lindie, insulting her by calling her 
“ugly and stupid”. Her mother’s judgmental attitude towards Lindie left her “feeling rejected 
and neglected” by her mother. She also reports that her mother admitted to her at times that she 
did not love her.  
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Lindie describes her relationship with her sister to be emotionally distanced, as her 
sister has always been very close to her mother. Lindie also perceived her sister to receive 
preferential treatment from their mother. As a result of what she endured at home, Lindie 
reports that she used to avoid being home at all costs, preferring to spend her time at her friends’ 
houses whose families she admired and envied. 
At present Lindie reports to have no contact with her mother or sister. She states that 
she has negative feelings towards her mother, and prefers not to have contact with her due to 
her verbally abusive nature.   
 
6.1.6     Peronal History 
 
Lindie reports that she was born via Caesarean-section and is not aware that her mother 
experienced any complications with her pregnancy or giving birth. She is unsure whether she 
was a planned pregnancy, but reports that since she can remember, she never really felt like an 
appreciated part of her family. She describes herself as having been a difficult child, as she was 
allergic to dairy and hence was a big burden on her mother. When she was somewhat older, 
Lindie remembers that she was quite shy but very inquisitive and had many friends.  
She started attending school at age six years and recounts that she loved every moment 
of school, despite her having been the target of bullies who made fun of her for being a “nerd”. 
Lindie reports that she wanted to spend as much time at school as she could, since she felt a 
sense of belonging there. She managed to complete school without any major obstacles.  
With regards to her relational history, Lindie reports that she, as a teenager, always had 
a boyfriend. Her first relationship started when she was in grade 10 and ended two years later 
at her Matriculation farewell when she broke up with her boyfriend for not ever having stood 
up for her when her mother insulted her. Lindie reports that her first relationship was 
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characterised by her mother comparing her (Lindie) to him (Lindie’s boyfriend) who used to 
buy her mother expensive and extravagant gifts. Lindie reports that her boyfriend’s and 
mother’s behaviour made her doubt her own worth and she experienced the expectation that 
she needed to work harder to gain the same acceptance from her mother as her boyfriend 
experienced from her mother. Since her first break up, Lindie reports that she started to question 
her own worth and felt especially critical of herself when she was not in a relationship.  
Lindie married in 2007. It was not long thereafter that her husband started to become 
physically and verbally abusive towards her. They divorced three months after the marriage. 
In 2012 Lindie moved from her home in Pretoria to Kwa-Zulu Natal after she became engaged 
to her boyfriend at the time. They lived together for one year, but terminated the engagement 
after this fiancé also became abusive towards Lindie. In mid-2013 Lindie moved to 
Johannesburg where she is currently working and living on her own.  
 
6.1.7      Current Stressors 
 
In sum, Lindie has experienced the following stressors that contribute to her current distress: 
 An abusive relationship with her mother (i.e. victim of verbal abuse, rejection and 
neglect); 
 A divorce in 2007 following three months of an abusive marriage; 
 A move back to her home in Kwa-Zulu Natal in 2012 to live with her new fiancé, who 
then also became abusive; 
 A relocation to Johannesburg in 2013 where she is living alone; 
 At present she has no close friends and is suffering disappointments due to loss of close 
friendships; 
 A lack of social and familial support. 
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6.1.8      Protective Factors 
 
 She is well educated, friendly, optimistic, young and attractive; 
 She has a stable- and well-paying job; 
 She is committed to, and active in, religious practices (Christianity); 
 She has supportive colleagues. 
 
6.1.9      Initial Considerations Related to the Problem and Plan for Treatment 
 
It was initially considered by the therapist that Lindie qualified for a diagnosis of a specific 
phobia with situationally precipitated panic attacks. In addition she appeared to experience 
adjustment issues related to the numerous stressful life circumstances she had to endure. This 
may be accounted for by an adjustment disorder with anxiety or a V-code of problems related 
to primary support group.  
Although these diagnoses can clearly be qualified from her clinical history, the danger 
exists that important factors may be overlooked when such a simple, reductionist understanding 
of her seemingly unrelated problems is embraced uncritically. For example, the diagnosis of a 
specific phobia may lead to the conclusion that Lindie may benefit best from a cognitive 
behavioural intervention such as In-vivo exposure therapy or eye movement desensitization 
and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy. After all, from the view of evidence-based approaches, 
such techniques enjoy vast empirical support for their effectiveness for specific phobias. 
Furthermore, as a means to address her social concerns, one could recommend social skills 
training, interpersonal therapy or any of the other range of empirically validated treatments for 
such social problems.  
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However, from the information provided by Lindie during the clinical intake, the 
therapist noticed certain coincidences in her history that prompted him to devise several 
hypotheses to be reflected on with the client.  
First, it seemed that Lindie has led somewhat of an isolated existence, left by others to 
fend for herself. This feeling of isolation was emphatically evident in her confrontation with 
spiders, when she first started living on her own. Maybe, then the fear was not so much of the 
spiders, but of dealing with them on her own?  
Second, it seems that Lindie has suffered a long history of disappointments in people 
who were supposed to protect, nurture and console her in her times of vulnerability. These 
people who were supposed to accept her for who she is and encourage her to express her needs, 
wants and concerns rather judged and rejected her when she was being herself. As a result, 
Lindie reported having felt the expectation to “work harder for acceptance”. Maybe then, 
observing how others rejected and neglected her when she was being herself, made her to be 
critical and judgmental of this authentic self? 
Finally, if she has in fact become critical and judgmental of whoever this authentic self-
inside of her is, then what has this done to her relationship with this self-inside of her? Is she 
able to trust this self to make the right decisions? Will this self be able to effectively confront 
and exterminate threats that seek to spoil Lindie’s happiness or has she abandoned her 
alignment with this self? After all, is it not the fault of this authentic self and her ‘deficiencies’ 
that Lindie was deprived of a loving and nurturing mother? Maybe then, it would be unrealistic 
to expect Lindie to trust, love and care for this self, when she may be resentful towards this self 
for being the root cause of her rejection and neglect.  
By considering these hypotheses, the therapist directed his information gathering to test 
his hypotheses and importantly to develop a personal narrative and comprehensive worldview 
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of the client’s problem. This worldview is vital as it needs to incorporate not only what the 
client brings, but also needs to be sufficiently different from the client’s worldview so as to 
leave room for both therapist and client to negotiate on a shared worldview of the problem. 
Since it is usually accepted that the client’s worldview of the problem is ‘problem saturated’, 
the difference of the therapist’s worldview should ideally present an explanation with 
unsaturated paths to a solution17. 
 
6.1.10     Formulation of the Problem 
 
Following from the above questions and resulting hypotheses, the therapist delivered 
the following account to Lindie about his own worldview of the problem:  
 
From what you told me about your problem today, there is no doubt in my mind 
that you are dealing with a phobia for spiders. However, what interests me more 
than the phobia, is your struggle with gaining acceptance and love from others. 
The whole time I thought to myself how this might be related to your fear of 
spiders, and then it became clear when I heard you say that you felt the 
expectation to work harder to gain your mother’s acceptance. Could it be, that 
when she was small, you saw how your mother treated Lindie, and thought to 
yourself: ‘There must be something wrong with me or with what I am doing for 
my mother not to be able to love me’. Maybe you even went so far as to think 
that small Lindie needed to be more than she was or work harder than she did 
to gain your mother’s acceptance. So I wonder if your mother’s judgments, 
                                                          
17 It is not always necessary or ideal for the therapist’s worldview to suggest clearly defined solutions, as it is 
sometimes a useful approach to forge solutions in cooperation with the client. Thus, the therapist’s worldview 
needs to be different enough to stimulate new ideas and/or questions that may eventually lead to new solutions.  
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insults and abuse towards small Lindie didn’t make you to become critical of 
her as well.  
After all, it appears that you lost out on having a loving mother, because small 
Lindie wasn’t able to be more of what your mother expected. So in order for 
you to have hope of gaining some love and acceptance you aligned yourself with 
your mother’s (and later others’) critical and judgmental attitudes towards this 
authentic self-inside of you, you the small Lindie. Because you were critical of 
small Lindie, I think it must have been hard for you to maintain a good and 
trusting relationship with her. So it makes sense to me now why you were so 
terrified of spiders. If you do not feel close to the authentic self-inside of you, 
how can you be expected to trust her to confront threats from outside? I would 
like you to take a moment to reflect on what I have just told you about my views 
and whether or not it resonates with your experiences. 
 
After being so candid in expressing his own worldview of Lindie’s experiences, the 
therapist thought it was important to convey his understanding that this was his way of making 
sense of her problem and that Lindie was allowed to differ from him or to add to what he was 
thinking. In this way then, a space between them is created whereby they could assist each 
other to refine the meaning of her problematic experiences.  
Lindie showed a strong non-verbal response while the therapist was delivering his 
account. Her eyes welled up with tears as she listened. Afterwards she remarked that his 
account touched on various experiences she had never thought about or was unable to verbalise, 
and that he assisted her to understand her predicament. However, she remarked that it felt 
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strange for her to think and speak of herself in relation to herself, and she was concerned that 
the therapist thought she had a ‘split personality’.  
At this point, the therapist reassured Lindie that this way of speaking of her as two 
people did not imply that she had a split personality, but rather stemed from personality theory 
(i.e. object relations theory and/or Kohut’s self-psychology) and was meant to facilitate their 
reflecting on her relationship with herself. Here, theory and/or models of psychotherapy are 
discussed in the space between and by letting Lindie in on the theory, the therapist indirectly 
offered her the role of co-therapist, able to reflect on, and give inputs to, the explanation of her 
problem and the course of therapy. Regarding the latter, Lindie asked the obvious next 
question: “So what do we do about this?” This implies an acceptance of the role of co-therapist. 
The therapist at this point felt the need to practice constraint, as he did not want to 
negate Lindie’s newly established role as co-therapist by dictating the course of events. On the 
other hand it was also important not to project an image of uncertainty, as he could not expect 
Lindie to accept this partnership when it seemed as if he did not know what he was doing. The 
therapist therefore suggested to Lindie that he thought it was important to the process of therapy 
for her to consider the implications of what he suggested to her and also to think of what she 
needed to do about small Lindie in order for her to come to a place where she was ready to 
repair the relationship.  
The latter response by the therapist achieved two things: First, it suggested a path or 
goal for psychotherapy (i.e. the reparation of Lindie’s relationship with the self-inside of her); 
and second, it confirmed Lindie’s role of co-therapist in that it accepted her as being the expert 
on what she needed to do in order to achieve the suggested goal of therapy. 
This marked the end of the intake session. To summarise, the first session commenced 
with basic information gathering. It allowed the client to give an account of her worldview, and 
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allowed the therapist to sample the client’s life experiences and form and test hypotheses that 
developed into a worldview of the client’s problem. The first session was also used to set a 
precedent in terms of the therapeutic relationship and how the client and therapist used the 
‘space between’. In other words, the nature of their interactions determined the roles each 
adopted in the therapeutic process (e.g. expert vs leek, co-therapists, supporter and supported), 
and according to these roles, how the interactive space between them will be utilised to shape 
the co-evolving, co-constructed worldview of the problem.  
 
6.2      FOLLOW-UP SESSIONS 
 
Lindie’s medical aid only covered a total of six sessions for psychotherapy. She 
attended four follow-up sessions before the therapeutic process was terminated.  
 
6.2.1      Discovering the Self in the Attic 
 
In her first follow-up session, Lindie reported that she was doing better since we first 
met. She made certain decisions to better her life and well-being. These decisions included 
joining a gym and finding a new church to attend. She also reported that she was sleeping much 
better and reported no nightmares in the past week. Although she was still experiencing anxiety 
in relation to spiders and her interpersonal difficulties, they were less intrusive and she was 
able to think of these matters without being overwhelmed by anxiety. These changes made her 
feel more empowered, according to Lindie’s report.  
The therapist reacted to Lindie’s report by reflecting with her as to the origin of these 
changes in her condition. Lindie felt that it had to do with the intake session and the letter she 
wrote to the self-inside of her. In this letter she expressed several angry feelings relating to the 
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notion that the self-inside of her had been oppressed for so long and that her main focus was 
on pleasing others at her own expense.  
When her letter and her experiences of writing were reflected on in the space between, 
Lindie acknowledged that she was surprised at the anger she was feeling when engaging in the 
activity. She was, however, not sure whose anger it was, as she still had difficulties 
distinguishing between herself as a critical observing self and herself as an oppressed authentic 
self. The remainder of the session focussed on critically reflecting on the anger and the 
relationship between the two selves as a means to further refine this co-constructed narrative 
of two selves driven apart and at war with each other.  
The therapist, adopting a curious stance, asked various reflexive questions such as “As 
you are sitting with me here discussing your experiences of writing the letter, whose anger do 
you feel it is, yours or the self that have been oppressed”, then “whom do you feel this self is 
angry towards?” and later “If she is angry of being oppressed, who is the one that oppressed 
her and maintains her oppression?”.  
Lindie found it quite difficult to give clear and specific answers to these questions. Her 
uncertainty was then reflected on in the space between, and the therapist suggested that it might 
mean she needs more time to explore these feelings given the questions that unfolded during 
their discussion and reflection together. The therapist, reflecting on his own experiences of the 
session, also made the remark that it appeared to him that, regardless of the underlying 
motivations, there is a self-inside of her (authentic self-object) who experiences intense and 
unverbalised anger that is likely directed at another self (critical self-object) and that her 
avoidance of confronting these resentments is maintaining a split in their ranks, leading to 
mistrust in herself. The therapist suggested that Lindie allow this oppressed self with the 
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freedom to express her anger and also to consider what affirmative action she required from 
her critical self in order to feel compensated for the injustices she had to endure.  
The co-evolving narrative of two selves at war, suggest that the internalised parts of the 
self (i.e. self-objects) have complex, yet unacknowledged feelings towards each other. This 
evokes the idea of two persons who have strong feelings of love towards each other, but due to 
ineffective communication and misunderstanding have started to resent each other for not 
affirming their love for each other. This developing narrative allows for the construction of a 
worldview where Lindie as the person attending therapy can assume the role of peace facilitator 
in collaboration with the therapist. As such, the space between is utilised to reflect on the client 
as factor in this peace-making process in order to reach conclusions of what the necessary steps 
are to resolve the internal war.  
The description of the client’s experiences of the self as two distinct people allows her 
as a person to reflect on her experiences of herself as a factor from a neutral, ‘objective’ place. 
The goals of therapy also become progressively more defined (i.e. as re-establishing empathy 
and trust between an oppressed self and a critical self that were turned against each other, and 
as a result represents a disunited front against the challenges of the world).  
 
6.2.2     Chipping through the Anger that Separates  
 
During the second follow-up session, Lindie reported that she was doing very well. She 
felt increasingly in control of her anxiety and also became increasingly directive in her role as 
facilitator of peace within herself. She acknowledged that she found it very difficult to consider 
what affirmative action the oppressed self-inside of her required. One of the ideas she had, was 
to write a letter to the people who had wronged her in her past by making her doubt herself. 
This signalled to the therapist that the client was invested in the narrative that external agents 
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managed to divide her ranks by turning her ‘self’ against her ‘self’, thereby causing mistrust 
and doubt in herself.  
As she was very vocal and expressed many opinions on the matter, the therapist utilised 
the technique of listening (and remaining silent) to allow the client to express the many ideas 
she had formulated over the past week. By doing this, the therapist allowed the client space to 
act out her role as facilitator and expert and gain confidence in being reflexive and critical of 
the status quo.  
In her report of her ideas, Lindie mentioned that she had taken up the practice of 
conversing with the self-inside of her regarding this self-doubt. In this way, she reassures this 
self that she is worthy and should not allow others to walk over her. After Lindie seemed to be 
satisfied that she had expressed everything that she had thought about, the therapist commenced 
with reflecting on what had just happened in the space between. He did this by first reflecting 
on his experience and wonderment at what was going on today: “While I was listening to you, 
it struck me that you seemed to have a lot to say today and I became puzzled by your 
excitement. Would you mind enlightening me as to what led to this?”  
With his remark, the therapist drew attention to the possibility that something 
significant might be going on that is not being verbalised and invited Lindie to critically reflect 
on herself and her excitement critically as it pertained to their worldview of the problem. 
Lindie, at first seemed to be perplexed at the therapist’s question, and stated that she did not 
know how to answer his question because she had not thought about it. The therapist then 
remarked that he was impressed with how she seemed to have embraced her role as peace-
maker and especially of how she appeared to have commiserated with the oppressed self-inside 
of her by being quite nurturing and reassuring towards her.  
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The therapist then extended this reflection by asking the reflexive question: “When you 
were telling me about how you started conversing with her internally, I kept wondering how 
this oppressed self-inside of you must have experienced this interaction, especially since there 
have been years of angry silence between the two of you. Do you have any ideas on that?”  
The conversation then focussed on exploring Lindie’s oppressed self’s needs for care, 
love, reassurance, etcetera, that she never received from the significant adults in her life and 
how Lindie built up walls to defend this self against getting hurt. The therapist, at some point 
during this discussion, remarked that the image of a big sister-little sister kept popping into his 
head. He also asked Lindie if they could give this self-inside of her a name to acknowledge her 
importance and to ease reference towards her. She decided that her oppressed self should be 
called Megan due to the childhood significance she attached to the name.  
The therapist said:  
 
When we speak of your relationship with Megan in this way, it reminds me of 
the type of relationship between a big sister and a little sister. The one is 
vulnerable and in need of care and protection, while the bigger one [therapist 
pointing to Lindie] is quite responsible and sensible. All this time I thought the 
two of you were just angry and spiteful towards each other, but it becomes 
increasingly apparent to me that deep down there is a lot of love for each other. 
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The therapist continuing:  
 
For instance, [therapist pointing to Lindie] I now understand that when you 
saw Megan being insulted and rejected by your mother, you tried to protect her 
by shielding her from your mother’s attacks and over time started to hide her 
from the world. In your attempts to protect her, it is also clear that you had to 
sacrifice many of your own needs in order to worry about protecting and hiding 
away your vulnerable little sister. So it is clear to me why both of you would feel 
angry. You Lindie, because you had to sacrifice your happiness by focussing on 
hiding Megan from the world, and Megan for misunderstanding your attempts 
to protect her as attempts to oppress her. 
 
Lindie reacted to the therapist’s comment by becoming quite tearful. Afterwards he 
asked her about her tears and what they meant. Lindie replied that they were an expression of 
relief as she was finally able to empathise with the hurt Megan felt and that it felt good that it 
was being acknowledged in the therapeutic conversation.  
The therapist signalled the end of the session by reflecting on his idea that others seem 
to have convinced Lindie to believe that Megan is weak, fragile and will always be in need of 
care. He wondered whether this was truly the case, and whether it might not have been a good 
idea for Lindie to start giving Megan some freedom to be herself and to prove that she has 
many good qualities as a grown-up self that may even benefit and support Lindie in dealing 
with the challenges of the world.  
By making this suggestion, the therapist suggested that through the liberation of her 
oppressed, authentic self, Lindie would be free from worry as she would be able to embrace 
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herself fully without worrying about the judgements of others. In this way then, Lindie could 
start to trust in Megan and count on her to have her back when faced with the challenges of the 
world. They no longer had to be split in their ranks by personal judgements that stemmed from 
the judgements of others. 
 
6.2.3     Enjoying the Fruits of Liberty 
 
In her third follow-up session, Lindie reported that her anxiety had almost entirely 
subsided. During the past week, she was exposed to pictures of spiders which led her to 
experience some manageable level of anxiety, but was pleased to say that she did not become 
overwhelmed with debilitating fear. From her report of her past week, it also became evident 
that she started experimenting with not being so controlling of Megan.  
When reflecting on the effects of her experiment, Lindie reported that she had not felt 
as defensive in the past week when relating to other people. In fact, she approached her 
colleagues and acquaintances in a more carefree, spontaneous manner and smiled broadly as 
she stated that she started to feel like her old self for a change. It appeared from her behaviour 
and general demeanour as if Lindie felt a sense of relief, and the therapist relayed his subjective 
observation in the space between: “You appear to be relieved today? If this is true, of what 
have you been relieved?” The therapist hypothesised that Lindie’s relief stemmed from the fact 
that she was no longer monitoring her every move, but was learning to embrace and trust in 
her unique, authentic self’s worthiness.  
Lindie, replied to his question by admitting that she had realised with increasing clarity 
that she had built a wall around herself by overthinking her relationships and doubting herself. 
As a result of trying to analyse the right way to behave in relation to others, she had kept people 
at a distance, afraid that they might see and judge the vulnerable, weak self-inside of her. The 
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more Lindie got to know and like this self, the less she had to worry that others would judge 
this self and the more energy she had to be spontaneously herself.  
Another positive development Lindie was pleased to share, was that she was able to let 
go of her preoccupying need to be in a relationship. No longer did she feel the need to have 
someone in her life in order to survive the challenges of the world. When the right man 
eventually crosses her path, she would be ready, but definitely not desperately waiting in 
anticipative anxiety.  
The therapist really enjoyed this third session, as he did not have to do very much 
‘work’. It was apparent to him that their co-constructed new narrative had taken root and 
transformed Lindie’s worldview of the problem. She had a satisfactory explanation of why she 
was anxious and this explanation stimulated her to devise many of her own solutions to her 
problems. The therapist was able to sit back and enjoy Lindie’s delight at exploring her newly 
recovered sense of empowerment and personal agency. He did of course, throw in the odd 
reflexive question and/or statement as a means to support Lindie’s new found agency.  
Statements such as: “What amazes me is how much more in control you seem to be, 
especially since it was a big fear of yours to give up control.” This statement merely encourages 
the client to be reflexive and appreciate the significance of what she had achieved. It often 
occurs that clients tend to underestimate the magnitude of the changes they have made, chiefly 
because these changes occurred in the flow of things and were not consciously reflected on. 
The therapist’s continued use of a reflexive stance also reinforced the value of such a stance, 
not just when things were going badly, but also when things were going well.  
The fourth follow-up session was scheduled with the understanding that it would be 
used to reflect back on the therapeutic process and to tie up any loose ends that may still be 
dangling in the air.  
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6.2.4     Looking to the Future by Looking Back 
 
With the fourth follow-up session, Lindie reported nil debilitating anxiety. During the 
week her cat had walked away, which saddened her immensely. Instead of being afraid of, and 
suppressing these feelings, Lindie said she tried to embrace them and to express her feelings 
of sadness to others. To her amazement, she found people to be generally supportive instead of 
judgmental towards her.  
The session further focussed on reflexively discussing the therapeutic process as a 
factor in her improvement. The idea was to place Lindie’s improvement into context by 
reflecting on what exactly had changed, how it had changed, who had changed it, what 
supported this change, and what prevented this change in the first place. Reflexive questions 
such as: “How would you explain what helped you to make the brave changes you made to 
better your life?”, and “If you were to face a similar challenge in future, what would you take 
from what you achieved here in order to help you then?”.  
These questions, first reinforce the idea that the client was the main agent of change by 
suggesting that all other factors were tools at her disposal, and second they suggest a reframe 
of the idea of relapse, not as something to be feared, but as a challenge that could resurface and 
that could be managed by the client if she adopted a similar reflexive attitude in using the tools 
available to her in order to find a satisfactory solution.  
The therapist and the therapeutic process as factors are of course included in this 
reflection. The value that these factors played in the client’s path to wellbeing should be 
reflected on as well, not so much for the sake of credit, but rather as a means to help the client 
articulate the benefits of the process. This type of reflection helps to demystify the process of 
psychotherapy and by proxy also the nature of psychological problems.  
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For instance, in Lindie’s case, reflecting on the value of psychotherapy helped us to 
define the process as one of critically taking stock of her past experiences and the implications 
they had for her relationship with herself. Defining it in this way then gives the process of 
psychotherapy a clear purpose and served to empower Lindie by suggesting that her problem 
was never some mysterious disorder that should be cured by magical techniques, but rather 
stemmed from her accepting others’ judgments uncritically.  
Therefore, in future, should she experience problems again, they need not be a cause 
for concern, all she will need to do is to take critical stock of her assumptions about her 
relationship with herself and her relationships with others, And if she should need to see a 
therapist to help her to do this, then so be it. The idea is that she walks away with the belief 
that her problems can be managed by maintaining a united and trusting relationship with the 
self-inside of her and that this internal unity gives her the power to manage and solve any 
challenges thrown her way.   
 
6.3      CONCLUSION 
In this chapter an extensive and detailed case formulation used the social constructionist 
model of therapeutic factors. Lindie’s case was used to illustrate how the model serves to guide 
a therapist and client through a meta-reflexive process of the various factors that feed into an 
existing problem narrative. It also illustrated how reflexivity on therapeutic factors can be used 
to co-construct a new problem narrative that includes potential and viable solutions. The next 
chapter concludes with a critical reflection on the model in terms of areas of application as well 
as its contributions and opportunities for refinement through further research.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the foregoing chapters various aspects of the evidence-based approaches to 
psychotherapy, including empirically supported treatments (EST’s) and evidence based 
practice (EBPP), are considered. Of specific interest were the philosophical assumptions of 
these approaches, and although many differences were highlighted between EST’s and EBPP, 
the discussion in Chapter 2 revealed that both approaches are firmly based in a positivist 
epistemology. As a result, a tendency has developed among evidence-based proponents to 
favour the empirical method of scientific enquiry over other scientific methods of enquiry and 
in some extreme cases even singles out empiricism as being the only legitimate method of 
enquiry (see Chapter 2). 
As an antithesis to the evidence-based approaches, the Common Factors model of 
psychotherapy offers convincing arguments, backed by substantial empirical evidence to 
support its opposing view (i.e. that it is not model-specific factors), but common factors that 
best account for the effectiveness of psychotherapy. Despite its contributions, a critical 
discussion of the Common Factors model revealed that it too has serious limitations, the most 
limiting of which relate to its unequivocal adoption of a positivist epistemology and hence 
reliance on empirical evidence above other methods of enquiry.  
The objections to the uncritical acceptance of positivist assumptions by the majority of 
the scientific community are not aimed at discrediting the contributions of empirical enquiry 
in psychotherapy. Rather the aim is to point out and question the tendency to marginalise other 
methods of scientific enquiry through adulating the empirical methods as the current trend 
seems to be. Examples of such dangers include restrictive and exclusionary health funding 
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policies and restrictive practice guidelines that are informed by philosophically biased 
assumptions about the nature of evidence in scientific research.  
Chapter 3 focussed on providing a balanced view of scientific enquiry by elucidating 
an alternative worldview of reality and of scientific enquiry, one which critically accepts 
positivism as one of many possible and equally valid explanations of reality, and hence neither 
champions, nor rejects empirical enquiry. Rather, a social constructionist epistemology 
considers empiricism to be one of many useful approaches to gain scientific insights into the 
question of effectiveness of psychotherapy. Of further importance, are the potential 
contributions of a social constructionist epistemology to the field of therapeutic factors research 
that has not been fully appreciated as of yet.  
An attempt to apply insights gained from an alternative epistemology to therapeutic 
factors research finds expression in the form of a social constructionist model of therapeutic 
factors that are discussed in depth in Chapter 4 and demonstrated practically through case 
studies in Chapter 5 and 6. 
As the proposed social constructionist model of therapeutic factors attempts to address 
the shortcomings of EBPP and common factors models, it should offer something unique and 
useful in the arena of therapeutic outcome research. The rest of Chapter 7 is devoted to a 
discussion of the contributions of the proposed model and also examines opportunities for 
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7.1      CONTRIBUTIONS 
Much of what is proposed in the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors 
reflects what therapists already do in therapy. Therefore the question may arise as to whether 
the model does not simply state the obvious. 
On the surface the model appears to state the obvious in the sense that it endorses what 
many common factors models propose: that is what therapeutic factors are effective. In 
addition, however, models of therapeutic factors, including the model proposed here, also seek 
to explain why therapeutic actions are effective to lend scientific legitimacy to its claims of 
effectiveness. Hence, the proposed model is embedded in deconstructive analyses of specific 
theoretical assumptions that inform therapeutic actions as well as case illustrations to 
demonstrate the implementation of therapeutic actions.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, an assumption of the social constructionist model of 
therapeutic factors is that change occurs chiefly as a result of two people, client and therapist, 
who engage collaboratively to construct a more useful worldview of the problem. In the case 
of Lindie (see Chapter 6), it was illustrated that the therapist, through hypothesising about the 
possible meanings of the therapeutic factors involved in the case of Lindie, tries to 
conceptualise an alternative worldview of her problem in order to give an alternative 
explanatory frame for her problematic experiences.  
The therapist’s worldview of the problem incorporated many of the experiences, 
discourses, narratives and metaphors that Lindie’s account carried. However, the therapist’s 
worldview was also quite different from Lindie’s worldview. It incorporated Lindie’s problem 
narrative, but also added to it by drawing from his training, knowledge of psychological 
theories/models, ability to imagine, describe, empathise by virtue of his personal experiences 
of relationships and disappointments and of being human and vulnerable.  
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The process of therapy (at least within this social constructionist model) relies heavily 
on the differences between clients’ and therapists’ worldviews to the extent that it invokes just 
enough, but not too much, uncertainty to stimulate critical reflection, in the client, of previously 
accepted assumptions about self and problem. The therapist, who uses this model seeks to 
utilise the uncertainty created in the client to co-construct a new and more useful narrative of 
the problem, one that can inspire different behavioural pathways that were not possible in the 
previously accepted narrative. 
The example above illustrates that the proposed model gains scientific legitimacy 
through its theorist’s ability to account for its assumptions and illustrate this practically. The 
legitimacy obtained through this process is no better than the empirical legitimacy obtained by 
EBPP and common factors models. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that all methods 
of legitimacy are themselves based on assumptions of reality and of what constitutes science. 
In contrast to EBPP and common factors approaches, which seek to utilise methods of 
scientific legitimising to prove their universal superiority, the social constructionist model of 
therapeutic factors proposed here does not seek to establish its universal superiority. This is 
because its guiding epistemology rejects the very idea of contextually abstracted and universal 
truths. Given this worldview of multiple truths, it would be a fallacious goal to strive towards 
establishing a universally superior model of therapeutic factors.  
Instead the idea of local truths and local utility are embraced. Hence the proposed model 
is based on the assumption that the usefulness and truthfulness of any therapeutic endeavour 
varies, and this variance is dependent on the relational context in which the therapist and client 
find themselves. Thus, a therapeutic endeavour’s usefulness is determined in an interactive 
process between a specific client and a specific therapist in a specific interactional context. The 
proposed model of therapeutic factors is unique in that it does not view the effectiveness of 
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psychotherapy to reside in any one self-contained technique, model or therapeutic factor, but 
rather in how these models and factors gain their meaning as being useful only in relation to 
other factors and in relation to a specific therapeutic context. This alludes to the concept of 
performativity as described by Barad (2003) in her account of a relational ontology of bodies. 
As a result, the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors rejects the claims, 
and even the pursuit, of universal superiority as espoused in EBPP and common factors models. 
On the other hand, the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors accepts the claims of 
legitimacy by EBPP and common factors models in that any of these approaches are likely to 
be deemed useful and truthful in specific interactional contexts with specific therapists and 
clients so long as these approaches offer some form of alternative worldview of the client’s 
problem that leads to satisfactory paths to solutions.  
As much as the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors draws from well-
known social constructionist and eco-systemic concepts and critiques, it is also an attempt to 
express these concepts and critiques in a model that can be applied in clinical and research 
settings. Thus the model is unique in that it attempts to operationalise valuable eco-systemic 
and social constructionist insights that have so far remained largely on and abstract and critical 
plain.   
As an operationalised model, the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors not 
only highlights the shortcomings of EBPP and common factors conceptualisations of effective 
therapy, but also offers alternative ways of conceptualising effectiveness in psychotherapy. The 
proposed model highlights the interactional and collaborative process in determining the 
usefulness of therapeutic factors, and also appreciates and incorporates important contributions 
made by both EBPP and common factors models.  
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As such, the proposed model draws from a substantial body of empirical information 
that is used to delineate groups of therapeutic factors thought to be common across various 
models of psychotherapy. However, the model also cautions that the usefulness of any of these 
factors cannot be guaranteed on a universal level. Similarly, the proposed model draws from 
the evidence based principle of selecting treatments and techniques that are likely to work in 
specific situations with specific problems. Most importantly, the model emphasises that 
specific techniques or treatments are to be utilised as supporting aids in the more crucial 
therapeutic activity of renegotiating a worldview of the client’s problem that may inspire 
alternative and potentially more useful behavioural paths.  
Therefore, rather than being an opposing view to EBPP and common factors approaches 
to therapeutic outcome research, the social constructionist model of therapeutic factors 
provides a larger framework in which both common factors and specific factors play crucial 
roles in affecting therapeutic outcomes. At the centre of this more encompassing frame of the 
therapeutic process is the notion of therapy as an interaction aimed at disrupting a problem-
saturated narrative, rather than therapy as a unilateral performance of procedures applied by a 
therapist to a client. 
 
7.2       CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
Given that the proposed model is based on contributions from eco-systemic and social 
constructionist theories, and also draws from empirical findings of the common factors and 
evidence based approaches, validating the approach should prove difficult from an 
epistemological standpoint. The principles of contextual sensitivity and/or flexibility, which 
are a central component of eco-systemic and social constructionist theories, make it difficult to 
standardize therapeutic approaches based on these theories. Also, from a social constructionist 
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viewpoint, it is accepted that truths and therapeutic outcomes are constructed locally and thus 
any desire to prove the model’s general usefulness poses a philosophical dilemma.  
Given that the onto-epistemological foundations on which the social constructionist 
model of therapeutic factors are based differs substantially from current positivistic values of 
empirical validation, the model does not lend itself to outcomes studies that seek to determine 
its overall validity and reliability as a method. In fact, the opposing nature of the ontologies of 
realism and relativism, which are at the core of the debate regarding evidence means that 
agreement in this field is improbable, unless a different viewpoint is considered. 
Posthumanist, Karen Barad attributes this stalemate between realists and relativists 
(including social constructionists) to the uncritical acceptance of representationalist 
assumptions (as opposed to performative assumptions). According to Barad (2003):  
 
…[realists and social constructionists] share representationalist assumptions 
that foster such endless debates: both scientific realists and social 
constructivists believe that scientific knowledge…mediates our access to the 
material world (pp. 805-806).  
 
Barad (2003) advocates that a performative understanding is needed to appreciate the 
reality of things, and criticises the tendency in scientific observation to think in terms of 
represented objects and their representations in language. Rather, she and many others, are of 
the opinion that a relational ontology better captures the complexities of reality as it 
acknowledges the material (including practices such as scientific practice) while rejecting 
representationalist notions of self-contained, static beings. Barad and others’ ideas of a 
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relational ontology challenges the concept of scientific evidence, since such an ontology 
suggests that the gap, which occurs between an observed object and its representation, will 
always lead to the problem of having to account for observations. In a relational ontology, 
however, the observer and the observed are said to be simultaneously part of a relational 
performance, thereby being defined in relation to one another. This performative understanding 
then eliminates the gap between an observer and the observed that exist in a representationalist 
account. Barad’s work may thus impact greatly on how evidence is defined in the field of 
therapeutic factors research as well as how we conceptualise our models of therapeutic factors.  
The proposed model of therapeutic factors, for instance, is based on a social 
constructionist epistemology that assumes the existence of a therapist and a client who together 
give rise to a therapeutic relationship. Barad’s (2003) ideas on a relational ontology, however, 
suggest that relationality is not dependent on the existence of independent relata. Taking these 
ideas into account may open up avenues to explore how the relational performance of therapy 
may give rise to, and define, what we currently observe as self-contained human entities (i.e. 
client and therapist). Future development of the model proposed may also gain valuable 
insights from the works of Butler (1993), Haraway (1992), Rouse (2002) and Slife (2004) 
among others. 
 
7.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFINEMENT AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Notwithstanding the critiques of the uncritical acceptance of empiricism, it is 
acknowledged throughout this thesis that there are important benefits of empirical research 
findings. Although efforts have been made to promote flexibility in clinical practice and 
decision-making, the proposed model is likely to benefit from refinement in this area. For 
instance, it would be interesting to research how the proposed model may be applied 
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appropriately in different professional settings, including research-, organisational-, clinical-, 
counselling- and assessment settings.  
Given that varied professional settings set diverse demands on professionals, the model 
may be utilised differently in different contexts. In an organisational context, a professional 
may need to adjust the model when working with more than one individual at a time; or in 
counselling or clinic settings family and/or group therapy may be more warranted. This may 
require refinement in how group processes may be utilised as a factor in shaping multiple 
and/or shared problem definitions.  
Alternatively, in hospital settings where assessment procedures may form a larger part 
of a professional’s clinical work, it may be necessary to explore the way in which the model 
may be useful in guiding assessment practices. Since assessment procedures and feedback of 
assessment results are deemed to be factors that have the power to shape a client’s problem 
definition, in a positive or negative way, it follows that the model may be a useful tool in 
managing the assessment process in an empowering way.     
Furthermore, different methods of enquiry may also yield more in-depth knowledge 
about the utility and relevance of the model to different clinicians. Specifically, one may 
enquire as to the degree of utility and relevance the model holds for practitioners subscribing 
to different schools of psychotherapy, and also whether the model is as useful to therapists 
working with different client populations, cultural groups, minorities, etcetera. Since the utility 
of the model is more dependent on the clinician’s understanding of, ability and willingness to 
embrace, its philosophical tenets it is predicted that clinicians who are more accepting of the 
model would show higher levels of utility and relevance than other clinicians.  
A final area related to a professional context that needs further consideration, in terms 
of the proposed model, is that of training. Given that training in social constructionism and 
 164 
© University of South Africa 2015 
 
other post-modern approaches to psychotherapy has traditionally been fairly abstract and of a 
critical nature, it poses a dilemma for training students according to the proposed model. 
Certainly, one of the strengths of post-modern approaches is its focus on critique of the status 
quo as is also evident in the proposed model. Yet, on the other hand, the model represents an 
understanding of different models of psychotherapy as explanatory systems of language, 
images and metaphors that offer new ways of accounting for clients’ problems.  
Thus, the model embraces the viewpoint that all models of psychotherapy are equally 
valid, but that their validity is determined locally in an interactive context with a specific client 
and therapist. Training in the use of this model would thus require a balancing act between 
fostering a generally critical attitude towards scientific givens, yet providing enough training 
and exposure to models that are based in different epistemological foundations in order to 
enrich their therapeutic repertoires.  
 
7.4 A FINAL REFLECTION: THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTHS 
Much has been said, throughout this thesis, about the dangers of absolute and universal 
truths and also of how subtle and insidious these may creep up on a person. In fact, the 
proposition of a social constructionist model of therapeutic factors, as an alternative to EBPP 
and other common factors models, rests on the researcher’s assumptions that psychotherapy 
models based on universal truths are less desirable than a model that allows for locally 
constructed truths. The researcher’s desire to propose a model that rejects universal truths, 
however, poses a paradox in that it contains an unavoidable appeal to the reader to buy into his 
truth: that is that locally constructed truths are universally superior to universal truths. Having 
stated this paradox, the researcher acknowledges that in his critiques about truth, he cannot 
avoid promoting his truth about truths. The reader is, therefore, invited to engage in their own 
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deconstructive analysis of the proposed model and in so doing define their locally constructed 
truth about truths.   
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